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On February 24, 1982, President Reagan announced an new program to assist 
approximately two dozen small, developing countries in the Caribbean, Central 
America, and northern South America. The original Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI) proposed free trade arrangements, tax incentives for investments, and 
foreign aid to improve economic conditions which threaten political and social 
stability in the region. 
During the 97th Congress, the foreign aid portion of the CBI was passed as 
part of the 1982 General Supplemental Appropriations bill, which became law 
(P.L. 97-257) on September 10, 1983. The trade and tax provisions of the CBI 
were not enacted. 
On August 5, 1983, President Reagan signed Public Law 98-67, which 
provides duty-free entry into the United States for certain Caribbean exports 
and allows U.S. business people to take tax deductions for the expense of 
attending conventions in the Caribbean region. 
This Info Pack includes information on the broad outline of the 
initiative; the reactions of the congressional,business, and international 
communities; legislative action during the 97th and 98th Congress; and 
information on the Caribbean Basin Business Information Center, which was 
created by the Department of Commerce to assist the business community in 
identifying trade and investment opportunities. 
Members of Congress desiring additional information on this topic can 
contact CRS at 287-5700. 
We hope that this information is helpful. 
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I welcome this opportunity to continue 
our dialogue on the Caribbean region 
and specifically the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act. The legislation 
we have proposed is a far-sighted 
response to a deepening economic and 
social crisis troubling some of our closest 
neighbors. It deserves to become law 
this year-the sooner this year, the 
better. 
Our Vital Interests 
Let me begin by reviewing our own vital 
interests in the Caribbean Basin. The 
Caribbean is an unfenced neighborhood 
that we share with 27 island and coastal 
nations. Their security and economic 
well-being have a direct impact on our 
own strategic and economic interests. 
We do not have to go to Miami to 
come in daily contact with people born 
in the Caribbean region or to appreciate 
the rapid impact of turmoil there on our 
own society. In fact, our country has 
become a safehaven for thousands upon 
thousands of Caribbean citizens who pin 
their h o p s  for a better life on a 
dange~ous, uncertain, and clandestine 
migration to this country. As a result, 
the basin area is now the second largest 
source of illegal immigration to the 
United States. This situation will not im- 
prove until the nations of the Caribbean 
Bzsin are better able to offer their peo- 
ple opportunities to build secure, produc- 
tive lives a t  home. 
Economically, the Caribbean Basin 
region is a vital strategic and commer- 
cial artery for the United States. Nearly )/ 
half our trade, three-quarters of our im- 
ported oil, and over half our imported 
strategic minerals pass through the 
Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico. If 
this regio~l should become prey to social 
and economic upheaval, and dominated 
by regimes hostile to us, the conse- 
quences for our security would be im- 
mediate and far reaching. 
The health of the Caribbean econo- 
mies also affects o w  economy. The area 
is now a $7 billion market for US .  ex- 
ports. Thousands of American jobs were 
lost when our exports to the region fell 
$150 million last year as income in the 
region declined. A large portion of the 
debt of Caribbean countries is owed to 
banks in this country. At the end of 
1981, U.S. direct investment in the 
region was approximately $8 billion. 
The Caribbean Basin Economic Re- 
covery Act is the cornerstone of our ef- 
fort to come to grips with these issues. 
This legislation recognizes the critical 
relationship between economic develop- 
ment and political stability. It is de- 
signed to promote self-sustaining 
economic growth; to enable countries in 
the region to strengthen democratic in- 
stitutions; and to implement political, 
social, and economic reforms. Ultimate- 
ly, its purpose is to help restore the 
faith of people of the region in their 
countries' ability to offer them hope for 
a better future. 
Economic Problems increasingly burdensome levels. The 
The societies of the Caribbean Basin 
republics are undergoing inevitable 
change that puts them under con- 
siderable stress. Declining employment 
in agriculture, high b i i  rates, and slow 
creation of urban jobs have diminished 
hopes for combating poverty and caused 
appalling rates of unemployment, 
especially among the young. Youth 
unemployment in Jamaica, for example, 
is estimated to be 50%. Without 
dramatic increases in investment to im- 
prove living standards and to create 
jobs, rising crime and urban instability 
withering of government revenues has 
stopped or delayed development proj- 
ects. Real per capita incomes have 
declined throughout most of the basin 
region. 
All this adds up to a massive prob- 
lem: the governments of the Caribbean 
republics must find ways to assure 
sociopolitical stability and revive 
economic growth while also accommo- 
dating rapid internal change. Their suc- 
cess or failure in meeting this challenge 
will greatly affect the environment in 
which we live. 
will create a downward spiral of social 
disintegration. And because the Carib The ChallengeIThe Alternatives 
bean economies are so small, new in- 
vestment-domestic as well as 
foreign-will not take place without 
assured access to outside markets. 
The diminutive sue of individual 
Caribbean markets-averaging just 1.5 
million people, with 16 countries under 
0.5 million-makes them uniquely d e  
pendent on the outside world in ways we 
can only dimly imagine. The national in- 
comes of most Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries are less than that of a U.S. metro- 
politan area of 300,000 people, such as 
Omaha, Nebraska, or Charlotte, North 
Carolina. Dominica, for example, with a 
population of only 80,000, is the least 
developed country in the eastern Carib 
bean. I t  is also one of the most 
democratic and pro-Western. If small, 
vulnerable economies like Dominica are 
to be a t  all viable, they mugt have access 
to bigger markets. In Central America 
where the economies tend to be a bit 
larger, the disruptions in recent years of 
the Central American Common Market 
have made economies such as Costa Rica 
much more dependent on markets out- 
side its region. As long as they are 
limited to production for their small and 
poor domestic markets, the small econo- 
mies of the Caribbean Basin cannot 
d iverse  their economies. Nor can they 
develop the expertise and efficiency 
needed to become prosperous interna- 
tional traders. 
We recognize that the Caribbean 
Basin economies will always be depend- 
ent to some degree on markets outside 
the region. But developments of the past 
few years have had a devastating im- 
pact. Prices of the non-oil commodities 
the Caribbean republics export-sugar, 
coffee, bananas, bauxite-have fallen 
drastically. And this is a t  a time when 
they are still strugglmg to cope with the 
massive increases of *e 1970s in the 
price of their most basic import: oil. 
Recession in the United States has 
caused a steep drop in revenue from 
tourism. Foreign debt has mounted to 
The United States thus has a vital stake 
in helping its Caribbean neighbors pur- 
sue their goals of open societies and 
growing economies through productive 
exchange with us and the rest of the 
world. The Administration has ap- 
proached this task with full recognition 
that we have great assets and advan- 
tages when it comes to supporting 
democratic development. 
This becomes most clear when we 
look a t  the alternatives. One alternative 
is the closed solution: the society which, 
while not a viable economy, turns in on 
itself and enforces by fiat the distribu- 
tion of the limited economic benefits a 
small economy can generate itself or 
receive in aid. This is a recipe for 
totalitarian force-because people will 
not take it willingly-and economic 
stagnation. I t  is the Cuban solution. It 
poses continuing threats to our interests 
in this hemisphere which we have had to 
counter for the last 20 years. 
A second alternative is decline of the 
population to the level which a small 
economy can support on its own. With 
the young populations and high birth- 
rates of these countries, this alternative 
entails massive emigration from the 
Caribbean Basin region. Our country is 
inevitably the preferred destination. As 
much as we welcome the rich contribu- 
tion of the region's immigrants to our 
own life, massive immigration is not 
what we want. Nor is it what the coun- 
tries of the region want. That is not a t  
issue. Nor is it the only reason we care. 
The President's proposed legislation 
supports a third alternative-democratic 
development. This is the only alternative 
that meets our vital self-interests and 
our nation's long tradition as a source of 
progress and hope in the world. Politi- 
cally, the people of these societies have 
shown they want a voice in their own 
fate and that they reject totalitarian for- 
mulas. Two-thirds of the governments of 
the region have democratically elected 
governments. Significant progress 
toward democracy is occurring in others 
as well, despite the obstacles. Democ- 
racy represents a set of values that vir- 
tually all the peoples of the region see as 
sympathetic to their own aspirations. 
The Cuban and now Nicaraguan models 
stand as clear demonstrations of both 
political repression and economic failure. 
Economically we have the assets 
that can be ultimately decisive in the 
orientation of Caribbean development. 
We represent a market economy that 
works, a natural market for Caribbean 
exports, the major source of private in- 
vestment in the region, and the manage- 
ment and technology that come with it. 
The Caribbean initiative of the Ad- 
ministration is an imaginative and com- 
prehensive approach to bringing these 
assets to bear on the problems of our 
Caribbean neighbors. It is a forward- 
looking effort to boost both development 
and stability. Because it builds on 
private resources and enterprise, it has 
the potential to deal with their deep 
economic plight in a fundamental way. 
Because it can help to ease delicate 
social and political transitions before 
they create security problems of an in- 
ternational dimension, it is a program to 
get ahead of history, instead of just 
countering its unwelcome effects. 
Caribbean Basin Program 
Our program is part of a major multilat- 
eral effort. Other higher income coun- 
tries of the region are also increasing 
their efforts significantly. Canada has 
embarked on a 5-year program for the 
area providing over $500 million. 
Canada currently provides duty-free 
treatment or preferential access for 98% 
of its imports from the Caribbean Basin. 
Mexico and Venezuela, despite their own 
financial difficulties, are continuing con- 
cessional credits to the region through 
their oil facility. Venezuelan financial 
support has been over $2.5 billion in the 
last 5 years. Colombia is initiating 
technical assistance of up to $50 million, 
new credit lines of $10 million per coun- 
try, and additional balance-of-payments 
financing and a trust fund for less 
developed countries of the eastern 
Caribbean. The collective efforts of 
these democracies are a strong en- 
couragement to open societies and 
democratic development in the region. 
But success would be imperiled without 
us. Our full participation is vitally 
needed. 
The U.S. contribution integrates 
three types of mutually reinforcing 
economic measures-trade opportunities, 
tax incentives, and aid. The program has 
been developed in continuing consulta- 
tion with the governments and the 
private sectors of the regions. It reflects 
their own priorities and assessment of 
their needs. 
As you know, we were able to make 
a start on our Caribbean economic ini- 
tiatives last summer, when the Congress 
approved an emergency supplemental 
aid package of $350 million-a key ele- 
ment in the President's original Carib- 
bean Basin program. Our aid requests 
for both FY 1983 and FY 1984 reflect 
the new higher priority we have given to 
the Caribbean Basin area in the alloca- 
tion of our scarce economic assistance 
resources. As a percentage of our 
overall economic assistance budget, as- 
sistance to the Caribbean region will 
double in FY 1983 and 1984, over FY 
1980, from 6.6% authorized in 1980 to 
13.6% proposed in FY 1984. 
Most of the $350 million appro- 
priated last year has been obligated for 
use by the private sector in those coun- 
tries with the most serious financial 
problems. This assistance has helped 
many established, productive private 
firms continue to obtain needed raw 
materials and equipment from the 
United States. In addition, it has pro- 
vided critical support for balance-of- 
payments problems and infrastructure 
projects in the small, least developed 
countries. 
We have also been able to use a por- 
tion of these funds to support training 
and scholarship opportunities for in- 
dividuals from the Caribbean region 
with leadership potential. These oppor- 
tunities support our goal of transferring 
knowledge and skills, enhancing eco- 
nomic cooperation among nations of the 
region and strengthening political ties 
between recipient countries and the 
United States. We are currently offering 
1,300 scholarships each year. As new 
money is available, the number of 
scholarship recipients will continue to in- 
crease. These programs have high devel- 
opment, economic, and political impact 
and are a key element in our assistance 
to the Caribbean Basin region. 
But as the President said when he 
requested that emergency CBI [Carib- 
bean Basin Initiative] appropriation, 
financial assistance is only a short-term 
remedy. Indeed, financial assistance and 
development projects will be wasted if 
the development process is not a broad- 
based and integrated process. We 
believe that such development can only 
be achieved through a strategy which 
encourages private initiative and invest- 
ment. 
The U.S. Market 
The key to new production and employ- 
ment in the Caribbean is assured access 
to its natural market in this country. 
Suppliers in the Caribbean need help to 
get started in the competition with 
larger, more experienced, and estab- 
lished producers elsewhere. That sug- 
gests a bold solution that reinforces the 
natural pole of attraction of the U.S. 
market. 
The President's proposal to grant 
duty-free entry to Caribbean Basin prod- 
ucts for a 12-year period is the center- 
piece of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. 
I t  can provide a decisive boost to Carib- 
bean development. The proposal is 
dramatic and simple. It offers long-term 
economic benefits of free trade and the 
immediate impact of a major political 
commitment to the region. By assuring 
duty-free access to the vast US .  
market, this measure will provide strong 
and continuing incentives for invest- 
ment, innovation, and risk taking in 
Caribbean countries. 
As I have pointed out, the domestic 
economies of most Caribbean Basin na- 
tions are simply too small to permit the 
diversification essential for noninfla- 
tionary growth. An opening of the U.S. 
market to the nontraditional products of 
these countries will provide important 
opportunities to develop new production 
and an incentive to produce more effi- 
ciently. Increased and diversified pro- 
duction will mean higher wages, a 
strengthened middle class, more 
resources available for education and 
health-and more demand for raw 
materials, equipment, and finished goods 
from the United States. 
I recognize that these are difficult 
economic times in our own country. 
Understandably, there is concern over 
the imljact this legislation will have on 
workers in the United States. I am con- 
vinced that the impact on our economy 
will be positive. Because the Caribbean 
countries are so closely linked to our 
economy, our sales to them will grow 
apace with their economies. Excluding 
petroleum trade, we have a $2 billion 
trade surplus with the Caribbean Basin 
and are already the major trade partner 
of most countries there. A stronger 
Caribbean Basin will be an even better 
and more reliable customer for U.S. 
products. As countries in the region pro- 
duce more, they will import more. 
American workers will share in the 
fruits of that growth. 
The Caribbean Basin economies are 
equal to only 2% of our GNP, and our 
imports from the region are less than 
4% of our total imports. Imports not 
already entering duty-free are an even 
smaller percentage. Therefore, even a 
significant increase in Caribbean Basin 
production and exports will not have a 
significant negative impact on our 
economy. And if American industries 
are injured by Caribbean imports, they 
have the remedy of seeking relief under 
the safeguard provisions of the 1974 
Trade Act. 
The United States is the world's 
most open major market. A large share 
of the Caribbean Basin's exports to the 
United States already enter duty free. 
Petroleum accounts for almost 60% of 
our imports from the region. In 1982, 
70% of our nonpetroleum imports from 
the Caribbean Basin entered duty free. 
Sixteen percent of these nonpetroleurn 
imports entered under GSP [generalized 
system of preferences]. But GSP is due 
to expire next year. While the Ad- 
ministration strongly supports the ex- 
tension of GSP, it contains competitive 
need restrictions and product exclusions 
which limit its usefulness as a stimulus 
to broad-based recovery by the small 
Caribbean Basin countries. The products 
that would be extended duty-free entry 
as a result of the proposed CBI legisla- 
tion comprised only one-quarter of 1% of 
U.S. imports in 1982. Yet these products 
represent an important area of potential 
new production for the Caribbean Basin 
countries. 
I would like to mention briefly a see 
tion of this bill that was not included 
when I addressed this committee last 
August on this legislation. I refer to the 
convention tax deduction. This provision 
recognizes the vital importance of 
tourism and travel to the economies of 
many Caribbean nations. I should em- 
phasize that this provision wodd simply 
grant Caribbean Basin conventions tax 
status equal to that presently enjoyed by 
Mexico, Canada, and Jamaica. In our 
consultations with Caribbean Basin 
business and government leaders, they 
have frequently cited the disadvan- 
tageous present tax treatment of Carib 
bean conventions as being an obstacle to 
the recovery of their travel industries. 
We should also keep in mind that many 
American travel dollars spent in the 
Caribbean come back via U.S.-owned 
airlines, hotels, and recreation facilities. 
Let me reiterate the important role 
that Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands have in the Caribbean Basin Ini- 
tiative. Since the earliest days of this 
Administration, we have consulted close- 
ly with the governments of Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands to fashion 
the initiative in a way that would foster 
the development of the U.S. Caribbean. 
The legislation reflects that in several 
ways. I t  liberalizes duty-free imports 
into the United States from insular 
possessions. I t  explicitly permits in- 
dustries in Puerto Rico and U S .  ter- 
ritories to petition for relief under the 
safeguard provisions of U.S. trade law. 
I t  also modifies environmental restric- 
tions on the U.S. Virgin Islands rum in- 
dustry and constructs the rules-of-origin 
requirements to encourage the use of 
products of Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. An important provision 
would transfer excise taxes on all im- 
ported rum to the treasuries of Puerto 
Rico and the U S .  Virgin Islands. In 
sum, the facilities, skills, and people of 
Puerto Rico and the U S .  Virgin Islands 
are  a major component of our develop- 
ment cooperation efforts elsewhere in 
the Caribbean. 
The Political Dimen~ion 
The political dimension of Caribbean 
progress is of g r a t  and ultimate impor- 
tance to  us. We do not seek clients. Our 
goal is a region of independent countries 
in which people can choose their leaders 
and their own path to economic and 
social progress. We are confident that 
will produce societies and regimes which 
are not hostile to us. That same belief 
underlies the strong commitment of the 
other democracies in the region to the 
Caribbean initiative. Together with Mex- 
ico, Venezuela, Colombia, and the 
region's other democratic governments, 
we seek to encourage economic and 
social reforms which address the real 
grievances of various sectors of the 
population of Central America and 
Caribbean countries. 
Stability in societies based on free 
association rather than coercion must 
depend on addressing people's right to 
own their own land. They must be able 
to organize in cooperatives and unions to 
promote their economic interests. And 
they must be able to exercise their 
political rights, free of intimidation. 
That is the course we encourage through 
our support in the Caribbean Basin 
region. That is also the course which the 
peoples of the region seek-as they have 
shown repeatedly in their own political 
life. 
Conclusion 
The Caribbean Basin Initiative is solidly 
grounded in the tradition and values of 
both this country and the Caribbean 
region. I t  is a strong and multilateral ef- 
fort in which the U.S. Government has 
cooperated and consulted with the 
Governments of Canada, Venezuela, 
Mexico, and Colombia; with other donor 
countries; and with the international 
financial institutions. The proposals 
before this committee are the result of 
extensive discussions with business and 
government leaders in the Caribbean 
Basin region about the obstacles to their 
economic revival. The focus of our ef- 
forts is on the private sector, which 
must be the engine of a lasting economic 
growth. 
The nations of the Caribbean Basin 
are  counting on us. I t  is now over a year 
since President Reagan outlined his 
Caribbean Basin Initiative proposals 
before the Organization of American 
States. Those proposals were warmly, 
even enthusiastically, received by most 
government, labor, and private sector 
leaders in the region. For  those in the 
Caribbean Basin countries who believe 
in cooperation with the United States, in 
pluralistic democracy and private enter- 
prise, the announcement of the initiative 
demonstrated that the United States 
realizes the importance of urgent and 
far-reaching action to promote the 
region's prosperity. They were bitterly 
disappointed that this legislation did not 
reach the Senate floor during the last 
Congress. If we fail to act now, our in- 
action will be interpreted as lack of in- 
terest and a broken promise. I t  would 
undercut moderate leaders in the region 
who have geared their policies to 
cooperation with the United States and 
to serious efforts for economic develop- 
ment and democracy. I t  would ex- 
tinguish the hopes that have been raised 
in the region that the United States is 
willing to give significant help to foster 
economic and social progress in the 
Caribbean Basin. 
I am confident that after careful ex- 
amination, this committee and the 
Senate will recognize that this legisla- 
tion is important to the interests of the 
United States and the Caribbean Basin 
countries. I strongly urge favorable ac- 
tion. W 
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By Mr. DOLE (by request): - 
S. 544. A bill to promote economic 
revitalization and facilitate the expan- 
sion of economic opportunities in the 
Caribbean Basin region; to the Com- 
mittee on Mnance. 
CARIBBEAR BASIR ECOlOBfIC RECOVERY ACT 
0 Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am 
pleased today to introduce President 
Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative. 
This legislation reflects the extensive 
work of the House of Representatives 
and the Finance Committee on the 
President's original proposal in the 
97th Congress. Senators BAKER, PERCY, 
DANFORTH, EINZ. SWMS, and WALLOP 
Join me in presenting to this Congress 
an important program designed to 
assist our southern neighbors to devel- 
op economically and to join in a new, 
mutually beneficial relationship with 
the United States. 
The bill contains two titles. The first 
would extend for 12 years duty-free 
status to articles from eligible benefi- 
ciary countries. There are several ex- 
ceptions for imporbsensitive products, 
and imports will be subject to safe- 
guards to protect domestic industries 
against injurious import surges. The 
exceptions are those voted by the 
House and Ffnance Committee last 
year, and include textiles and apparel 
articles subject to textile agreements; 
footweat, handbags, luggage, flat 
goods, work gloves, and leather wear- 
ing apparel not currently eligible for 
GSP; tuna; and petrole,um and petro- 
luem products. Title I also contains 
the eligibility requirements for the 
beneficiary countries; generally, the 
countries must be engage in construc- 
tive self-help rne-es that will 
enable them to benefit fully from the 
program. 
Title I1 offers a tax incentive to 
boost development in the tourist and 
service industries af the beneficiary 
nations. Instead of the investment tax 
credit proposed last year, the bih in- 
cludes the convention business-ex- - 
pense deduction passed by the House 
of Representatives. This would allow 
U.S. taxpayers to deduct necefsary 
and proper business expenses associat- 
ed with attending conventions in the 
beneficiary countries, an allowawe al- 
ready made for attending conventions 
in Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica. In 
order for the deduction to be availrr- 
ble, however, a benefickry nstiam 
must agree to exchange data with U.S. 
officials as necessary and appropriate 
for the enforcement of tax laws, and 
the beneficiary nation's tax laws must 
not d i s c m a t e  against conventions 
held in the United Sta+&s. The revenue 
loss from this provision is expected to 
be neglipible. 
Finally, the bill includes some of the 
measures the President intends to im- 
plement to promote the growth of 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, 
and to protect them from significant 
competitive harm arising from the 
duty-free trade arrangement. Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands long have 
enjoyed preferential market access to 
the United States that has enabled 
them to develop economically much 
faster than their similarly situated Ca- 
ribbean neighbors. The one-way duty- 
free trade area may dimMsh this corn- 
Petitive advantage. The President 
therefore will undertake a number of 
compensating and protective meas- 
ures, not all of which will require legis- 
lative action. Included in this bill, 
however, is authority to remove duty- 
free treatment of nun from the bene- 
ficiary countries when it threatens the 
revenues Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands now derive from rebates of 
Federal excise taxes on rum to them. 
The bill further provides that excise 
taxes on rum from other nations will 
be rebated to Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands. In addition, the Presi- 
dent proposes to increase the maxi- 
mum foreign content permissible for 
duty-free entry of products from the 
insular POSSefEdOnS; to treat producers 
cor 
there as domestic Industry for pur- 
poses of import relief; and to exempt 
effluent discharges associated with the 
manufacture of Virgin Islands rum 
from provisions of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act. 
TEE PRomm U.S. mTmnsrs m 'I'm 
CARIBBEAN 
Mr. President, this should be the 
year we demonstrate to our Caribbean 
friends the leadership that will show 
them the way out of their economic 
malaise and strengthen their demo- 
cratic institutions. The beneficiary na- 
tions of the CBI are widely divergent 
in cultures, histories, languages, 
economies, and governments. But they 
share some common characteristics: 
Most are suffering severe economic 
hardships: they are increasingly ori- 
ented economically, politically, and so- 
cially to the United States-and to- 
gether they form our southern border. 
Too long has this country failed ade- 
quately to comprehend our national 
interests in this integrated region, and 
to take full advantage of the mutual 
opportunities greater cooperation 
offers. These interests are profoundly 
important. 
In a region suffering a history of 
conflict, the 15 recently emergent na- 
tions of the Caribbem Basin offer in 
their nascent states a tempting target 
for Soviet troublemaking. The an- 
nouncement last year of a Soviet aid 
package to Granada, and recent re- 
ports of Cuban interference in Suri- 
nam, provide timely examples of real 
concerns for our borders, our sea 
lanes, and the Panama Canal. 
The United States has great econom- 
ic ties to the region. Despite their colo- 
nial past. the CBI countries import 
more from the United States than any 
other country. Last year thii amount- 
ed to about $6.3 billion-nearly double 
what we imported from them, exclud- 
ing petroleum. US. direct investment 
reached nearly $10 billion in 1981. We 
import over 90 percent of our industri- 
al requirements of bauxite and alumi- 
na from the Caribbean countries, and 
rely on them to a slgnlficant degree 
for nickel. It seems clear that the 
region offers a vast new market for 
American products, l f  only greater eco- 
nomic and political stability can be 
brought about there. 
Besides the economic and security 
interests, the United States is bound 
by an increasing web of social ties with 
the Caribbean Basin countries. Some 
estimate that. excluding Mexicans, 
over 250.000 illegal immigrants now 
enter the United States yearly from 
the countries of the Caribbean Sea 
and Central America. Their desperate 
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Florida have spent over twice that on 
Cuban and Haitian refugees since the 
Mariel Boatlift. 
The ability of the United States to 
exploit these increasingly strong ties 
to the Caribbean Basin countries rests 
on their own stability. As the nations 
of Central America struggle to end 
armed conflict among themselves and 
with Communist guerrillas, as the Ca- 
ribbean nations attempt to restructure 
their economies away from centuries 
of dependency on transfers from their 
former colonial sovereigns, an historic 
opportunity presents itself to the 
United States to aid in placing them 
on a firm, permanent path to growth 
and stability. The President's Caribbe- 
an Basin Initiative embodies a sound 
plan to that end. 
TW CBI: AX OPPORlWNITY ?OR BOLD 
LEADERSHIP 
In a Washington Post column last 
year, international economist, Gustav 
Ramis of Yale University stated well 
the need for a "credible, nonpaterna- 
listic framework" for facilitating eco- 
nomic reform and development in de- 
veloping countries. He said in part: 
Receipt of an annual aid allocation is 
clearly not a country's birthright to be ex- 
tended automatically, just because it is poor 
and we are rich; at times the effective use of 
aid. in fact, means the c o m e  to be passive 
and bankerlike vis-a-vis some developing 
countries for some years on end But it also 
means that we must be able to respond 
when and If such countries do wme forward 
with a package of polky changes that make 
sense and ask our h e l ~  in cushionlnn the in- 
evitable pain of gettkg from here to there. 
By offering market incentives in the 
form of trade, tax, and other meas- 
ures, and by esxtending aid to ease the 
transition to stable, competitive econo- 
mies, the C8I demonstrates that this 
country is able to respond positively to 
vital needs-and opportunities. 
Twenty of the CBI countries could 
fit wlthin the boundaries of the King 
Ranch in Texa8; the CBI, even if suc- 
cessful beyond all expectations, cannot 
begin to engender ecunomic growth 
that will seriously threaten any of our 
domestic interests, and for those few 
industries that feel threatened, the 
legislation provides ample safeguards 
against infury. But by adopting appro- 
priate free-market programs, and with 
the CBI's incentives, these small bene- 
ficiary nations are capable of signifi- 
cant self-improvement. None of the 
beneficiaries claim the benefits of the 
CBI as a matter of right; the success 
'ATE 
of the program is of great mutual in- 
terest. 
This legislation is being introduced 
in both Houses with broad support. I 
intend to seek an early opportunity 
as44 
Be it enacted bp, the Senate and Houae of 
Representative, of the United Stater of 
Amerlca in Conmess 
S m O N  1. SHORT TITLE 
Thls Act may be cited as the "Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act". 
TITLE I-DUTY-FREE TREATMENT 
SECTlON 101. AUTHORITY TO GRANT DUTY-FREE 
TRRATMEPFT. 
The President may pmlalm duty-free 
treatment for all eligible articles from any 
beneficiary country in accordance with the 
provisions of this title. 
SECTION 102 BENEFICIARY COUhl'RY. 
(8x1) For purposes of this title-- 
(A) The term "beneficiary country" meana 
any country listed in subsection (b) with re- 
spect to which there is in effect a pmlarna- 
tion by the President designating such coun- 
try as a beneficiary country for purposes of 
this title. Before the President designates 
any country as a beneficiary country for 
purposes of this title, he shall notify the 
House of Representatives and the Senate of 
his intention to make such destgnation, to- 
gether with the considerations entering into 
such decision. 
(B) The term "entered" means entered, or 
withdrawn from -house for consum* 
tion. in the customs territory of the U n i k  
States. 
(C)  The term "TSUB" means Tsrtff 
Schedules of the United States (.I9 U.S.C. 
1202). 
(2) If the President has designated any 
country as a beneficiary country for pur- 
poses of this title, he shall not termlnate 
such designation (either by issuing a procla- 
mation for that purpose or by issuing a 
proclamation whlch has the effect of termi- 
nating such designation) unless, at least 
sixty days before such termination. he has 
notified the House of Representatives and 
the Senate and has notified such country of 
his intentlon to terminate such designation, 
together with the considerations entering 
into such decision. 
(b) In designating countries 8s "benefici- 
ary countries" under this title, the Presi- 
dent shall consider only the following wun- 
tries and territories or successor political en- 
tities: 
Angullla Nicaragua 
Antigua and Barbuda Panama 
Bahamas, The Saint Lucia 
Barbados Saint Vincent and 
Belize the Grenadines 
Costa Rica Surfnam 
Cuba Trinidad and Tobago 
Dominica Cayman Islands 
Dominican Republic Montserrat 
El Salvador Netherlands Antilles 
Orenada Saint Christopher- 
Guatemala Nevis 
Guyana Turb and Caicos 
Hai ti Islands 
Hondurao virgin Islands. 
Jamaica British 
In addition, the President shall not desig- 
nate any country a beneficiary country 
under this title-- 
(1) if such country is a Communist coun- 
try: 
desire to seek political or economic for Finance Committee action, and I (2) if such country- 
emanicipation in this country is per- hope the members will join me in (A) has nationalized. expropriated, or oth- 
haps matched only in magnftude by bringing the program to successful erwise seized ~wnership or control of prop- 
the strain on the services Of our na- fruition this year. erty owned by a United States cittzen or by 
tional and State governments provide Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- " partnership. Or 
them once they are here. I note that sent that the bffl be printed in the :$$, ~ ~ ~ ~ & ~ ~ " ,  xizg 
the entire region in fiscal year 1982 RECORD. (B) has taken steps to repudiate or nullify 
the United States targeted about $475 There being no objection, the bill an existing wntrsct or agreement with a 
million In developmental aid; the Fed- was ordered to be printed in the united states citizen or a coporation. part- 
e d  Government and the State of F&CORD. as follows: nership. or association whlch Ls 60 per 
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centum or more beneficially owned by (4) the degree to which such country fol- but not limited to, regulations providing 
United States citizens, the effect of which is lows the accepted mles of international that, in order to be eligible for duty-free 
to nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise trade provided for under the General Agree- treatment under this title, an article must 
seize ownership or control of property so ment on Tariffs and Trade, as well as appli- be wholly the groarth, product, or manufac- 
owned, or cable trade agreements approved under sec- ture of a beneficiary country, or must be a 
(C) has imposed or enforced taxes or tion 2(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of new or different article of commerce which 
other exactionS, restrictive maintenance or 1979: has been grown, produced, or manufactured 
operational conditions, or other measures (5) the degree to which such country uses in the beneficiary country; but no article or 
with respect to property so owned, the export subsidies or imposes export perform- material of a beneficiary country shall be 
effect of which is to nationalize, expropri- ante requirements or local content require- eligible for such treatment by virtue of 
Hte, or otherwise seize ownership or control ments which distort international trade; having merely undergone- 
of such property, unless the President de- (6) the degree to which the trade policies (A) simple combining or packaging oper- 
tennines that- of such country as they relate to other ben- ations, or 
(1) prompt, adequate, and effective com- eficiary countries are contributing to the re- (B) mere dilution with water or mere dilu- 
pensation has been or is being made to such vitctlization of the region; tion with another substance that does not 
citizen, corporation, partnerhsip, or associ- (7) the degree to which such Country is materially alter the characterlstla of the 
ation. undertaking self-help measures to promote article. 
(ii) good-faith negotiations to provide its own economic development; (3) As used in this subsection. the phrase 
prompt, sdepuate, and effective COmPensa- (8) the degree to whlch workers in such "direct costs of processing operations" in- tion under the applicable provfsions of in- country are afforded reasonable workplace cludes, but k not m i t e d  to- 
ternation law are in progress, or such coun- conditions and enjoy the right to organize (A) all actual labor mb involved in the try is otherwise taking steps to &charge i b  and bargain collectively; growth production, manufacture or assem- obligations under international law with re- (9) the extent to which such country pro- bly of lthe specific merchandise' including 
SPect to such citizen, corporation, Partner- hibits its nationals from engaging in the fhge b nefits, trainf;lg and the ship, or association, or broadcast of cowrfghted material, including cost of engineering, supervtsory, quality 
a dispute involving such citizen, tor- films or television material, belonging to control, and personnel: and poration, partnership, or association. over united states copyright owners without 
compensation for such a seizure has been their express consent: and (B) dies, molds, tooling, and depreciation 
submitted to arbitration under the provi- (10) the to which country is On machinery and muipment which are 
sions of the Convention'for the Settlement to d t h  the united locable t~ the merchandise. 
of Investment Disputes, or in another mUtU- states fn the m*t ra t ion  of the prod. such phrase does not include costs which 
ally agreed upon forum, and promptly fur- are not directly attributabl_e to the mer- 
nishes a COPY of such determination to the siyg $ e t ~ ~ r ~ ~ t ~ ~ a d n O k  3(a) the TSUS chandise concerned or are not Cosb of man- 
Senate and House of Representatives; trelathg to products of the tnsular posses- ufacturing the product, such as (i) profit, 
(3) if such country fails to act in good sions) amended by adding a t  the end and (ii) general expenses of doing business 
faith in recognizing as binding or in enforc- thereof the following paragraph: which are either not allocable to the specific 
ing arbitral awards in favor of United States yiv) subject to the provisions in section merchandise or are not related to the 
citizens or a corporation, partnership or as- 103 of the Caribbean Basin Economic Re- growth, production, manufacture, or assem- 
sociation which is 50 per centum or more covery ~ c t ,  articles which are imported bly of the merchandise, such as administra- 
beneficially owned by United states citizens, from insular possessions of the United tive salaries, casualty and IiabUty imur- 
which have been made by arbitrators ap- States shall receive duty treatment no less ance, advertising, and salesmen's salaries, 
pointed for each Case Or by Permanent arbi- favorable than the treatment afforded such ~mnmlssions Or expenses. 
tral bodies which the parties involved articles when they are imported from a ben- (b) The duty-free treatment provided 
have submitted their dispute; eficiary country under such Act.". under this title shall not apply to- 
(4) ' preferential te) The President shall, after complying (1) textile and apparel articles which are 
treatment the products Of a with the repuirements of subsection ta)(2), subject to textile agreements: 
Other than the United States, withdraw or suspend the designation of any (2) footwear, handbsgs, luggage, flat 
whfch has' Or Is likely to a sigmicant country as a beneficiary country if, after goods. work gloves, and leather wearhg ap- 
effect On United States such designation, he determines that as the parel not designated at the time of the ef- unless the President has received assurances result of changed circumstances such coun- fective date of this title as eliglble articles sstisfactory him that such preferentisl try would be barred from designation as a for the purpose of the Generalized System ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ b b e a s s e u ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ , " i \ ~ ~ i ~  beneficiary country under subsection (b). of Preferences under title V of the Trade 
such significant adverse effect, and he re- '03 PARTICLES. Act of 1974; 
ports those sssurances to the Congress: ta)(l)  Unless otherwise excluded from eli- (3) tuna, prepared or p r e ~ e ~ e d  in any 
(5) if a gave-ent-owned entity in such ability by this title, the duty-free treatment manner, in airtight containers; or 
country engages in the broadcast of copy- provided under this title shall apply to any (4)  petroleum, or any product derived 
righted material, including films or televi- article which is the growth, product, or from petroleum, provided for in part 10 of 
sion material, belonging to United States manufacture of a beneficiary country if- schedule 4 of the TSUS. 
copyright owners without their express con. (A)  that article is imported directly from a tc)(l) ks used in this subsection- 
sent; and beneficiary country into the customs terri- (A) The term "sugar and beef products" 
(6) unless such country is a signatory to a tory of the United States; and means-- 
treaty, convention, protocol, or other agree- (B) the sum of (1) the cost or value of the (i) sugars, simps, and molasses provided 
ment regarding the extrsdition of United materials produced in a beneficiary country for in items 155.20 and 155.30 of the TSUS, 
States citizens. or two or more beneficiary countries, plus and 
Paragraphs (1). (2). and (3) shall not pre. (ii) the direct of processing operations (ii) articles of beef or veal, however pro- 
vent the designation of any  count^ as a performed in s beneficiary country or Coun- vided for in subpart B of part 2 of schedule 
beneficiary country under this Act ' the tries less than 35 percent of the ap- 1 of the TSUS. 
President determines that such designation Praised Of such at the time it is (B) The term "Plan" meam a Stable Food 
will be in the national economic or security entered. Production Plan that consists of measures 
interest of the United States and reports For purposes of determining the percentage and proposals designed to ensure that the 
such determination to the Congress with his referred to in subparagraph (B), the term Present level of food production in, and the 
reasons therefor. "beneficiary country" includes the Com- nutritional level of the population of, a ben- 
(c) In determining whether to designate monwealth of Puerto Rico and the United eficiary country will not be adversely affect- 
any country a beneficiary country under States Virgin Islands. If the cost or value of ed by changes in land use and land owner- 
this title, the President shall take into ac- materials produced in the customs territory ship that will result if increased produrtion 
count- of the United States (other than the Com- of sugar and beef products is undertaken in 
(1) an expression by such country of its monwealth of Puerto Rico) is included with response to the duty-free treatment ex- 
desire to be so designated: respect to an article to which this para- tended under this title to such products. A 
(2) the economic conditions in such coun- graph applies, an amount not to exceed 15 Plan must specify such facts regarding, and 
try, the living standards of its inhabitants, percent of the appraised value of the article such proposed actions by, a beneficiary 
and any other economic factors which he at the time it is entered that is attributable country as the President deems necessary 
deems appropriate; to such United States cost or value may be for purposes of carrying out this subsection, 
(3) the extent to which such country has applied toward determining the percentage including but not limited t* 
assured the United States it will provide referred to in subparamph (B), (i) the current levels of food production 
equitable and reasonable access to the mar- (2) The Secretary of the Treasury shall and nutritional health of the populatlon: 
Bets and basic commodity resources of such prescribe such regulations as may be neces- (it) current levels of production and country: sary to c m y  out this subsection including, export of sugar and beef products; 
L 
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(ill) expected Lncreases in production and 
export of sugar and beef products as a 
result. of the dutr-free access to the United 
S t a h  market provided under thb  title; 
(iv) measures to be taken to ensure that 
the expanded production of those products 
because of such duty-free access will not 
occur at the expense of staple food produc- 
tion: and 
tv) proposals for a system to monltor the 
impact d such duty-free access on s t a ~ l e  
fwd production and-land use and land o h -  
ership patterns. 
(2) Duty-free treatment extended under 
this title to sugar and beef products that are 
the product of a beneficiary country shall 
be suspended by the President under this 
subsection if- 
(A) the beneficiary country, within the 90- 
day period begtnning on the date of its des- 
ignation as such a country under section 
102, does not submit a Plan to the President 
for evaluation; 
(B) on the bssis of his evaluation, the 
President determines that the Plan of a 
beneficiary country does not meet the crite- 
ria set forth in paragraph (1XB); or 
(C) as a result of the monitoring of the op- 
eration of the Plan under paragraph (5). the 
President determines that a beneficiary 
country is not making a good faith effort to 
implement its Plan, or that the measure# 
and propsals in the Plan, although behg im- 
plemented, are not achieving their purposes 
(4) Before the Resident suspends duty- 
free treatment by reason of paragraph 
(2XA). (B), or (C) to the sugar and beef 
products of a beneficiary country. he must 
offer to enter into consultation with the 
beneficiary country for purposes of formu- 
lating appropriate remedlal action which 
may be taken by that country to avoid such 
suspension. If the beneficiary country 
thereafter enters into consultation within a 
reasonable time and undertakes to formu- 
late remedial action in good faith, the Presi- 
dent shall withhold the suspension of duty- 
free treatment on the condition that the re- 
medial action agreed upon be appropriately 
implemented by that country. 
(5) The President shall monitor on a bi- 
ennial basis the operation of the Plans im- 
plemented by beneficiary countries. and 
shall submit a written report to Congress by 
March 15 following the close of each biennl- 
um. that- 
(A) specifies fhe  extent to which each 
Plan, and remedlal actions, U any, agreed 
upon under paragraph (41, have been imple- 
mented; and 
(B) evaluates the results of such imple- 
mentation 
(6) The President shall terminate m y  sun- 
pension of duty-free treatment imposed 
under this subsection if he determines that 
the beneficiary country has taken appropri- 
ate action to remedy the factors on which 
the suspension WES bawd. 
(d) For such period as there is in effect a 
proclamation issued by the Resident pursu- 
ant to the authority vested in him by e- 
tion 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(7 U.S.C. 624) to protect a price-support pro- 
m m  for sugar beets and sugar cane, the im- 
portation and duty-free treatment of sugars, 
sirups, and molassetr classified under items 
155.20 and 155.30 of the TSUS shall be gov- 
erned in the f o l l o u ~ g  manner: 
(1XA) For all beneficiary countries, except 
thme subject to subparagraph (B) and pars- 
graph (2). duty-free treatment shall bi pro- 
vided in the same manner as it is provided 
pursuant to title V of the Trade Act of 1974 
(19 US.C. 2461 et seq.), at the time of the 
effective date of thb  title; except that the 
Praident upon the recommendation of the 
Secretary of Agriculture, may suspend or 
adjust upward the value lMtatlon provided 
for In section 5MtcXl) of the Trade Act of 
1974 on the duty-free treatment afforded to 
beneficiary countries under this section if 
he finds that such adjustment aN1 not inter- 
fere with the price support proerram for 
sugar beets and sugar cane and is appropri- 
ate in light of market conditiona 
(B) As an alternative to subparamnph (A), 
the President may. at the request of a bene 
ficiary country not subject to pamemph (2) 
and upon the recommendation of the Secre- 
tary of Agriculture, elect to permit sugar. 
sirups, and molasses from that country to 
enter duty-free during a calendar year sub- 
Ject to quantitative limitations to be estab- 
lished by the P r e s ~ e d t  on the quantity of 
sugar, sirups, and molasses entered from 
that country. 
(2) For the following countries whose ex- 
ports of sugar, sirups. and molasses in 1981 
were not elMble for duty-free treatment be- 
cause of the operation of section 504tc) of 
the Trade Act of 1974, the quantity of 
sugar, sirups, and m o w  which may be 
entered In IUIY calendar year shall be limit 
ed to no more than the quantity speciffed 
below: 
Mctnc tom 
Dominim Republlc .,.-.., 780.000 
Ouatemala .........,...... .... .. 110.000 
Panama ................................... 160,000 
Such s u m ,  sirups, and molasses shall be ad- 
mitted free of duty, except as provided for 
in paragraph (3). 
(3) The President, upon the recommenda- 
tion of the Secretary of Agriculture, may 
suspend or adjust upward the quantitative 
limitations imposed under paragraph (1XB) 
or (2) if he determines such action wffl not 
interfere with the price support program for 
sugar beets and sugar cane and is appropri- 
ate in light of mark& conditions. The peal-  
dent, upon the recommendation of the Sec- 
retary of Agriculture, may suspend the 
duty-free treatment for all or part of the 
quantity of sugar, sirups, and molasses per- 
mitted to be entered by paragraphs (l)(B) 
and (2) if such action is necessary to protect 
the pricesupport prognun for sugar beeta 
and sugar cane. ' 
(4) .Any quantitative limitation imposed 
on a beneficiary country under paragraph 
(IXB) or (2) shall apply only to the extent 
that such limitation permits a lesser quanti- 
ty of sugar, sirups and molasses to be en- 
tered from that country than the quantity 
that would be permitted to be entered under 
any other provision of law. 
teX1) The President may by proclamation 
suspend the duty-free treatment provided 
by this title with respect to any eligible arti- 
cle md may proclaim r duty rate for such 
article U such action is proclaimed pursuant 
to section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 or 
section 232 of the Trsde Expansion Act of 
1962. Any proclamation issued pursuant to 
section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 that is 
in effect when duty-free treatment pursuant 
to mtion  101 of this title is proclaimed 
shall remain in effect until modified or ter- 
minated 
(2) In any report by the Internatlonsl 
Trade Commtpsion ta the President under 
section ZOl(d)(l) of the 'Frsde Act of 1974 
regarding any article for which duty-free 
treatment has been proclaimed by the Presl- 
dent pursuant to this title. the Commission 
shall state whether and to what extent its 
findings and recommendations apply to 
such article when imported from benefici- 
aq countries. With respect to any article 
which is subject to import relief in effect at  
the time duty-free treatment is proclatmed 
pursuant to sectfon 101 of this title, the 
Resident may reduce or terminate the ap- 
pllcatlon of such import relief to imports 
from beneficlary countries prior to its other- 
wixe echeduled date pursuant to the criteria 
and procedures of subsections (h),and (1) of 
section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
(3) For purposes of subsections (a) and tc) 
of section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974, the 
suspension of the duty-free treatment pro- 
vided by t h b  title shall be treated as an in- 
crease in duty. 
(4) No proclsmation which provides solely 
for a suspension referred to In paragraph 
(3) of this subsection with respect to any ar- 
ticle shall be made under subsection ts) and 
tc) of section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 
unless the Unfted S t a t e  International 
Trade Commlsslon, in addition to making an 
affirmative determination with respect to 
such article under section 201(b) of the 
Trade Act of 1974, determines in the course 
of its investigation under section 201(b) that 
the serious Injury (or threat thereof) sub- 
stantially caused by imports to the domestic 
industry producing a like or directly com- 
petitive article resulta from the duty-free 
treatment provided by this title. 
(f)(l)  If a petition is filed with the Inter- 
national Trade Commission pursuant to the 
provisions of section 201 of the Trade Act of 
1974 regarding a perishable product and al- 
leging injury from imports from beneficlary 
countries, then the petition may also be 
filed with the Secretary of Agriculture with 
a request that emergency relief be granted 
pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection 
with respect to such article. 
(2) Within fourteen days after the filing 
of a petition under paragraph (1) of this 
subsection- 
(A) U the Gecretary of Adculture has 
reason to belleve that a perishable product 
from a beneficiary country is belng import- 
ed into the UBtted States in such increased 
quantities as to be a substantial cruse of se- 
rious Injury, or the threat thereof, to the 
domestic industry producing a perishable 
product like or directly competitive with the 
imported product and that emergency 
action 18 warranted. he shall advise the 
President and recommend that the Presi- 
dent take emergency action; or 
(B) the Secretary of Agriculture shall pub. 
lish a notice of hb determination not to rec- 
ommend the tmposition of emergency action 
and so advise the petitioner. 
(3) Withh seven days after the President 
receives a recommendation from the Secre- 
tary of Agriculture to take emergency 
action pursusnt to paragraph (2) of t h b  
S U ~ S ~ C ~ ~ O R  he shan issue a proclamation 
withdrawing the duty-free treatment pro- 
vided by this title or publish a notice of his 
determination not to take emergency action 
(4) The emergency action provided by 
paragraph (3) of thb subsection shall cease 
to apply- 
(A) upon the proclamation of import relief 
pursuant to section 202ta)(l) of the Trade 
Act of 1974, 
(B) on the day the Resident makes a de- 
termination pursuant to section 203(b)(2) 
not to impose import relief, 
(C) in the event of a report of the United 
States International Trade Commission con- 
tslnlng a negative finding, on the day the 
Commission's report is submitted to the 
President, or 
(Dl whenever the President determines 
that because of changed circumstances such 
relief is no longer warranted 
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the. 
term "perishable product" means-- 
(A) live plants provided for in subpart A of 
part 8 of schedule 1 of the TSUS; 
(B) fresh or chilled vegetables provided 
for in items 135.10 through 138.42 of the 
TSUS: 
(C) fresh mushrooms provided for in item 
144.10 of the TSUS; 
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(D) fresh fruft provided for in terms 
146.10, 146.20, 146.30, 145.50 through 145.62 
146.90, 146.91. 147.03 through 147.33. 147.50 
through 149.21 and 149.50 of the TSUS; and 
(El fresh cut flowers provided for in items 
192.17, 192.18, and 192.21 of the TSUS. 
(g) No proclamation issued pursuant to 
this title shall affect fees imposed pursuant 
to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act (7 U.S.C. 624). 
SEC 104. MEASL'RES POR PL'ERM RlCO AND 
UNITED STATES INSULAR POSSES- 
SIONS. 
(a) Effective with respect to articles en- 
tered on or after the eifective date of this 
Act. general headnote 3ta) of the TSUS is 
amended- 
(11 by amending clause (i)- 
(A) by striking out "60 percent" and in- 
serting in lieu thereof "70 percent", and 
(B) by inserting after "total value", "tor 
more than 50 percent of their total value 
with respect to articles described in section 
103(b) of the Caribbean Basin Economic Re- 
covery Act)"; and 
(2) by amending clause (ii) by striking out 
"50 uercent" and inserting in lieu thereof 
"70 percent". 
(b) Item 813.31 of the T3US is amended 
by s t rkhg  out "4 liters" and inserting in 
lieu thereof "5 liters". and by insertim after 
"United States,", "and not more than 4 
liters of which shall have been produced 
elsewhere than in such insular Posses- 
sions,". 
(c) If the sum of the amounts of taxes cov- 
ered into the treasuries of Puerto Rico or 
the United States Virgin Islands pursuant 
to section 7652tc) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 is reduced below the amount 
that would have been covered over if the im- 
ported rum had been produced in Puerto 
Rim or the United States Virgin Islanrls, 
then the president shall consider compensa- 
tion measures and, in this regard, may with- 
draw the duty-free treatment on rum pro- 
vided by thls title. The President shall 
submit a report to the Congress on the 
measures he takes. 
(d7 Section 1112 of the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2582) is repealed. 
te) No action pursuant to this title may 
affect any tariff duty imposed by the Legis- 
lature of Puerto Rico pursuant to section 
319 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
1319) on coffee imported into Puerto Rico. 
(f) For purposes of chapter 1 of title I1 of 
the Trade Act of 1974, the term "industry" 
shall include producere located in the 
United States ir,sular po.ssem!3115. 
(g) Any discbarge from a point source in 
the United States Virgin Islands in exist- 
ence on the date of the enactment of this 
subsection which discharge is attrhutc~ble 
to the manufacture of rum (as defined in 
Paragraph (3) of section 7652(c) of the In- 
ternal Revenue Code of 1954) shall not be 
subject to the requirements of section 301 
(other than toxic pollutant discharges), sec- 
tion 306 or section 403 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act U-- 
(1) such discharge occurs at  least one 
thousand :ive hundred feet into the territc- 
rial sea from the line of ordinary low water 
from that portion of the coast which is in 
direct contact wlth the sea, and 
(2) the Governor of the United States 
Virgin Islands determines that such dis- 
charge will not interfere with the attain- 
ment or maintenance of that water qualite 
which shall assure protection of public 
water supplies, and the protection and prop- 
agation of a balanced 'population of shell- 
fish, fish, and wildfif., and allow recreation- 
al activities. in and on the water and a%u 
not result in the discharge of pollutanh in 
quantities which may reasonably be w.ticl- 
Dated to poae an unaficentahle risk to 
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human health or the envirownent because 
of bioace~w.ulation, persistency in the end- 
ronment, acute toxicity, chronic toxicity tin- 
cluding carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, or 
teratogenicity), or synergistic propensities. 
SECTION 106. ITC REPORTS ON IMPACT OF THIS 
Am. 
(a) m e  United States International Trade 
Commission (hereinafter in this section re- 
ferred to as the "Commission") shall gre- 
pare, and submit to the Congress and to the 
President, a report regarding the economic 
impact of this Act on United States indus- 
tries and consumers during- 
(1) the twenty-four month period begin- 
ning with the date of enactment of this Act; 
and 
(2) each calendar yew occurring thereaf- 
ter until duty-free treatment under this title 
is terminated under section 106(b). 
For purposes of this section, industries in 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the 
insular possessions of the Unikd States 
shall be considered to he United States in- 
dustries. 
(b)(l) Each report required under subsec- 
tion (a) shall include, but not be Umited to, 
an assessment by the Commission regard- 
ing- 
(A) the actual e f k t ,  during the period 
covered by the report, of this Act on the 
United States economy generally as well a s  
on those specific domestic indusiriw which 
produce articledl that are ibe, or directly 
competitive with, articles k ing  hported 
into the United Statas from beneficiary 
comtries; and 
(B) the prcbable future effect which this 
Act MI have on the United States economy 
generapjr, a s  well as on such domestic indus- 
tries, before the provisions of this Act terml- 
nate. 
(2) In prep&rlng the assessments required 
under paragraph (1). the Commission shall, 
tn the extent pmticable- 
(A) analyze the production, trade and con- 
sumption of United States products affxted 
by this Act, h k h  into consideration em- 
ployment, profit levels, and use of produc- 
the? facilities wlth respect to the domestic 
industries concerned, and such other eco- 
nomic factors in such indutrk8 as it consid- 
ers relevant, including prices, wages, d e s .  
inventories, patterns of demand, ca~itsf in- 
vestment, obsolszence of equipment, and 
diversification of production: m d  
(B) describe the nature and extent of any 
significant change in employment, profit 
levels, and use of productive facilities, and 
such other conditions as it deems relevant 
in the domestic concerned, which 
it believes are attributable to this Act. 
tcKl) Each report required under subsec- 
tion ta) shdl be submitted to the Congress 
and ?a the President before the close of the 
ninemonth period begimhg on the day 
after the last day of the perid beginning on 
the day after the lsst day of the period cov- 
ered by the report. 
(2) The CommLssion shall provide oppor- 
tunity for the submission by the public. 
either orally or in arriting, or both, of infor- 
mation relating to matters that will be ad- 
dressed in the reseyt. 
YECTlON 106, EWECTlYE DATE OF TFTLE AND TER- 
MINATION OF-  DUTY-FREE TRFAT- 
MEm. 
ta) EFECTIVE DATE.-This title shall take 
effect on Lhe date of the enactment of this 
Act. 
ib) TE~WINATION OF Drrr~-FhE l"&T- 
m . - N O  duty-free treatment extended to 
beneficiary countries under this title shall 
reroan in effect after September 30. 1995. 
ATE 
TXTLE 11-TAX PROVISIONS 
BECTION 201. PAYMENT OF EXCllE TAXES C O L  
LEC3ED ON RLH TO PUERTO RlCU 
AND THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN I& 
LANDS. 
(a> IN Om~ma.--Section 7652 of the In- 
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to 
shipments to the United States) is amended 
by inserting after subsection (b) the follow- 
ing new subsection: 
"tc) SHIPMENTS OF RUM TO noe U a r m  
STAN.- 
"(1) EXCISE TAXES ON RUM COVERED I M O  
TRWSURIES OF PUWTO RICO .mi VIRGIN IS- 
LANDS.-All taxes collected under section 
5@01(a)(l) on rum imported into the United 
States (less the estimated mount  necessary 
for payment of refunds and drawbacks) 
shall be covered into the treasuries of 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin I.slmd% 
"(2) SFZRFTARY PRESCRIBES MRMELA.-T~~ 
Secretmy shall, from time to time. prescribe 
by reg.ulation a formula for the division of 
such tax collections between Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands and the tinling and 
methods for transterrhg such tax collec- 
tions. 
"(3) Rwa 9mam.-For purposes of this 
subsection. the term 'rum' means any article 
classified m+r item 169.13 or 169.14 of the 
Tapiff &kt?ddes of the United States (19 
U.8.C. 1202). 
"(4) Coamlsl~anorr wrrrx s w s m o ~ s  (a) 
AND (b).-Paragraph (1) shall not agcly with 
r e ? m t  to any rum sut.!ecr ta tax kzfer sub- 
section :s) or W." 
(k> E . m m  Q ~ m - T o e  ammlment 
made by subsection (%) r,'ns3 apply to a?& 
des tmwrteb W o  the United States after 
Jwe 30, 1933. 
(4) GWQUL R~&-§ubm?tim (h: of KC- 
tion 274 of the Internal R$wr,rre O d e  of 
1954 (relating to attendqnce st emn erkfens, 
etc.) is mended by adding at t ie  end there- 
of the iollowlw new paragraph: 
"(5) ~ ' J M X X Z  OF C O H I ~ Q R B  XI8 W- 
TAIX CMLIBBTM C0USTRILS.- 
"(A) fa  o m . . - F o r  purposes of this 
subsection, the term 'Ncrth Amerirm area' 
includes, with respect to any ecnwzt;on. 
seminar, or sMlar  meeting. any bne-Wary 
oountry if (as of the time such meethg 
begins)-- 
"(i) there is in effect a bllaterrd or multi- 
lsteral ~ n e m e n t  between such wuntry EX? 
the United States providing for the ex- 
change of information between the United 
States such country, and 
"(11) there is not in effect a finding by the 
Secretary that tho tax laws of such country 
~ c . r L % h t e  sgair--t conventions held h the 
United Ststes. 
"(B) BENEFICWY m m ~ . - F o r  purposes 
of th!s paramoh, the term 'bensficiary 
country' has the rnr- given to Such 
term by section 102(a)(lHA) of the Cabbe- 
an Basin Economic Recovery Act; except 
that such term shall include Bermuda. 
authorized to negotiate and conclude-& 
agrwnent for the exchange of tnformatton 
with any beneficiary cnuntry. A n  exchange 
of information agreement shall provide for 
the exchange of such information (not l h -  
ited to information concerning nationals or 
residents of the Udted States or the b-nefi- 
ciary country) as may be necessary or ~ p -  
propriate to c a ~ y  ol:? wnd enfrrre the tax 
laws of the United S t ~ t e s  aad che benefici- 
ary country twhether cPiminrrl or civil pro- 
ceedings), including infonnntion which may 
otherwise 'be subject to nondiwlosure provi- 
8iom of the local 187, of the beneficiary 
country such as ~rovisions respecting bank 
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secrecy and bearer shares. The exchange of 
information agreement shall be tennineble 
by either country on reawnable notice and 
shall provide that infonnation received by 
either country will be disclosed only to per- 
sons or authorities (including courta and ad- 
ministrative bodies) involved in the adrninls- 
tration or oversight of, or in the determina- 
tion of appeaLs in respect of, taxes of the 
Un~ted States or the beneficiary country 
and will be used by such persons or authori- 
ties only for such purposes. 
"(D) Coommnr~or w ~ m  sarnor 610s.- 
Any exchange of information agreement ne- 
gotiated under subpuagmph (C)  shall be 
treated ss an income tax convention tor 
purposes of section 6103(k)(4).* 
YE) h m r m s  m n m  Ia nrs rmrM?. 
~ e c r s ~ c ~ - A n y  finding by the Secretary 
under subp-ph (AKii) (and any tcnni- 
nation thereof) shall be publlshed ill the 
Federal Register." 
"cb) E m m m  ~m.-The amendment 
made by subsection ( 8 )  shall apply to Con- 
ventions, seminars. or other meetinpa be* 
ning after June 30, l983.a 
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Programs Underway for the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative 
Address before the Committee fw 806 
and 807l in Washington, D.C., on 
NOU& 8, 1982. A-sador Midden- 
dorf is US. permanent representative to 
the Organization of American States 
(OM). 
I have deeply appreciated the work 
which this c o m m i t .  has done on behalf 
of maintaining an open market in the 
United States for Latin America and for 
other developing countries. This is a dif- 
ficult time in which to be a free trader. 
There is always a great temptation to 
restrain imports in an effort to protect 
American jobs and American production. 
That temptation is particularly strong in 
times of economic difficulties. But that 
temptation, as we all know, is a terrible 
illusion, which ends by costing the U.S. 
economy far more in terms of jobs, pro- 
ductivity, and international competitive 
ness than we gain. 
I am also grateful for the support 
which this committee has given to the 
President's Caribbean Basin initiative. 
Like open market policies in general, the 
trade and investment proposals in the 
Caribbean Basin initiative appear t~ 
many critics to involve considerable 
costs. We have tried to make clear to 
the Congress and to the public that the 
long-term benefits of strong and 
dynamic economies in the Caribbean 
Basin are far greater to the U.S. 
economy than any short-term costs. I 
believe that that message is becoming 
clearer and better understood, and I am 
optimistic that the Congress will take 
the action necessary this month or early 
in December to pass the two remaining 
portions of the initiative-namely the 
one-way free trade area and the invest- 
ment incentive. 
For my main theme tonight, how- 
ever, I would like to turn to a somewhat 
more heartening subject than the 
challenge of fighting protectionism. I 
would like to talk about a part of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative which has re- 
ceived very little public attention but 
which nevertheless is functioning effec- 
tively already. Most discussions of the 
initiative focus only on the legislation 
which we have presented to the Con- 
gress. But there is a range of activities 
already underway in this Administration 
Department of Sta te  B u l l e t i n  
that began under authority in existing 
legislation. I would like to briefly discuss 
these programs with you. None of these 
programs is of dramatic or startling 
scope. None of them will turn the 
economies of the region around single- 
handedly. However, taken as a whole 
there is already a si&icant impact 
derived from the initiative in supporting 
the efforts of the Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries themselves. 
This portion of the initiative under 
prior legislation involves activities by 
every interested agency of the U.S. 
Government. I t  derives from a strong 
commitment by the President and his in- 
dividual Cabinet officials to devote as 
many resources as possible to strength- 
ening each agency's programs in the 
Caribbean Basin region. Given the extra- 
ordinarily difficult budgetary constraints 
that all government agencies face these 
days, the scope of the programs which I 
am about to describe would not have 
been possible without the personal com- 
mitments of top Cabinet-level officials 
within this Administration. 
Agriculture 
The first sector that I would like to 
discuss is agriculture. Agriculture still 
forms the basis of most of this region's 
economies, but output has been growing 
slowly recently and per capita food pro- 
duction in many countries has been de- 
clining. A high proportion of land is idle 
or badly used. Services to the agri- 
cultural sector are  deficient. In general 
agriculture is viewed by many as a n  un- 
promising and backward occupation. 
There is thus a great need not only for 
expansion of production but also a 
thoroughgoing modernization. Despite 
the very significant programs which we 
have had in the region for years through 
the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (AID) program, much re- 
mains to be done. A revitalization of the 
agricultural sector is crucial to meet the 
food needs of the region's growing 
population, as well as to increase export 
earninas. - 
To an important extent, many of 
these problems can be traced to inap- 
propriate government policies that pro- 
vided inadequate incentives to pro- 
ducers. I will address this policy issue 
later. Technical assistance is also crucial 
to improved performance, and the U S .  
Department of Agriculture (USDA) has 
put together a substantial program in 
this area. 
First, USDA is promoting an in- 
creased regional understanding of U.S. 
agricultural health and sanitary regula- 
tions. This includes providing technical 
assistance for inspection procedures, for 
the operation of fumigation facilities, 
and for training in enforcing health and 
sanitary regulations. 
Second, USDA is offering technical 
assistance to the Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries to better gear their agricultural 
production to the standards of the world 
market. This involves assistance on how 
to achieve acceptable quality standards, 
procedures for proper labeling and test- 
ing, and techniques for minimizing losses 
during distribution and storage. 
Third, USDA is strengthening agri- 
cultural research and technology 
transfer through institutions within the 
Caribbean Basin area and a t  existing 
facilities in the United States. Par- 
ticularly important in this regard is the 
enhancement of the Mayaguez Institute 
for Tropical Agriculture in Puerto Rico. 
Fourth, USDA has begun to play an 
important role in facilitating the involve 
ment of U S .  agribusiness in the Carib 
bean Basin countries. A recently estab- 
lished Agribusiness Promotion Council 
will advise USDA on particular pro- 
grams to insure that projects are  ap- 
propriately designed for the individual 
conditions of the Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries. 
Fifth, USDA will assist govern- 
ments on the management and conserva- 
tion of forest, soil, and water resources. 
Sixth, USDA is ready to provide 
technical assistance to Caribbean Basin 
governments or private institutions to 
develop or improve crop credit insurance 
schemes. This will help to stimulate 
farmers to use more modem technology 
and increase productivity. 
Seventh, USDA is establishing an 
agricultural information center for U.S. 
business. This would provide a single 
source for U.S. traders and investors, as 
well as for Caribbean Basin exporters to 
obtain necessary market information 
and opportunities for agricultural invest- 
ment. 
Another very interesting effort in 
the agricultural field is being made by 
the Peace Corps. Peace Corps volun- 
teers are sometimes uniquely placed to 
see what people with fancier titles or of- 
fices might miss. The Peace Corps is 
modifying some of its programs and 
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training to help volunteers analyze both 
the opportunities and the problems r e  
gardfng the modernization and expan- 
sion of small-scale agricultural business. 
The Peace Corps has already begun to 
train some volunteers to perform p r e  
feasibility studies and help develop 
business and marketing plans primarily 
in, but not limited to, agribusiness. 
Interestingly, the Peace Corps train- 
ing initiatives pick up another of Presi- 
dent Reagan's themes-private sector 
involvement. The training of volunteers 
to assist in developing better business 
planning is also underway through 
private groups and increased coopera- 
tion with AID and other governmental 
organizations. 
Let me turn now to the industrial area. 
Industrial modernization has been one of 
the top priorities of countries in this 
region for years. The share of manufac- 
turing in gross domestic product is still 
low-under 20% in most countries. All 
of these countries offer small internal 
markets, and moat h s  in the region 
are  small and inexperienced in-perhaps 
fearful of-operating in larger foreign 
markets. There is a significant lack of 
such crucial management skills as 
marketing, quality control, and financial 
management. And yet the region also 
has very significant assets. Most coun- 
tries, especially in the English-speaking 
Caribbean, have a high level of social 
services with a generally welleducated 
healthy labor force. 
The basic infrastructure in most 
countries is a t  least adequate, although 
there are  significant maintenance p r o b  
lems and considerable need for improve 
ment. Above all, most of these countries 
have leadership which realizes the need 
for providing an appropriate policy en- 
vironment and incentives to the private 
sector. I t  certainly is a clear policy 
priority to encourage industrial growth 
as indispensable to absorb the high 
levels of unemployment in the region 
and to generate production for exports 
to turn the balanceof-payments crisis 
around. New investments both by local 
business and by foreign investors is 
clearly recognized as a critical need to 
regenerate and expand the productive 
base in these countries. 
The Department of Commerce in 
March opened its Caribbean Basin 
Business Information Center to provide 
comprehensive economic information to 
U S .  business representatives interested 
in dealing in the Caribbean Basin. The 
response of the U S .  business communi- 
ty has been dramatic; literally thousands 
of companies have asked for guidance on 
trade and investment opportunities. 
Commerce experts are prepared to brief 
U.S. business on the policies and prac- 
tices of Caribbean Basin countries and 
provide practical advice to resolve 
specific problems facing U.S. business 
representatives. The center has 
developed a wide network of contacts in 
the Caribbean Basin in both the govern- 
ment and private sectors and is thus 
well placed to arrange appropriate con- 
tacts for individual U S .  investors and 
business representatives. Commerce also 
serves as a clearinghouse for refemng 
companies to  other specialized U S .  
Government programs focusing on 
business development in the Caribbean 
Basin. The center also works with local 
Department of Commerce district offices 
throughout the United States in arrang- 
ing seminars on business opportunities 
in the Caribbean Basin area. The first of 
these regional seminars will be held 
November 12 in New Orleans. I t  will in- 
clude a comprehensive group of U.S. 
Government experts and representatives 
from Caribbean Basin companies. The 
center thus offers a single location for 
comprehensive and efficient services to 
U S .  business representatives to find out 
how to sell their products in the Carib 
bean Basin, how to invest in that area, 
and how to buy from the region. 
Invertment 
Related to the Department of Com- 
merce's work in improving the informa- 
tion flow to U S .  businesa is the wider 
governmental effort to help countries in 
the area improve their investment 
climate. Several agencies of the U.S. 
Government, led by the Office of the 
U S .  Trade Representative, have 
developed a worldwide program of 
bilateral investment treaties. I see this 
as an important and highly visible way 
to improve the investment climate in 
developing countries. The countries of 
the Caribbean Basin have expressed par- 
ticularly keen interest in the program, 
and we have recently concluded an 
agreement with Panama This treaty is 
designed .to provide a clear set of rights 
and obligations of the host government, 
of the foreign investor, and of the U S .  
Government. The U S .  Government has 
developed a prototype or model treaty 
containing the following key elements: 
Provisions concerning entry and 
duration of investment; 
Treatment for established U.S. in- 
vestors which is no less favorable than 
that given domestic investors and other 
foreign investors; 
Prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation in the event of nationaliza- 
tion; 
Unrestricted repatriation and 
other transfers of assets; and 
Dispute settlement provisions. 
I find it particularly interesting that 
several European governments have 
already in place a set of similar arrange 
menta and are  interested in expandmg 
this network. We may, therefore, be on 
the threshold of a major clarification of 
the way in which foreign investors are  
expected to operate. The treaty program 
insures that the concerns of all parties 
are fully taken into account. I, therefore, 
believe that the investment regime 
which results from the treaty program 
will be a lasting one. 
To date we have signed two agree- 
ments with Egypt and Panama. So we 
have a lot of work ahead of us before 
my hopes for this program are fully 
realized. However, the advantages that 
flow from improved and stable invest- 
ment climates are increasingly recog- 
nized by developing countries. There is 
growing interest in this program, and 
we are ready to discuss it with any in- 
terested country. 
OPIC Propama. One of the key 
agencies in supporting U.S. private ac- 
tivities in developing countries has been 
the Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration (OPIC). OPIC is very 
sigmficantly increasing its activities in 
the Caribbean Basin. Its programs offer 
insurance to U S .  investors operating in 
developing countries to cover political 
risks-exoro~riation. war. and inconver- 
tibility.  his is the core of OPIC's ac- 
tivities and an important incentive for 
investment in the region. In fiscal years 
(FY) 1981 and 1982, 47 new projects in 
the Caribbean Basin were insured by 
OPIC for a total of $361 million of new 
project investment. 
A smaller but increasingly important 
function of OPIC has been finance, in- 
cluding direct loans to small and 
medium-sized joint ventures. In FY 1981 
and 1982, OPIC supported 18 projects in 
the Caribbean Basin for a total of $149 
million of new project financing. In  FY 
Department of State Bulletln 
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1982, OPIC also supported 16 invest- 
ment feasibility studies in eight Carib 
bean Basin countries. 
Together these OPIC programs 
represent more than a doubling of what 
OPIC was doing in FY 1980. And I ex- 
pect that these activities will continue to 
increase in the coming years. 
OPIC has also been particularly ac- 
tive in organizing investment mission? to 
this region. The missions which OPIC 
led to Jamaica and Haiti in late 1981 
were highly successful. Another mission 
is planned for the eastern Caribbean 
area this month, in addition to followup 
visits to Jamaica and Haiti. A particular- 
ly innovative and exciting program is 
the investment "telemission." Two weeks 
ago OPIC and AID cosponsored such a 
mission for the Caribbean area. The mis- 
sion brought together, by use of satellite 
television links, business and govern- 
ment representatives from several cities 
of the United States with their counter- 
parts in the English-speaking Caribbean, 
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The 
resulting lively discussion of investment 
and trade opportunities and problems 
promises to result in some interesting 
and significant new investment flows. 
Finally, OPIC is making a major ef- 
fort to reach out into the business com- 
munity rather than just respond to in- 
quiries coming into its off~ce. OPIC has 
instituted a number of procedures to im- 
prove the information flow to U.S. 
businesses about its programs and the 
opportunities in the Caribbean Basin. 
Export-Import Bank. The Export- 
Import Bank is also active in this region. 
The top management of the Export- 
Import Bank (Eximbank) has enthusi- 
astically supported the Caribbean Basin 
initiative and strengthened the focus of 
the bank onto this region. In FY 1981, 
$555 million in credit., insurance, and 
guarantees were committed by Exim- 
bank to Caribbean Basin purchasers of 
US, goods and services. The bank hopes 
to improve this performance signirkant- 
ly over the next few years, keeping in 
mind of course its statutory constraint 
of operating only where there is 
reasonable prospect of repayment. The 
bank also is expanding its guaranty 
facilities for short-term credits to local 
commercial banks in credit-worthy 
markets. 
Let me now turn to an area in which 
work is underway, but in which we have 
not yet developed a specific program. 
This is the area of transportation. Vir- 
tually everyone concerned with the prob- 
lems of the Caribbean Basin agrees that 
improved accessibility for people and 
goods is an extremely important ele- 
ment. We have found this to be a par- 
ticularly difficult area in which to devise 
solutions to the problems we know exist. 
To oversimplify the problem somewhat, 
it appears that this is one of those 
vicious circles. Costs are high in the 
Caribbean Basin area partly because 
traffic volumes are relatively small and 
routes are fragmented, while the high- 
cost transport system discourages the 
development of more efficient operations 
and peater volume. How to break this 
vicious circle is still a major unresolved 
question, and it is a prominent item on 
our future agenda. 
As a first step, we are trying to 
define more precisely what the problems 
and constraints are. In a meeting ar- 
ranged by CaribbeanJCentral American 
Action with shippers early this year, we 
came to the conclusion that-contrary to 
some of o w  own expectations-capacity 
is not a problem, even assuming signifi- 
cant growth in trade over the next few 
years. The problems in this low-volume1 
high-tariff situation appear to be in the 
~tructure of routes, in the operation of 
port facilities, and possibly in marketing. 
We are planning a similar diagnostic 
meeting with the airlines, and we are in 
contact with other institutions which 
have been working on this issue, in- 
cluding, interestingly enough, 
CARICOM (the Caribbean Common 
Market) and the European Community. 
We are also analyzing comments on 
transportation problems which AID of- 
ficers and others in the field have 
reported. 
Role of AID 
AID has long had important programs 
in the basin area. But the overall ap- 
proach of our economic assistance policy 
toward the region has changed in three 
very signiFicant ways. 
First, the Caribbean Basin has 
clearly become a higher priority in our 
global economic assistance program, and 
the level of our program to the region 
has just about doubled since FY 1980. In 
that year (FY 1980), our programs to 
the Caribbean Basin added up to $324 
million. In FY 1982, our regular pro- 
$rams amounted to $475 million, to 
which we added $350 million in the 
special supplemental for a total of $825 
million. For FY 1983 we are requesting 
a b u t  $665 million for the region, and 
we are anticipating future programs for 
FY 1984 and beyond at  roughly that 
order of magnitude, although I must 
caution that final decisions on those 
budgets have not yet been taken. 
Gceond, AID is paying much greater 
attention to economic policy issues in its 
assistance programs. AID is upgrading 
its economic analysis capabilities and is 
working to maintain a close dialogue 
with basin governments on key policy 
issues and to assist them in implement- 
ing reforms. Because of their impact on 
private sector activity, government 
policies in such areas as agricultural 
pricing and exchange rates are extreme 
ly important to overall economic 
performance. 
Third, r very slgn3cant change has 
been an increased emphasis on pcivate 
Bettor support. This is a broad-based 
change, but I would like to cite several 
specific and innovative programs as il- 
lustrative of our overall efforts. Costa 
Rica's Agro.Industria1 and Export 
Bank-called BANEX for short-is one 
striking example. AID'S $10 million loan 
commitment last year was a crucial fac- 
tor in bringing this institution about. It 
is new and quite small but surprisingly 
successful already. I t  provides an inte- 
grated program of credit, +rt 
management assistance, and export- 
oriented banking services for producers 
and traders of nontraditional Costa 
Rican exports. 
Two things about this project are 
particularly Qmficant in my mind. 
First, this is a privately owned bank in 
Costa Rica's state-owned banking 
system-conceived, implemented, and 
managed by the Costa Rican private sec- 
tor. I t  has shown a degree of innovation, 
risk taking, and sound management 
which is an important example to the 
whole Costa Rican economy-and 
perhaps to the region as a whole-about 
what the private sector can accomplish 
even in very difficult economic circum- 
stances. Secondly, the institution is dedi- 
cated not just to supporting existing ex- 
porters but to developing new non- 
traditional export lines-that m a n s  
searching out potential export products, 
finding markets, establishing distribu- 
tion channels, and insuring product 
quality standards and reliable delivery 
systems. This comprehensive approach 
to the problem of export promotion is 
another way in which this institution is 
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an example to the rest of the Costa 
Rican and regional economy. 
So as not to take up too much of 
your time, let me tick off a few other in- 
novative AID projects which are  under- 
way or in the planning stages and which 
are specifically directed a t  the private 
sector: 
A loan to establish the Caribbean 
Agricultural Trading Company, an inter- 
island marketing project which will 
stimulate increased trade and agri- 
cultural production in the eastern Carib 
bean; 
A loan to establish a new, private 
ly owned development finance company 
in Haiti; 
* A loan to Jamaica to provide in- 
vestment funds for equity i d  debt 
financing for medium-size agroindustrial 
and man-ufacturing enterprises; 
* Grants to establish a Caribbean 
Basin information network as well as to 
support an emerging twin-chamber pro- 
gram whereby U.S. Chambers of Com- 
merce are linked to business associations 
in the basin countries for the purpose of 
stimulating trade and investment oppor- 
tunities; 
A loan to establish a regional 
development bank in the eastern Carib 
bean; and 
Joint OPIC-AID support for a 
marketing campaign and investment 
missions to increase the awareness of 
the U S .  business community about in- 
vestment opportunities in the Caribbean. 
Role of Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islandr 
Let me say just a few words about the 
role of Puerto Rico and the U S .  Virgin 
Islands within the Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative. We all recognize that Puerto 
Rim and the U.S. Virgin Islands are im- 
portant components of the U.S. 
presence in the Caribbean area. Clearly 
we need to insure that the economic 
development of the U S .  possessions ia 
enhanced by U S .  policy toward the 
Caribbean region, and we welcome the 
contribution that these possessions are 
making to implementation of the Carib 
bean Basin initiative. 
The U S .  Government has been in 
close consultation with the Governments 
of Puerto Rim and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands about the Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative and their role in it. Suggestions 
made by these governments have been 
taken into account in designing Carib 
bean Basin initiative proposals and 
legislation. 
Puerto Rico and the U S .  Virgin 
Islands will play a major role in tech- 
nical assistance, private sector develop 
ment, and transportation within the 
Caribbean region. In fact, we see these 
areas as a focal point for assistance to 
the whole region. Several ways in which 
this can occur are as follows: 
Strengthening the Tropical Agri- 
cultural Research Center in Mayaguez, 
Puerto Rico; 
Funding for an Eastern Caribbean 
Center for Educational, Cultural, Tech- 
nical, and Scientific Interchange a t  the 
College of the Virgin Islands; 
Use of Puerto Rican and U S .  
Virgin Islands facilities, personnel, and 
firms in technical assistance programs 
and development projects; and 
Expansion of airports in the U S .  
Virgin Islands and other measures to en- 
courage the development of Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands as a transporta- 
tion hub for the Caribbean region. 
Finally, I am pleased to note that 
Puerto Rico is already active in pro- 
moting closer links with other Caribbean 
Basin countries. Particularly noteworthy 
are  the broad-ranging programs of tech- 
nical cooperation with Jamaica and with 
St. Lucia 
Promoting a Productive 
Private Sector 
Let me conclude by describing to you a 
general interagency effort, led by AID, 
to  devise an overall strategy in support 
of the private sector for each of the 
Caribbean Basin countries. The object of 
the exercise is to develop concrete plans 
to promote a more dynamic and produc- 
tive private sector. Our efforts are 
primarily within the U S .  Government, 
but we are  consulting closely with the 
U S .  private sector and with representa- 
tives of interested governments and 
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The US Caribbean Basin Initiative 
W E S H  RAMSARAN 
IN a speech to the Organization of American States (OAS) on 24 February 1982, 
President Ronald Reagan of the United States outlined a programme of special 
assistance to the countries of the Caribbean and Central America. For some time 
previous to this, discussions had been held by the United States. Cmada, Mexiw 
and Venezuela on the scape nnd nature of an aid package to the region. The 
decision by the 1JS to embark on its own programme undoubtedly reflected an 
inability on the part of ?he four countries to agree on a common schemne, or 071 the 
conditions that should be attached 6 0  any programme of assistance. Canadx, for 
its part, has long been renowned for providing aid without controversial 'stri-la'. 
Mexico, too, had made it clear- that it was opposed to certain cop litianr which 
the US was trying to include in the aid package. For instmcc, Pr:ssidetit L6pcz 
Portillo of Mexico was adamant in his view that certain cou~itrks (e.g. Cuba. 
Nicaragua, Grenada) should not he excluded from any aid yrogrrunvve on the 
basis of their political ideology or economic policies. Nor diJ hc fcel that military 
aid should form part of any aid package. Venezuela, for its Far: apparently felt it 
could get more political mileage by providing aid on a bili%t:-;i basis. 
F 
Cn 
President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) proposals went to the US 
Congress in March 1982, but the financial part was not cleared until mld-August 
1982, after some modification. The package as a whole s l u ~ ~ e d  several at'empts 
to defeat it in both Houses. The aid component was included in a USSI4.1 billion 
appropriations Hill, which the President vetoed on 28 August becal~w Congress 
had tacked on some additional expenditures which would have incrmscd his 
planned deficit for the year. The CBI thus got caught in dom:*s:ic ;~oliticd -r.r mg- 
ling unrelated toany particular foreign political issue. In  mid-3:ptmnber. howe\ er. 
Congress overrode the President's veto, which for all praitiral purposes, means 
$hat the aid proposal is now law. The other aspects of the pooprainme would re- 
quire specific pieces of legislation for implementation after final approval. 
The CBI programme 
The reaction to President Reagan's Carib!min Initiatii e has been r c ,  ied. Wefore 
discussing these reactions, however. it might be useful at this point ti: outlint the 
proposed aid package. 
71rr creation of 11 me-r uy;ke  l'rade area 
This is rerhaps the most important clement 3f the package. It ir propo ,t:,i that 
exports (excluding kxtile and apparel products) should receive duty-i:?r: m a t -  
ment in the US. Under existing arrangements, it isestimatcd rhat s o m  I I per ,mt 
nr R mmmn is Scnior 1.c~ m r  at the Instilule of lnlernationai *.I L i t ~ , , , .  Zlalvcruly of 
i h ~  %st Indres. St Augustr:lc. Tnnliiai?. 
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of Caribbean Basin1 exports already enter the US market duty-free. The argument 
put forward is that some of the duties that remain in place are in sectors of special 
interest to Basin countries. They also limit export expansion into many non- 
traditional products. It is also argued that the global reasons used for excluding 
certain products from the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are not 
relevant to the Caribbean Basin. The complex structures of the GSP itself militates 
against the ability of sniall inexperienced countries to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered. 
St~gar will receive duty-free treatment but only up to acertain limit. 
For goods to qualify for duty-free entry they must have a minimum of25 pt 
cent local value added. Inputs from all Basin countries can be cuntuiated to meet 
the 25 per cent minunurn. 
Beneficiaries of the proposed Free Trade Area will be designated by the 1Presi- 
dent. 'Communist' corlctries and countries which expropriate without compena- 
tion or which discriminate against US exports will not be eligible. The countries* 
attitude towards Foreign investment and policies employed to promote their own 
development wi3 2ko be taken into account. 
Tax i.wewtives 
In order to encourage the flow of private capital to the area, the President 
proposes to ask Congress to provide 'significant tax incentives for investment in 
the Caribbean Basin'. IIe also indicated a readiness to ncgatiate bilateral invest- 
ment treaties with interested Wasin countries. The purpose of these treaties would 
be to provide 'an agreed legal framework for investment, by assuring certain 
mn,mum standards d treatment and by providing agreed means for resolving 
investnmt disputes.' Mentinn has also been made or the services provided by the 
Oversas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) which currently 0ffer.s political 
risk iusurance for US investors abroad. This institution is in the process ofexpand- 
ing insurance coverage available to eligible US invwitors by working with private 
sector insurers to establish inforrnal consortia to deal with projects on an individud 
basis. 
Financial and military assistance 
Nc~ni l i t a ry  aid to b i n  countries is currently channelled through three main 
programmes: (I) the Develo~incnt Assistance Programme (DA) which is project 
oriented; (ii) the Economic Support Funds (ESF) which are mon. flexible and can 
jwovide direct balance of payments support as well as credit for crucial imports; 
(iii) food aid, provided throt~gh PL 480 programmes. For countries 'whkh are 
pluticulvly :xud hit economically' the President intends to provitie additional 
funds it1 the fiscal years 1382 and !383. It is proposed to increase the 1982 ESF 
currcnt hudget level from US$l40 million to IISSJW m. or by US$3H) m. The 
;r:-~osed FSF f igm f a  1783 is US$326.0 m., while the DA figure has been given 
' 'C rrihbcan Basin* is an aght:rary term ~ucd by ;he Reagan Administration to  cover some 
two dofen countries in the nal tlrarn tip of% ith America, Central America and ?he Caribbean. 
Takcn tcgetber these wuntnes have a poyulaticw of about 39 million people and a ODk' of 
US$M L~llion. 
'omg =o 0~ lpn~~ lb  01 w = ~ ,  -PA WS pwmn w w ~  W W J ~ I  3 3 ~ 1 s  
oqi JO u- 4 w ~ v q 8  w p x a  wgmto3 '183 aq$ nroq woXw qn13xa 
@gdy? IOU WOP sn q ~3 t 1 3 ~  q U O ~ @  'hfi anqnS &A 8 U! p o r n  
q uo!snpm JO uopsmb n ~ .  -xnmsp8 palo?p aq p l n o m  r a o p d d  w3!mq~ 
W!M pr- IOU OP W M  -old pas V!'-IM (=@~J=?N 
'SPwlrI) W"3 .*a)=v1 pw P O P J B M ~  3q P P O M  (@=s PJ8MP3 n p ~ ~ ~ f  
9'3) =~WS wmn a111 01 qqmdxxrs =pgod msmd q 3 3 ~  w y u n ~  -JW
9 1 4 s  c,auap!saq a q ~  IJ! 1!3gdXa amb s! qmardde 3q1s poe 10- aq~,  'wp[od 
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however, hava turned from their Anmian neighbum and their heritage. Let 
than nhun to the traditions and common valw of thia hantphar, and we will 
welcome than. llra choice is thein: 
The content of the programme itself hss drawn a mixed rcaponw. Many of tbe 
politicians in the areP welcomed the additional aid, though some of them (particu- 
larly in the Eastan Caribbean) expected the hm&d part to be mom substantial. 
ntey could not hope to attract foreign investors, they argue, without improving 
their ba& infrastnrture. The businest groups tend to sea the opening up of the 
US market aa an opportunity for the expansion in trade. The academia, on the 
otba hand, have expressed grave ~ a t i ~  about the possible impact on tbe 
integration movanent in the Caribbean and on development strategies in genenl. 
Tbsy also fcal that the independence of the Caribbean states would be com- 
promis6d. It would be instructive at this point to go into a littk mom detail into 
tbe thinking behind these various positions. 
In recent years, the Caribbean Bnsin states (particularly the non-oil producing 
00untries) have been exptriaocing serious onomic d i W t i e a  Real economic 
growth in many instances has barn close to zao and in some casa mn negative. 
Forcipcxchangc earnings have baen decliniig. Inflation and unemployment 
haw taken on significant proportions. Such probkms, of cowsc, tend to generate 
social discontent and their pasisteace haa led to a questioning of basic develop 
C 
m n t  strategies. In such cimunstances, even existing political arrangements have 
u come undu attack. A -or purpcws of the hancial assistance provided unda 
tbe CBI, it u indicated, b to assist countriea 'which am particularly hard hit 
ecc~omicallf. The division of the supplemental A n d  assistence proposed for 
tbe 1982 fiscal yaor, how- doer not s e a n  to accord with this objective. 
Of the US$350 m. supplanental aid proposed under the ESF programme for the 
1982fiacolye~r, El Salvador is slated to receive US$128 m. (36.6 percent), Jamaica 
US$% m. (14.3 pa cent), the Eastan Caribbean U S $  m. (2.8 per cent), B e l i  
US$lO m. (2-8 pa cent), Dominican Republic US140 m. (11.4 per cent). Costa 
Rica US170m. (20Opacent). Honduras US$35 m (10.0pacent). Haiti US$S m 
(1 -1 pa cent), and the Amaicau Institute for Labour Development US$2 m. 
(0.6 per cent). Political consideratiom seem to weigh heavily in this allocation: 
TbcEartanCaribbeaaislao&whichminstrioust~~IIOmjcditlticul~andwhich 
need to davtlop their infnutructuns in order to increase production, get less than 
3 per cent of the total as campad to o w  14 per cent for Jamaica (where it is 
hoped that the advantagu of a market-oriented private enterprise economy 
will bo daovoDstratsd), and Plmost 67 pa cent for three Central American 
cmmtriar. 
Am far as military &Eamr is coaoaned, the total budgeted for 1982 amounts 
to about 20 pa cenr of all ni6l p r o p o d  for this year. (This does not include the 
additional US$@ m. in military aid that was proposed by Resident Reagan for 
El Salvador.) The Pnsidcat has stated that thia expenditure is m;aded to meet 'the 
' In order to get a more balanced alloation, tha US Senrrts Foruign Rclotiono Cornmiurn 
b d  suggested a c e h g  dUS$75 m. for m y  one country. Thb was mjected by tbc full Senate.. ' Compued to M actual of 10-7 per ccmt in 1987. 
growing threat of Cuban and Soviet subvuxion in the Caribbean Basin'. There 
many, of course, who would argue that the political instability in the r d o n  h 
more rooted in domestic political and economic conditions than in outside inter- 
f e r e ~ ~ ,  and the situation is more liidy to improve if these conditions are rd- 
drtssbd directly. Failure to do this is likely to lead to annual emlatiom in military 
expenditure. 
With respect to the trading arrangements, one view holds that the effect u 
likely to be more psychological than anything else, since 87 per ccnt of Basin 
goods already enter the US market duty-free. Another view is that the non-tariff 
barriers would m a i n  a serious impediment to an CXptUI~ion of exports to the Us 
market. A third position is that the duty-free market is meaningful only if one- 
the production capacity. The Eastem Caribbean states, for example, would need , 
to develop their physiwl infrastructure before they can significantly expand their 
production. There may be some merit in each of these positions. Spokesmen for 
the Reagan Administration, however, tend to see the effects of the frebtrada 
arrangements in both a short- and long-term perspective. The immed'iate cffeds, 
they argue, would be felt in the traditional commodities area (e.g. sugar, coffee. 
cocoa, vegetables, raw materials etc.). This argument, however. has to be seen 
against the fact that in a n t  years, earnings from most of these items have been 
declining, and not for lack of markets. In the medium and l o n w  tenn, existinu 
and new manufactured goods are likely to be affected. Again, it must ba noted 
that many of the countries have not been able to satisfy the origin rule for manu- 
factured goods to take advantage of the opportunities offerad under various GSP 
Schemes and under the Lorn6 Convention in which several Basin ~0ulltrieS are 
participants. The point is, the provision of markets may not be the crucial thing. 
Structural and technical problems exacerbated by irrelevant policies m y  be the 
more important factors facing an expansion of production and exports. 
In the US itself, the freatradc idea has received strong opposition in certain 
quarten, despite the safeguard provisions of the plan, and despite the fact that 
imports that would be affected by the proposals cumntly account for less than 
one-half of one per cent of the US total imports. The 25 per ccnt local content 
requirwncnt has been cri t icid as being too low. Some American producers f d  
that the Caribbean will be used as a conduit by foreign competitors to peaetrate 
the US market. The AFL-CIO group is concanad about the impact on j o b  as 
investors are attracted away by the proposed arrangements. 
The CBI is cast in a particular framework which has given rise to a great d d  
of controversy. A certain basic model is assumed in which government i n t m  
tion in the economic system is played down, and a free enterprise system involvin# 
an expanded role for the private MOP is pushed to the centre stage of the develop- 
ment strategies. When we add to this measures to attract foreign capital prod&g 
for a foreign market, we have virtually all the elements of the Puerto Rican modd, 
which has so far failed to deliw the promised goods. Thc ideological bias in the 
programme is clear. The fact that to qualify for aid, domestic policies will have to 
a 
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pass the rnrtkry of the US Administration raists the whole question of political 
.nd cammic a o ~ t y 4  very mmitive ifsue on which any ulvantaga in 
the progmnuw eventually tloundcr. 
In tbe context of Commonwealth Caribbean integration, it is feared in some 
quutas that biitaal assistance of the Kid  envisaged in the CBI wuld aeriously 
interfen with the process. It is widely felt that the Caribbean Development Bank 
ahould be the appropriate institution for channelling aid aimed at regional de- 
velopment. The CBI shows no particular concern with integration objectives, but 
nuha uidressa itselfto an ideological drift and the need for the US to reusert its 
hegemony in the political and dfonomic circumstances of the early 1980s. In the 
ahaxe of a common policy on foreign investment, manber states of the Cuib 
bean Community may find thanselves offering a wide variety of arrrmgaents 
that cwld make no1w~18e of the whok integration movanent. The iodustriPl 
pmgramming dfort now bean# made could also be affected if foreign invatom 
(with tbt mllaboration of individual g o v a ~ ~ ~ t a )  decide to pay no attention to 
the.gr&martsreeched. 
Condudin# ramark8 
The M t s  offered by the CBI arc conditional. In other words, tbat is a cost 
;", involved, and prospective buKficiaries would have to decide whether they arc pra  
p a d  to pay this cost. More fwdamartally. they would have to dccide whether 
the bendits offered arc significant for their development objactivcs, and whether 
the conditions are compatibk with the solution to their dfollomic difticutks as 
they sac them. The positive aspccts would have to be weighed against the negative. 
The basic strat* envisaged in the CBI is not new. It has been tried and found 
wanting. And this may uplain why morc and more countries of the region iue 
turning to new approaches that often entail political and economic rcorganizltion 
of a far-mhing natun. If the CBI is supposed to constitute a response to thirs 
situation, the US has fakd to understand the mood of the region or to appredate 
-the link betwaen its own for* policy and poverty and oppression in the Fegion. 
No lemons wcm to have been learnt from past mistakes or from the experiarce of 
the AUiPnce for Progress w h m  bcncfits wcre largely confinad to privileged group 
unwillin~ to undertplre the fundamental refonus necessary to deal with the ques- 
tion of &dtsPteod poverty. The concern with rtcurity continues to o v d d e  dl 
other ddaations in a renewed cold-wu r t m p h a c .  
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Caribbean Basin Initiative 
Reviewed by 
Foreign Ministers 
Secretary Haig and Ambassador 
Wi l l i am  E. Brock, US. Trade Repre- 
sentative, met i n  Neu York  March 
14-15, 1982, with Minister of State for 
External Affairs Mark MacGuigan 
(Canada), Secreta y of Foreign Aflairs 
Jorge Castaneda de la Rosa (Mexico), 
Minister of Foreign Aflairs Jose Albert0 
Zumbrano I'alasco (Venezuela), and 
.!fin ister of' Foreign .4Ja irs Carlos 
L a o s  S immonds  (Colombia) to m i e w  
the result o j  the Ju l y  1981 consultations 
begun at S a s s a u  regarding an  initiative 
to stimuLate economic and social 
dmelopement i n  the Caribbean Basin  
area. 
FoLLouing i s  the joint neus  con- 
ference held i n  the C'.AV. Plaza Hotel and 
the joint communique.' 
JOINT NEWS COSFERENCE,  
MAR. 15, 1982 
Secretary Haig. We'd like to use this as 
an opportunity to review for the press 
corps the results of our last day and a 
half of the meetings here on the Carib- 
h a n  Basin initiative. 
This meeting in New York was a 
further step in the consultation process 
begun at  Nassau in July of 1981. At the 
time the Foreign Ministers of Canada, 
Mexico, Venezuela, and the United 
States committed themselves to address 
the grave and, in some cases, 
catastrophic ecopomic and social p rob  
lems besetting the Caribbean Basin. 
Over the past 6 months, there have 
been additional meetings with the six 
countries of Central America, as well as 
the countries of the Caribbean Basin. 
On this occasion, a t  this weekend's 
meeting, the original Nassau four 
became the New York five with the ad- 
dition of our colleague from Colombia to 
the discussions and to the donor 
category. We plan as  a group to meet 
again, as the communique indicates, in 
Caracas, Venezuela, in August of this 
year to as,fQss again the progress that 
we have been making in this important 
collective endeavor. 
I would like to just say a brief word 
about the U.S. approach to this 
endeavor which is a departure from 
traditional U.S. efforts in the foreign 
assistance area. 
It  is testament to the fact that now 
five donor countries can concert 
together to meet the socioeconomic 
crisis in thC region and to do so in a 
flexible, understanding, and compatible 
way. We have mutually agreed to be 
free to choose the ways in which each 
donor nation can help in the region. 
In the case of the United States, 
President Reagan's Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative will involve a doubling of our 
economic constructions from previous 
years, but the truly innovative aspect of 
the program lies in a longer term trade 
and investment initiative which we hope 
will be matched by reciprocal self-help 
measures on the part of recipient na- 
tions. 
I think in general I,  personally-and 
I will let my colleagues comment from 
their perspective-consider this meeting 
to have been highly successful. The com- 
munique itself confirms the un- 
precedented level of sacrifice made by 
the donor countries and the high degree 
of cooperation involved in this project. I t  
is a project that is not focused on prom- 
ises and rhetoric but on real con- 
tributory steps by all of the donor 
states. One might even single out our 
Colombian colleague whose government 
has come to this meeting with com- 
mitments, even though Colombia itself is 
in a developmental status, so the 
sacrifices that it entails are, I think, 
most laudable. 
I think it's important that it is 
recognized that in this project we've 
avoided the creation of large 
bureaucracies or controlling mechanisms 
which consume resources and energy 
and have dealt within the framework of 
our existing governmental structures. 
All in all, I think from the U.S. point 
of view, we can take a great sense of 
satisfaction. This week, as you know, 
President Reagan will forward to the 
Congress the American legislative pro- 
posals to implement his approach to the 
Caribbean Basin initiative. I t  is clear 
that, following the President's recent 
Department of State Bulletin 
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Secretary Haig holds joint meeting with foreign ministers who supPo; President ~ e a ~ i n ' s  Caribbean Basin initiative. Left to right are 
Jorge Castaneda of Mexico; Carlos Lemos Simmonds of Colombia; Secretary Baig; William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Representative; 
Minister of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan of Canada. Foreign Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco of Venezuela, not 
shown here, also attended the meeting. 
speech, it has garnered strong bipartisan 
support, and we are very hopeful that 
the American Congress will recognize 
that the Cnited States is now joining a 
number of donor states which are well 
along in their commitment and their 
delivery on those commitments to the 
anguishing problems of the hemisphere. 
Q. I would like to ask the visiting 
foreign ministers, since you have re- 
tained freedom of action in your own 
trade and aid programs, to what ex- 
tent are your countries willing to aid 
in the economic reconstruclion of El 
Salvador even if the insurrection there 
succeeds? And to what extent do you 
share the extreme worry of the United 
States about that eventuality? 
Secretary MacGuigan. I don't think 
that we are here to answer hwypothetical 
questions, but I can say that my country 
imposes no ideological tests for its aid 
programs, but we do impose certain 
practical tests, and one of those, of 
course, is the safety of any personnel 
that we might have in the country. 
In our recently announced program 
for Central America-El Salvador-is 
certainly included, as are the other coun- 
tries of the region, but we are not 
presently planning any aid to that coun- 
try because we are not sure that we 
could carry out any program planning 
which we would begin a t  this time. So 
essentially it's a pragmatic question for 
us. 
R e  don't have a theoretical or 
ideological answer to a question of that 
kind, but we certainly have a lot of prac- 
tical concerns. We wouldn't want to give 
an answer in advance. We'd have to 
check the circumstances a t  the time. 
Q.  Do you share the Secretary's 
stated concern about that eventuality? 
Secretary MacGuigan. I'm giving a 
press conference a t  noon. You're 
welcome to come. I think the conference 
here really should be on the Caribbean 
Basin initiative, but if you want to get 
into Canadian foreign policy, we'll be 
very happy to discuss it a t  that time. 
Canada has certainly supported the elec- 
tion process in El Salvador. 
Q.  What role will human rights be 
playing in this Caribbean policy ini- 
tiative? 
Secretary Haig. Clearly, human 
rights is an essential ingredient of 
American foreign policy, as it has been 
from the outset. Human rights value 
judgments run across the whole spec- 
trum of America's foreign policy at  
large, and globally, to use that dirty 
word, as  well as in the region. 
Q.  Is the U S .  ban on aid to Cuba 
in this plan-is that viewed as holding 
up a more structured cooperative ef- 
fort by the donors? 
Secretary Castaneda. As you know, 
in accordance with this Caribbean Basin 
initiative, each donor country chooses 
not only the countries to which it gives 
aid but the manner in which it gives aid. 
So that the American prohibition for aid 
to Cuba affects only the United States. 
It does not affect other countries. 
In the case of Mexico, we will, as 
much as  is possible for us-we are a 
developing country-we do give aid to 
Cuba, and we have very rich coordinated 
[inaudible] between the two countries of 
mutual assistance in the technical field 
and in the growing field in general. So it 
does not affect Mexico's participation in 
this effort a t  all. 
Q.  This is a rather impressive ar- 
ray of statesmen from the Western 
Hemisphere. In political terms what 
kind of impact do you think this 
meeting is going to have on your ef- 
forts to sell the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative to the American Congress? 
Secretary Haig. I think we have 
Ambassador Brock here who's been 
leading our charge on this situation and 
has just recently returned from some of 
his intensive discussions on it. Bill, why 
don't you answer the question? 
Ambassador Brock. As I said to the 
meeting this morning, the demonstration 
of cooperation and the breadth of sup- 
port, evidenced by the ministers from 
the several countries here, is essential, I 
think, to our success in Congress. 
We face very difficult economic 
problems at  home, and the fact that this 
is an effort which is joined by some of 
our most important friends and allies, it 
is imperative to its ultimate success, 
both in real terms and in terms of gain- 
ing the support that we have to have to 
insure congressional passage. I think 
that prospect is greatly enhanced by this 
meeting, and I think we're going to have 
a successful piece of legislation, hope- 
fully in the not-too-distant future. 
Q .  In view of recent contacts that 
have been held with Cuba and 
Nicaragua, can the United States con- 
template the possibility of an ap- 
provalistic aid or assistance to all 
those countries? 
Secretary Haig. Again, I want to 
ke 3 the focus of this press conference 
on ihe Caribbean Basin initiative. But I 
think the basic philosophy that's underlg- 
ing the initiative and our respective ap- 
proaches to it have been that there are 
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are I. 8 automatic inclusions. The pros- 
pects for the future will depend in large 
measure, from the U.S. point of view, 
on a number of uncertainties which are 
yet to clarify. But as they do clarify, 
clearly such an outcome would be very 
possible. 
Q. The existence of this gathering 
is in some ways viewed as  redundant 
to  the effort and the mission of the 
Organization of American States. I 
wonder if, indeed, you consider this to 
be in any way supplanting or does 
your organization here indicate the 
OAS is not capable of handling either 
these problems or the  peace problems 
in the area? 
Secretary Haig. This in no way 
should be viewed as running counter to 
the objectives and the functions of the 
Organization of American States. In- 
deed, it should be viewed as complemen- 
tary to their efforts, as well as the ef- 
forts of other organizations which have 
long been in place and which are de- 
signed to contribute to the socio- 
economic improvement of the region. 
Beyond that, I think it's important 
to recognize that Canada is not a 
member of the OAS, but it is par- 
ticipating not only actively but as a 
leading contributor to the developmental 
needs of the region. So there are no con- 
tradictions a t  all in our efforts here. 
Q. In the past, the conduct of 
many of the multinationals in Latin 
America has been the cause for suspi- 
cion and distrust. How is the U.S. 
Government going t o  guarantee, in a 
sense, the good behavior of the pres- 
ent  initiative? 
Secretary Haig. I t  goes without 
saying that the whole approach of Presi- 
dent Reagan has been one which is 
designed to provide for reciprocity in the 
sense of not only shaping the American 
contribution to elicit progress in the 
socioeconomic spheres in the recipient 
country but to shape our contribution in 
conformance with the wishes of the re- 
cipient country. Therefore, the answer 
to your question is that the basic 
philosophy insures mutual advantage 
and mutual coordination in the develop- 
ment of the program itself. 
Foreign Minister Zambrano. 
Venezuela is most active in cooperative 
efforts in the Caribbean, and this in- 
terest of our country explains our 
presence here a t  this meeting. 
However, we have a very clear idea 
of what constitutes cooperation and 
what constitutes negotiation. As far as 
we are concerned, the content of 
cooperation is one that allows many and 
variegated forms of cooperation. It  
might be very important cooperation, in 
cooperation of lesser importance, but all 
of this cooperation must be consistent 
with the fundamental concept that this 
is a contribution that one community 
makes to another community, conscious 
of its responsibility and of its solidarity. 
And that these contributions are used 
for the economic development of those 
societies and also must contribute to the 
common good. 
In Venezuela, in our particular case, 
we are making great sacrifices within 
our own community, and instead of 
devoting these resources to our own 
self-interests and our own needs, we are 
making these contributions to other 
areas and to other countries in the 
region. I t  seems to us that in this sense 
our cooperation and the cooperation that 
any country or any private company or 
corporation might want to make should 
be done under these principles with sub- 
mission to these ideals of what we con- 
sider is a true cooperation, and then the 
recipient state is fully free and complete- 
ly sovereign to use the aid or support in 
any manner it wishes. 
Ambassador Brock. A couple of 
very important or specific points. If 
what we do does not result in an oppor- 
tunity for the individual country to 
choose its own path, we will have chosen 
the wrong way to go. If what we do 
does not result in the development of 
domestic economic growth, domestically 
controlled, the program will not succeed. 
If you look a t  the legislation, the 
kinds of things that we mention as  con- 
stituting a self-help effort are a 
pluralistic, democratic process, a free 
labor movement, the opportunity for in- 
dividuals and groups of individuals to 
better themselvgs within the societal 
value system of each country as they 
desire their own program. 
I think my own belief is that we 
have very consciously tried to structure 
an effort that will deal with precisely the 
problem you mentioned by letting each 
country control its own destiny and have 
the economic growth and the jobs to do 
so and to maintain a pluralistic, 
democratic society in the process. 
Q.  I would like t o  ask why Colom- 
bia might think that  this would be dif- 
ferent from previous aid programs in 
the past, and why Colombia, a s  a 
developing nation in need of economic 
assistance itself, chose t o  become a 
sponsor? 
Foreign Minister Lemos. I shall 
reply, addressing myself to the last part 
of your question first. Colombia, though 
it is a developing country and, as such, 
it needs assistance, feels, however, that 
it has reached a level of growth which, 
though it might not be as  great as  other 
larger countries such as the United 
States, Canada, or some other in- 
dustrialized country, is greater than that 
of other nations in the same Caribbean 
Basin area. 
Therefore, we considered that we 
should share what we do have with some 
of the less developed nations in the area. 
Yesterday I stated that one would 
not have to be opulent to feel that one 
should express a feeling of solidarity for 
other nations in the area. Colombia feels 
a need to show this solidarity and make 
its contribution toward the economic 
development of other countries because 
we feel that economic balance is a pre- 
condition to political balance and well be- 
ing. 
Colombia has made great efforts in 
terms of its own capabilities, and we 
would hope that our initiative would con- 
stitute an example for other countries 
which might be richer and yet are less 
generous. This is what has led Colombia 
to join a common effort of the Nassau 
four and has led us to offer our help. 
And, as we have heard here yesterday, 
the result of the initial efforts has 
already been splendid, and we hope that 
this effort will imbue some dynamism 
and some hope to the countries of the 
area. 
JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
MAR. 15, 1982 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark 
MacGuigan of Canada, Secretary of Foreign 
Relations Jorge Castaneda of Mexico, 
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig of the 
United States of America, Ambassador 
William E.  Brock, United States Trade 
Representative, Foreign Minister Jose Alber- 
to Zambrano Velasco of Venezuela, and 
Foreign Minister Carlos Lemos Simmonds of 
Colombia met in New York on March 14-15, 
1982 to review the results of the consulta- 
tions begun a t  Nassau on July 11, 1981 
regarding an initiative to stimulate the 
economic and social development of the 
Caribbean Basin area. 
The Ministers noted that since that time 
extensive discussions had been held with the 
governments of countries in the Caribbean 
Department of State Bulletin 
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Basin area, with other interested govern- 
ments and with international financial institu- 
tions, both on a bilateral basis and a t  interna- 
tional meetings. They emphasized that their 
governments' efforts would continue to take 
full account of the national plans and 
priorities of the countries of the Caribbean 
Basin and their own capacities to assist these 
countries. 
On the basis of these consultations, the 
Ministers stressed that dynamic and balanced 
social and economic development in the coun- 
tries of the Caribbean Basin area is essential, 
not only for the welfare of the people in the 
area but also for the peace and prosperity of 
the entire hemisphere. They agreed that the 
socio-economic problems which face the coun- 
tries of the Caribbean and Central America 
are critical and in many cases are  becoming 
more serious. The Ministers underlined that 
this economic and social development could 
best be achieved by programs of cooperation, 
without military considerations or political 
pre-conditions. They stated that each country 
in the Caribbean Basin could benefit from 
such economic cooperation and that, a t  the 
same time, donor countries must be free to 
choose the countries with which they 
cooperate, and the ways they can best be of 
help. The Ministers agreed that general 
economic development could be stimulated 
through, inter aha, public financial develop- 
ment cooperation, trade and investment, both 
public and private. 
The Ministers took note of the individual 
programs of each of the participants as 
described below: 
Canada's Secretary of State for External 
Affairs explained that Canada has already 
embarked on a five-year expanded program 
of economic development cooperation with 
the English-speaking Caribbean and also with 
Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the coun- 
tries of Central America, a t  a value of over 
one half billion dollars. Canadian tariff treat- 
ment currently provides duty free or 
preferential access to the Canadian market 
for some 98 percent by value of all exports 
from the Caribbean Basin area to Canada. In 
the context of the CanaddCARICOM [Carib- 
bean Community] Joint Trade and Economic 
Agreement of January 1979, Canada is 
already engaged with the Commonwealth 
Caribbean in a wide range of programs to 
promote regional integration, industrial 
development and cooperation between Cana- 
dian and Caribbean private sector organiza- 
tions. Canada has recently established Petro- 
Canada International to assist oil-importing 
developing countries, including those in the 
Caribbean Basin area, to reduce or eliminate 
their dependence on imported oil. 
The Foreign Ministers of Mexico and 
Venezuela advised the meeting that their 
countries are  continuing their cooperation 
with the countries of the Caribbean Basin 
area, under the San Jose Declaration of 
Presidents Lopez Portillo and Herrera Cam- 
pins, which assures supply of oil for internal 
consumption and provides long-term conces- 
sional credits for government development 
projects. This program, valued a t  over $700 
million per year, is of great benefit for the 
countries of the area, enabling them to fulfill 
better their national development priorities. 
Mexico's Foreign Minister described Mex- 
ico's ongoing development cooperation proj- 
ects with the countries of the area. In addi- 
tion to the San Jose agreement, he men- 
tioned specifically the system of trade 
facilities with the Central American coun- 
tries, which will be broadened to Caribbean 
countries, preferential credit lines, currently 
a t  $68 million to the central banks of the 
area, Mexico's membership in the Caribbean 
Development Bank and its participation in 
the special program for s6ft-loans to Carib- 
bean less developed countries, its active role 
in various regional multinational government 
enterprises and its broad programs of 
bilateral technical cooperation with countries 
of the region, which now include 308 specific 
projects. 
The Foreign Minister of Venezuela ad- 
vised that the Government of Venezuela has 
traditionally cooperated in solidarity with the 
countries of the area, based on principles of 
international social justice, and has provided 
even more significant cooperation since 1974 
through programs of financial support (more 
than US $2.5 billion in the last five years). He 
mentioned particularly the creation of a 
special fund for the Eastern Caribbean that 
provides highly concessional financing for 
balance of payments and development pro- 
jects. He mentioned also the establishment of 
technical and technological assistance in the 
commercial, agricultural, educational and 
cultural areas which are  aimed a t  con- 
tributing to the total development of the 
human and physical resources of the coun- 
tries in question, and thereby to their 
democratic, political, economic and social 
development. 
The United States described its program 
of integrated and mutually reinforcing 
measures in the fields of trade, investment 
and financial assistance, which President 
Reagan announced on February 24. 
The following measures are being submit- 
ted to the C'nited States Congress. In trade, 
a key feature will be the elimination of duties 
on imports from the Caribbean Basin, with 
the exception of textiles and apparel which 
are  subject to textile agreements. Investment 
will be spurred by granting Cnited States in- 
vestors in Basin countries the same ten per- 
cent tax credit a s  is available for investment 
in the Cnited States. A requested $350 
million supplemental appropriation for the 
region in fiscal year 1982 will address critical 
short-term economic problems of the region, 
and bring total concessional economic 
assistance there in fiscal year 1982 to $825 
million. 
In addition to these legislative requests, 
measures within the discretion of the Presi- 
dent will include: a )  favorable treatment for 
Caribbean Basin textiles and apparel exports, 
within the context of the overall United 
States textile policy; b) expanded short-term 
credit guarantees by the United States 
Export-Import Bank; c) willingness to 
negotiate bilateral investment treaties; and d) 
a program to enhance the role of Puerto Rico 
and the United States Virgin Islands in the 
development of overall prosperity in the 
region. 
The Colombian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs stated that for some time his country 
has been actively cooperating with the coun- 
tries of the Basin and, in that respect 
welcomed the opportunity to join the nations 
which met in Nassau in their effort to resolve 
the economic and social problems of the 
region. 
He described the Colombian contributions 
to the Caribbean Development Bank amount- 
ing to $16 million and the existing credit 
lines and deposits of $42 million. He explain- 
ed that the Colombian Government has now 
decided to initiate the following measures: (1) 
creation of a special fund for technical 
assistance to be provided by official agencies 
with resources up to $50 million; (2) granting 
of new credit lines up to $10 million per coun- 
try; (3) establishment of additional time 
deposits for the financing of balance of 
payments deficits; (4) reciprocal credit 
agreements with the countries not yet 
covered; (5) establishment of a trust fund for 
projects in the less developed countries of the 
Eastern Caribbean; (6) preferential trade 
agreements within the context of the Latin 
American Association of Integration 
(ALADI); (7) improvement, in cooperation 
with other countries, of sea and air transpor- 
tation systems. 
The Ministers expressed their deep 
satisfaction with the ongoing economic 
cooperation in the area. They agreed that the 
announced economic program of the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America could 
make a significant contribution to the region's 
development, and expressed their hope that 
these measures would be implemented as 
quickly as  possible. 
The Ministers welcomed the decision 
taken by Governments of the area to be in- 
volved actively in the formulation of regional 
development plans. In this regard, the 
Ministers stressed the importance of existing 
institutions for consultation and coordination 
regarding economic and developmental needs 
and priorities in the Caribbean region. They 
noted the efforts being made to develop a 
coordinating group for Central America and 
hoped there would be an early and positive 
result from this exercise. 
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The Ministers expressed satisfaction that, 
within the region, other countries were par- 
ticipating in the developn~ent process. In this 
connection, they welcomed the substantial 
financial assistance provided by Trinidad and 
Tobago in the area. They also noted that 
other countries outside the area were also 
responding to the region's pressing needs. 
The Ministers concluded that the effort 
begun at Nassau had been successful in focus- 
ing greater attention on the critical need for 
increased economic development assistance, 
cooperation and coordination in the Carib- 
bean Basin area and they affirmqi their 
political will to continue their efforts to imple- 
ment their respective national cooperation 
programs in the area as quickly and effective- 
ly as possible. The Ministers also reaffirmed 
their view that promotion of peace, stability 
and economic development in the Caribbean 
Basin area is equally important to the 
broader world community and they appealed 
to other nations of the hemisphere and the 
world to contribute toward that objective. 
The Ministers agreed to continue con- 
sultations with other governments with a 
view to inviting senior officials of interested 
countries and multilateral economic organiza- 
tions to an ad hoc meeting to encourage 
greater cooperative efforts for economic and 
social development of the region. 
They also agreed to meet again in August 
inCaracas, Venezuela to examine jointly the 
progress which has been achieved. 
lPress release 101 of Mar. 18, 1982.  
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I. SUMMARY 
The Caribbean Basin includes some two 
dozen small developing nations in 
Central America, the Caribbean, and 
northern South America. The region 
forms the third border of the United 
States, contains vital sea lanes through 
which three-quarters of our oil imports 
must flow, is an important market for 
U.S. exports, and is our second largest 
source of illegal immigration. 
The Problem 
The basin countries have been seriously 
affected by the escalating cost of im- 
ported oil and declining prices for their 
major exports (sugar, coffee, bauxite, 
etc.). This has exacerbated their deep- 
rooted structural problems and caused 
serious inflation, high unemployment, 
declining gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, enormous balanceof-payments 
deficits, and a pressing liquidity crisis. 
This economic crisis threatens political 
and social stability throughout the 
region and creates conditions which 
Cuba and others seek to exploit through 
terrorism and subversion. 
Development of the Initiative 
The United States has been developing 
its program for responding to the 
economic crisis in close consultation with 
potential recipients and other donor 
countries. Last July S e c r e w  Haig and 
U.S. Special Trade Representative 
William Brock met in Nassau with the 
Foreign Ministers of Canada, Mexico, 
and Venezuela. They agreed to sponsor 
a multilateral action program for the 
region within which each country would 
develop its own program. Venezuela and 
Mexico are making a sigmficant con- 
tribution to the basin, particularly 
through their joint oil facility. Canada 
recently announced major increases in 
its foreign assistance to the area. The 
Colombians also intend to increase their 
financial contribution to the basin. We 
expect other donors will also expand 
their efforts in the areas of trade and 
investment. 
Key Elements of Proposed U.S. 
~ 0 t i P m  
The proposed U.S. program consists of 
integrated, mutually reinforcing meas- 
ures in the fields of trade, investment, 
and financial assistance. 
The centerpiece of the U.S. program 
is the offer of one-way free trade. Cur- 
rently the countries of the region are 
already afforded liberal entry into the 
US. market. Nevertheless, some of the 
duties which remain in place are in sec- 
tors of special interest to the basin coun- 
tries. They also limit export expansion 
into many nontraditional products. 
The President will request from the 
Congress authority to eli inate duties 
on all imports from the b%in except tex 
tiles and apparel. Sugar imports will 
receive duty-free treatment but only up 
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FY 1983 budget) 
I For allocation by country, see pp. 6-7. 
' Includes $20 m~llion earmarked for Nicaragua in the FY 1982 lnternatlonal Security and Development 
Cooperation Act. The Fore~gn Assistance and Related Program Appropriat~ons Act, 1982 contalns no speclflc 
reference to N~caragua; however, it was the intention of the committees as reflected in the propriatlons 
Conference Report that no funds should be spent for these purposes. The disposition of th@funds W I  be 
decided after further consultation w~th  Congress. 
to a certain limit in order to protect the 
U S .  domestic sugar price support pro- 
gram mandated by Congress. A safe- 
guard mechanism will be available to 
any U.S. industry seriously injured by 
increased basin imports. Rules of origin 
will be liberal to encourage investment 
but will require a minimum amount of 
local content (25%). The President will 
have discretion to designate bene- 
ficiaries, taking into account countries' 
own efforts to carry out necessary 
reform of their internal economic 
policies. 
The President will also seek congres- 
sional authorization to grant U.S. in- 
vestors in the Caribbean Basin a signifi- 
cant tax measure to encourage invest- 
ment. We are still consulting with the 
Congress on the exact measures to be 
employed. 
The President will request a fiscal 
year (FY) 1982 supplemental economic 
assistance appropriation of $350 million 
to  provide emergency assistance for 
several key countries whose situation is 
particularly critical. That will bring pro- 
posed FY 1982 economic assistance to 
$824.6 million or $403 million above FY 
1981. The Administration's request is for 
$664.5 million in FY 1983 economic 
assistance. As the table above shows, 
the security assistance is only a small 
portion of the total assistance provided 
by the United States to the Caribbean 
Basin region. 
Other Economic Initiatives 
The United States will extend 
more favorable treatment to Caribbean 
Basin textile and apparel exports under 
bilateral and multilateral agreements 
while continuing our overall policy of 
seeking tighter limits on import growth 
from our major suppliers. 
The United States will seek to 
negotiate bilateral investment treaties 
with interested countries. 
The United States will work with 
multilateral development banks and the 
private sector to develop insurance 
facilities to supplement the noncommer- 
cial investment risk insurance operation 
of the Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration (OPIC). 
The U.S. Export-Import Bank will 
expand protection, where its lending 
criteria allow, for short-term credit from 
commercial banks to basin private sec- 
tors for critical imports. 
The United States wi!l wnrk v,<,:irh 
each country to develop private sect.)r 
strategies to coordinate and fows 
development efforts of local business, 
U S .  firms, and private voluntary 
organizations. The strategies will seek to 
remove impediments to growth including 
lack of marketing skills, shortages of 
trained manpower, poor regiorral trans- 
port, and inadequate infrastructure. 
Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands 
A series of measures will support the 
efforts of Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands to play a dynamic role in the 
Caribbean region. For example, involve- 
ment of the possessions will he critical 
to the success of private sector d e v 4 p  
ment strategies. In addition, the U.S. 
Government has consulted closely with 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 
about the Caribbean Basin initiative. 
Legislation under the initiative will 
reflect Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
interests in many important ways. 
Excise taxes on all imported rum will be 
rebated to Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands. Inputs into Caribbean Basin 
production from the possessions will be 
considered domestic under the rules of 
origin. Their industries will have access 
to the same safeguards provisions as  
mainland industries. 
11. SPECIFIC U.S. ECONOMIC 
MEASURES 
The U S .  program for the Caribbean 
Basin initiative has been devcloped over 
the last 8 months in an intensiw inter- 
agency process and wide-rangiog con- 
sultations with the governments a ~ d  the
private sectors of donor and potential 
recipient countries. The resulting in- 
tegrated program of trade, invcotment, 
and aid attacks both emergency prob- 
lems and structural impediments to 
long-range economic development. 
The backbone of the program is the 
offer gf one-way free trade. While the 
economic benefits are long term, the 
offer of an unimpeded U.S. market to 
those small nations is a major pclitica! 
commitment with immediate impact. It 
will also strongly encourage sound inter- 
nal economic policies. 
Investment incentives (perticularly 
extension of a significant tax incenlive 
for U S .  direct investment in the baqin) 
Data on Potential Benefklarles of the Carlbkrn Basin Initlrtive, 1980 
TOTAL AREA: 494,684 square miles 
TOTAL POWLATION: 39 milllon 
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' Source: International Monetary Fund. Dlncmr~es of Trade Statktlcs V e a m k ,  1974-80. 
Primarily processed products of imported c r u d  oil. 
promise an immediate return to U.S. 
investors who undertake the increased 
risk perceived in the basin. They thus 
encourage the location of new produc- 
tion there. 
The emergency economic aid pro- 
g-&m confronts the acute liquidity crisis 
faced by many countries in the region. 
At stake is the survival of the private 
sector and with it the pluralism, diver- 
sity, and political moderation on which 
viable long-run policies depend. The 
development assistance and economic 
support funds in the FY 1983 budget, 
which incorporate significant increases 
from earlier years, will be directed into 
new programs aimed at  removing basic 
impediments to growth. 
In order to insure that Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands not only can con- 
tribute to, but benefit from, these new 
policies, a package of new measures con- 
cerning them is being prepared. 
Free Trade Area 
Given the serious economic deterioration 
in the Caribbean Basin region, the trade 
component of the Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative was designed to provide the 
most favorable access possible for ex- 
ports from the basin. Currently the 
countries of the region are already 
afforded liberal entry into the U.S. 
market. (In 1980, $6.4 billion-out of 
total Caribbean Basin exports to the 
United States of $10.4 billion-were free 
of duty; a large part of dutiable trade 
was accounted-for by petroleum-$2.7 
billion-for which tariffs are not 
economically meaningful.) Nevertheless, 
some of the duties which remain in place 
are in sectors of special interest to the 
basin counties. They also limit export 
expansion into many nontraditional 
products. 
The generalized system of pref- 
erences (GSP) already extends duty-free 
treatment on many products to a large 
number of developing countries. 
However, the GSP has a complex struc- 
ture which limits the ability of small and 
relatively inexperienced traders-which 
is the case in a great many of the Carib 
bean Basin's enterprises-to take advan- 
tage of the opportunities which GSP 
offers. Many of the more promising 
prospects for basin exports are in prod- 
uct categories which have been 
legislatively excluded from the GSP pro- 
gram for global reasons which are not 
relevant to the Caribbean Basin. Also, 
GSP has both dollar and percentage 
limitations which are arbitrary in their 
application to many Caribbean Basin 
products. 
U.S. Economic Relations With the 
Caribbean Basin 
U.S. Exports in 1981 $ 6,842 million 
(Major products: 
transportation equip- 




U.S. Imports in 1981 $10,027 mlllion 
(Major products: cot- 
ton, sugar, bauxite, 
coffee, meat) 
U.S. Direct Investment in 
1980 (cumulatlve) S 5,652 million 
U.S. Tourism in 1980 
Expenditures $ 1,134 million 
Number of travelers, 2.6 million 
excluding cruise travel travelers 
Therefore, the Administration will 
seek legislative authority to grant 
beneficiaries in the Caribbean Basin 
duty-free treatment for 12 years for all 
products with the sole exception of tex- 
tiles and apparel items which are subject 
to textile agreements. Sugar imports 
will receive duty-free treatment but only 
up to a certain limit in order to protect 
the U.S. domestic sugar price support 
program mandated by Congress. The 
Secretary of Agriculture will retain 
standby authority to further limit the 
entry of duty-free imports should this be 
necessary to protect the sugar program. 
A safeguard mechanism will be 
available. This will require a finding by 
the International Trade Commission that 
increased imports are a substantial 
cause of serious injury or threat thereof 
to U.S. domestic industry and a recom- 
mendation to the President to grant 
relief (e.g., a restoration of the tariff). 
Where safeguard relief is sought for 
perishable commodities, the legislation 
provides authority for the Secretary of 
Agriculture to recommend to the Presi- 
dent the restoration of most-favored- 
nation (MFN) treatment on an imme- 
diate basis if warranted pending the 
completion of the formal escape clause 
process. 
The rules of 0rig.m under the free- 
trade arrangement are an important fac- 
tor in determining the accessibility of 
duty-free access for resource-poor basin 
countries. The free trade area has been 
designed to avoid fostering the type of 
investment in the region which would 
result in mere "pass-throug;h" operations 
involving little value added in the coun- 
try. The Administration does not want 
to reduce the level of required local in- 
put to the point where the free trade 
area will encourage "runaway plants." 
Because of the relatively low level of 
development of many of the countries in 
the region and their limited access to 
local inputs, the free trade area will re- 
quire that basin countries supply a 
minimum of 25% of local value added. 
Inputs from all basin countries can be 
cumulated to meet the 25% minimum. 
Inputs from Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands will be treated as Caribbean 
products for purposes of the rules of 
origin. 
The President will have discretion to 
designate countries in the Caribbean 
Basin as beneficiaries of the free trade 
area subject to many of the same 
caveats contained in the GSP system 
(nondesignation of Communist countries 
and of countries which expropriate 
without compensation or which discrim- 
inate against U.S. exports). The Presi- 
dent will also take into account economic 
criteria such as the attitude of the 
beneficiaries toward private enterprise 
and the policies recipient countries are 
pursuing to promote their own devel- 
opment. The U S .  Government will enter 
into discussions with the Caribbean 
Basin countries to develop self-help 
objectives. 
The free trade area will require the 
United States to seek a waiver of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). 
Textiles 
The textile and apparel industry in most 
Caribbean Basin countries is of modest 
scale. U.S. imports from the region in 
1981 amounted to $472 million and 192 
million square yards equivalent, account- 
ing for 6% of total U.S. imports of 
apparel on a volume basis. 
Most textile exports from Caribbean 
Basin countries to the Urited States are 
made by U.S. companies which assemble 
garments in those countries from fabric 
produced and cut in the United States. 
Under section 807 of the U.S. tariff 
code, these companies pay duty only on 
the value added abroad. 
In 1981 the United States exported 
$8 million worth of textile machinery 
and $519 million worth of textile and 
apparel products to the Caribbean Basin 
countries, much of the latter as cut 
fabric for assembly into garments. 
International textile trade is gov- 
erned by the provisions of the GATT 
arrangement commonly known as the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). The 
MFA provides a framework for insuring 
orderly development of textile and 
apparel trade while avoiding disrupt,ion 
of importing country markets. In recog- 
nition of the special nature of textile 
trade as reflected by the MFA, textile 
and apparel products are not proposed 
for duty-free treatment under the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative. The U.S. Govern- 
ment intends, however, to allow more 
favorable access for Caribbean Basin 
products, on a case-by-case basis within 
the context of overall Administration 
textile policy implementing the MFA. 
The U.S. Government will continue to 
seek tighter limits on import growth 
from our major suppliers. 
The United States has textile trade 
agreements with Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic, Costa Rica, and Jamaica, 
which set agreed levels of trade for cer- 
tain products. (No quokq are currently 
in effect under the Jamaica agreement.) 
Tax Measures 
The Administration recognizes that 
some U S .  entrepreneurs may be hesi- 
tant to invest in some Caribbean Basin 
countries. The risk may be perceived as 
high for venture capital, especially when 
coupled with the start-up costs of 
developing new markets and marketing 
channels, training new local employees 
and managers, and overcoming trans- 
portation %otflenecks to insure a steady 
flow of raw mate ria!^ and export prod- 
ucts. 
For this reason, the Administration 
is developing a tax proposal to en- 
courage U.S. investment in the Carib- 
bean Basin. We are still consulting on 
the exact nature of this proposal. An 
example of a possible tax measure under 
discussion is a 5-year legislative exten- 
sion of the domestic investment tax 
credit for up to 10% of the amount of 
fixed asset investment in the countries 
of the region. Such a system would 
operate in much the same fashion as 
does the tax credit for investment cur- 
rently in effect in the United States. The 
tax credit would be granted for a 5-year 
period to individual countries which 
enter into executive agreements for tax 
administration purposes. After the 
5-year period, the program would be 
evaluated and a decision made on 
whether to continue the extension. The 
credit would permit U.S. businesses to 
reduce their net tax liability in the 
United States. 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Bilateral investment treaties are in- 
tended to help stabilize the bilateral in- 
vestment relationship with a developing 
country by establishing an agreed legal 
framework for investment, by assuring 
certain minimum standards of treat- 
ment, and by providing agreed means 
for resolving investment disputes. 
Other developed countries are fur- 
ther along in their bilateral investment 
treaty programs than the United States. 
(The Federal Republic of Germany, for 
example, has approximately 50 outstand- 
ing.) During 1981 the United States 
developed a prototype and late in the 
year began discussions with several 
countries. I t  is generally agreed that the 
U.S. prototype treats the investment 
issue more comprehensively than the 
treaties signed by other developed coun- 
tries and has the potential to have a 
greater impact on investment climates in 
less developed countries (LDCs). The 
key elements of the U.S. protob-pe 
bilateral investment treaty are: 
Provisions concerning entry and 
duration of investment; 
Treatment for established U.S. in- 
vestors which is no less favorable than 
that given domestic investors and other 
foreign investors; 
Prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation in the event of nationaliza- 
tion; 
Unrestricted repatriation and 
other transfers of assets; and 
Dispute settlement provisions. 
The United States is prepared to 
negotiate bilateral investment treaties 
with interested countries in the Carib- 
bean Basin. Negotiations have already 
begun with Panama, a t  that country's 
initiative. 
Investment Insurance and OPIC 
Programs 
The Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration currently offers political risk in- 
surance for U S .  investors in approx- 
imately 100 developing countries. 
Coverages offered are for expropriation, 
war risk, and inconvertibility. Similar 
programs are offered by other developed 
countries, although their participation in 
Latin America varies according to per- 
ceived commercial and strategic in- 
terests. 
OPIC also has other programs to 
facilitate U S .  investment flows to the 
Caribbean Basin region. OPIC can make 
direct loans for certain kinds of in- 
vestments. This authority is used almost 
exclusively in the region. OPIC also 
organizes missions of U.S. business 
representatives to explore investment 
opportunities. In late 1981 OPIC took in- 
vestment missions to two basin states, 
Jamaica and Haiti. 
OPIC is increasing its activities in 
the Caribbean Basin in both the in- 
surance and other programs. However, 
for legislative and other reasons, there 
are gaps in insurance coverage availah:.: 
to Caribbean Basin investment. These 
include: 
Limited coverages in countries 
where OPIC is a t  or near its country 
limit; 
Lack of general coverage for non- 
developed country investment, i.e., 
reeional investment. domestic invest- 
mznt, Organization 'of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
investment; 
Lack of sufficient coverage for 
major investments in mining and energy 
production. 
To expand insurance coverage avail. 
able to eligible U.S. investors, OPIC is 
working with private sector insurers to 
establish informal consortia where 
appropriate on a project-by-project basis. 
Mixed coverage of this kind is currently 
being discussed for a major project in 
the basin. 
For other investments not eligible 
for OPIC coverage, some form of 
multilateral insurance may be possible. 
World Bank (IBRD) President Clausen 
stated his interest in examining such a 
scheme in his September 1981 speech to 
the World Bank Board of Governors. 
Concessional Aid 
Concessional U.S. assistance is expected 
to increase rapidly under the Caribbean 
Basin initiative. The three primary tools 
for providing direct economic aid are: 
Development assistance, which is 
project oriented, with emphasis on 
agriculture, health, and population prob- 
lems; 
Economic support funds (ESF), 
which are more flexible and can provide 
direct balanceof-payments support as  
well as credit for crucial imports; and 
Food aid, provided through PL 
480 programs, which provides needed 
foreign exchange and generates counter- 
part development funds. 
Some increase of total concessional 
assistance to the Caribbean Basin is 
planned in FY 1982 under the current 
budget level. A major increase will be 
achieved, however, through a $350 
million supplemental request to Con- 
gress to increase FY 1982 funding. In 
FY 1983 the proposed level is more than 
50% higher than the actual level of 
obligations in FY 1981 and double the 
FY 1980 level. 
The bulk of the planned increase in 
U.S. assistance is in the economic sup- 
port fund program for the region. ESF 
assistance for the basin would increase 
from $15 million in FY 1980 to $490 
million in FY 1982 if the supplemental 
request is approved and to $326 million 
in FY 1983. The ESF would be used pri- 
marily to finance private-sector imports, 
thus strengthening the balance of 
payments of key countries of the basin 
while facilitating increased domestic pro- 
duction and employment. At the same 
time, we will be discussing with other 
donors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
and with the policymakers of these coun- 
tries, possible reform measures to insure 
that the ESF assistance is utilized effec- 
tively and will have the greatest possible 
impact on local production and employ- 
ment. 
In FY 1982, development assistance 
for the basin wiU increase by $44 
million, or 25%, over the FY 1981 level. 
In FY 1983, $218 million of development 
assistance is proposed, a further in- 
crease of 3% over the FY 1982 level. 
These amounts are approximately the 
same as the $215 million of development 
assistance provided in FY 1980, but the 
level in FY 1980 was extraordinarily 
high Kmce it included funding provided 
in response to several natural disasters 
in the Canibean as well as to the 
worsening situation in Central America. 
Food f& Peace assistance under PL 
480 is projected to i n w  by $40 
million, or nearly M%, over FY 1980 
levels. This will increase tbe foodstuff8 
available in the basin countries while 
alao providing balamd-payments sup 
port. I.mal currency genmted throueh 
this assistance supports local develop 
ment activities and helps reduce govern- 
ment budget deficits. Conditionr a m .  
ciated with this aabtma relate to 
rpacr~ec~nornic policy rdonnr rn well aa 
policies and programa to 
agricultural production. 
Assistance under the Car0bean 
Basin initiative will be focused 
ingly on private sector mpport. Bdh 
capital and technical assistance will be 
provided to ameliorate i n f r a s h d e ,  
credit, institutional, and con- 
straints to trade and investment expan- 
sion throughout the area. 
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(Continued on page 7) 
The table above 11h0ws: A l p i e P l M  Modernization 
The Caribbean Basin initiative accords a 
high priority to the problem8 of the 
on'# food and 8. Deputment 0 F* Agnculau. -r- (USDA) me
har q e d d  eqmrtiae which can help 
m o d e  the b ' r  agriculture. 
Agrjcultunl output in the Caribbean 
%in countaka inchersed only 1.6% in 
1981, down h rp ly  from the 4%-6% 
growth trend of the 1970s. World prices 
are currently soft for the region's major 
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I Due to roundina, some fioures mav not total. 
Includes $20 million eariarked fo; Nicaragua in the FY 1982 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act. The Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations Act, 1982, contains no 
specific reference to Nicaragua; however, it was the intention of the committees as reflected in the A p  
propriations Conference Report that no funds ehould be spent for these purposes. The disposition of these 
funds will be decided after further consultation with Congress. 
a Specifically for the American lnetltute for Free Labor Development. 
' Unallocated for speclal requirements. 
agricultural exports (banmas, coffee, 
beef, sugar, cotton, and coooa). 
Agricultural commodities account for 
about half of the basin's export earnings. 
Although the agricultural sector's 
contribution to the economies of the 
region haa been steadily declining (and 
nowhere exceeds 40%)' about 67% of the 
region's population is still rural. Modern- 
ization of the agricultural sector is vital 
to meeting the food needs of the region's 
growing populace and to enhance export 
earnings. 
Improving Animal and Plant 
Health and Quality. Plant and animal 
products exported to the United States 
must meet U.S. agricultural health and 
sanitary regulations which USDA en- 
forces. USDA is prepared to make a 
concerted, coordinated effort to promote 
increased regional understanding of U.S. 
agricultural health and sanitary regula- 
tions, to provide technical assistance on 
plant inspection procedures and on 
operating fumigation facilities, and to 
offer training in enforcing health and 
sanitary regulations. An interagency 
group is working to develop means for 
providing assistance to comply with U.S. 
health and sanitary regulations. 
An animal disease-free Caribbean 
Basin would be mutually beneficial to 
the region and the United States. The 
U.S. Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID) and USDA have programs 
to contain and eradicate swine fever and 
encephalomyelitis. Additional coopera- 
tion in this field is envisioned. 
Caribbean Basin countries need to 
better gear their agricultural production 
to the standards of the world market, to 
better serve their domestic and export 
needs both in terms of quality and 
seasonal availability. To aid these coun- 
tries to achieve acceptable standards 
and grades, technical assistance could be 
offered from USDA, drawing on the ex- 
perience of the Food Quality and Safety 
Service which assures that all imported 
food products meet U.S. standards for 
proper labeling and wholesomeness. 
Technical advice could assist Caribbean 
exporters to serve the world market by 
supplying quality products which may 
not be available otherwise at  reasonable 
prices. Minimizing losses during distribu- 
tion and storage of perishables is essen- 
tial to the successful marketing of these 
products. 
Promotion of Agroindustries. 
USDA has begun to play an important 
role in facilitating the involvement of 
U.S. agribusiness in developing coun- 
tries. Technical expertise found in U.S. 
agribusiness can help solve agricultural 
problems in developing countries and to 
provide additional opportunities for U.S. 
firms. Given the relatively small 
economies of the Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries, agroindustries must be carefully 
designed with regard to location and 
scale. USDA is already actively involved 
in providing agribusiness development 
assistance to Jamaica, including the for- 
mulation of joint ventures, provision of 
management expertise, and the sale of 
U.S. capital goods. 
Expanding Agricultural Research 
and Training Opportunities. Both 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have 
proposed establishment of a tropical 
agriculture research center for the en- 
tire Caribbean region. Establishing such 
a center on U.S. territory can take ad- 
vantage of linkages with the entire U.S. 
agricultural research and educational 
system. USDA, through its own re- 
search organizations and in concert with 
the land grant universities, can play a 
useful role in advising both the hosts 
and financers of such a center. Careful 
coordination will be necessary with ex- 
isting educational and research institu- 
tions in the region, such as the Center 
for Agricultural Research and Training 
located in Costa Rica. 
Expanded agricultural training activ- 
ities are anticipated as a result of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative. Examples of 
USDA's involvement include a recent 
agricultural credit course in Haiti, a 
comprehensive agricultural training plan 
in Guyana, and a tropical forestry cur- 
riculum developed in cooperation with 
the Forest Service's Tropical Forestry 
Station in Puerto Rico. Training of plant 
health inspectors from the Caribbean 
can also be envisioned. 
Coordinating Bilateral Agricul- 
tural Programs With Multilateral 
Organizations. USDA experts, as well 
as short-term consultants, work with 
international organizations involved in 
the Caribbean Basin. USDA is 
represented on the governing bodies of 
the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture, as well as 
other such organizations, and thereby 
helps direct the organizations' programs 
and policies of assistance. Discussions 
are now underway with the staffs of the 
World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank to establish subcom- 
mittees on food and agriculture to func- 
tion within the framework of the consor- 
tia led by the respective banks. 
Assistance for Private Sector 
Development 
The U.S. Government will be working 
with Caribbean Basin governments to 
design private sector development 
strategies which combine private, public, 
and voluntary organizations' resources in 
imaginative new programs. We will also 
explore ways to promote regional 
trading companies, p provide assistance 
to comply with U.S. health and sanitary 
regulations, to improve transportation 
links, and in general to remove public 
and private national and regional im- 
pediments to private sector development 
with emphasis on new investment. 
AID will be coordinating this process 
in Washington, and the AID missions 
will have a parallel role in the basin 
countries. Other U.S. Government in- 
stitutions, particularly the Department 
of Commerce, and the private sector in 
the United States and in the basin will 
have important responsibilities. Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands will also 
have an important role in sharing their 
own expertise and experience. But the 
creation of an environment which en- 
courages business activity will require 
the leadership of basin governments. 
Among the factors that will be con- 
sidered are: the current condition of the 
private sector; the business climate; 
government policies affecting the private 
sector; public and private institutions 
serving the private sector; and bottle- 
necks to significant expansion of invest- 
ment, production, exports, and par- 
ticularly jobs. Some of the specific bot- 
tlenecks which will be addressed are 
financing shortfalls, market information 
and exporthnvestment know-how, defi- 
cits in trained people, and infrastructure 
problems. 
Trade Credit Insurance Program 
At the present time, U.S. banks are 
reluctant to provide short-term credits 
for certain Caribbean Basin countries. 
This reluctance stems from the banks' 
perceptions of the serious economic 
and/or political developments in these 
countries and their assessment that pro- 
viding credits in the face of these 
developments would entail extraordinary 
risks of loss which they are not prepared 
to take. Within the Caribbean Basin 
countries the demand for U.S. credits- 
which is not being fulfilled because of 
these risks-is estimated to exceed $1 
billion. To induce the reopening of short- 
term credits, there is a need for 
reasonably priced and effective in- 
surance which would protect the U.S. 
banks against these extraordinary risks. 
The Export-Import Bank has 
already been providing medium-term 
credit or credit guarantees through US.  
exporters and banks to borrowers in the 
Caribbean Basin which meet Eximbank's 
statutory standard of "reasonable 
assurance of repayment." This amounted 
to $365.5 million in FY 1981. All of Ex- 
imbank's programs are available to U.S. 
suppliers exporting to those countries, 
and Eximbank will intensify its efforts 
to increase the use of its programs by 
the private sector. 
In addition, Eximbank will expand 
its present protection by considering 
cover for short-term credits to in- 
digenous commercial banks in creditwor- 
thy markets. 
Meaaures for Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islanda 
Puerto Rico and the US. Virgin Islands 
are important components of the U.S. 
presence in the Caribbean area. The 
United States recognizes the need to in- 
sure that the economic development of 
the U.S. possessions is enhanced by U S .  
policy toward the Caribbean region and 
welcomes their contribution to imple- 
mentation of the Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative. 
The U.S. Government has been in 
close consultation with the Governments 
of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands about the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative and their role in it. Suggestions 
made by these governments have been 
taken into account in designing Carib- 
bean Basin initiative prop~sals and 
legislation. In particular, legislation 
under the Caribbean Basin initiative will 
reflect Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
interests in the following ways: 
Inclusion of rum in the proposed 
free trade area is coupled with a proviso 
that excise taxes on imported rum will 
be rebated to Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. 
The Administration will support 
additional tax and investment benefits 
for the possessions. 
Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
industries will have recourse to the same 
safeguard procedures as mainland in- 
dustries in the event they are seriously 
injured by increased imports from the 
Caribbean. 
Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
inputs will be considered as Caribbean 
inputs under the rules-of-origin re- 
quirements for duty-free treatment, so 
as to encourage the use of Puerto Rican 
and Virgin Islands products. 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands will play a major role in 
technical assistance, private sector 
development, and transportation within 
the Caribbean region. As part of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative, the Ad- 
ministration will seek congressional 
authorization for the following measures 
to foster the development of Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands: 
Establishment of a tropical 
agricultural research center in 
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico; 
Funding for an eastern Caribbean 
center for educational, cultural, 
technical, and scientific interchange at  
the College of the Virgin Islands; 
Use of Puerto Rican and Virgin 
Islands facilities, personnel, and firms in 
technical assistance programs and devel- 
opment projects; and 
Expansion of airports in the 
Virgin Islands and other measures to en- 
courage the development of Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands as a transporta- 
tion hub for the Caribbean region. 
Other measures not directly related 
to the Caribbean Basin initiative are be- 
ing discussed with Puerto Rican and 
Virgin Islands officials. 
111. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
ACTIVITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN 
BASIN 
From the beginning, the Caribbean 
Basin initiative has been a multilateral 
and not just a US.  effort. The first 
foreign heads of state to visit President 
Reagan were President Lopez Portillo of 
Mexico and Prime Minister Seaga of 
Jamaica. Out of their conversations 
came the concept of a multilateral, 
region-wide effort to counteract the 
economic decline of the countries of the 
Caribbean Basin. 
The United States then began con- 
versations with the countries in the 
region; with Canada, Venezuela, and 
Mexico; and with our European and 
Japanese allies. In July 1981 Secretary 
Haig and U.S. Trade Representative 
Brock met in Nassau with their col- 
leagues from Mexico, Canada, and 
Venezuela. This meeting agreed on a 
coordinated approach to the region's 
development, combining multilateral ef- 
forts, consultations with the countries of 
the region, and bilateral assistance. I t  
also went beyond traditional foreign aid 
approaches to include changes in trade 
and investment policy. More recently 
Colombia has also expressed an interest 
in contributing to the initiative. 
The United States and the other 
three countries of the so-called Nassau 
group have held a series of multilateral 
and bilateral meetings with the countries 
of the Caribbean Basin. In San Jose in 
September 1981, it was agreed to form 
a multilateral consultative group for the 
Central American countries, analogous 
to the Caribbean Group for Cooperation 
in Economic Development. These two 
groups will provide fora where donor 
countries can coordinate their develop- 
ment assistance effort and where coun- 
try policies can be discussed, studied, 
and coordinated. 
After an October 1981 multilateral 
meeting in Santo Domingo with the 
Caribbean island countries, the United 
States held bilateral consultations with 
almost every country in the Caribbean 
Basin region. During these meetings we 
sought their comments and suggestions, 
got a better idea of their needs and 
priorities, and informed them which 
US.  actions appeared the most feasible. 
Emphasis on the multilateral a p  
proach derives from three factors. First 
is the recognition that many other coun- 
tries and institutions have interests in 
the basin and are already active there. 
Second is the recognition that the 
isolated efforts of a single country-even 
such a relatively rich and powerful coun- 
try as the United States-are not 
enough to reverse the economic decline 
of the region. A coordinated approach 
can multiply the impact of each in- 
dividual effort. In the final analysis, of 
course, most of the responsibility for 
development of the Caribbean Basin 
rests with the countries of the region 
themselves. We will intensify our efforts 
through the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, the Inter- 
American Development Bank, and, biat- 
erally, to help these governments devise 
coherent development strategies. 
Canada 
Canadian interest and assistance to 
countries in the Caribbean Basin have 
been growing rapidly in the past year. 
Traditionally, Canadian political and 
economic ties in the area had been con- 
centrated in commonwealth countries. 
These contacts reflected both the 
English- and French-speaking heritages 
of Canadians. Canada has recently, 
however, broadened its emphasis to a 
wider group of Caribbean countries. 
Foreign Minister MacGuigan in a 
speech on Canadian policy toward Latin 
America and the Caribbean said the 
government recognized two main con- 
cepts in its development policy: the 
mutuality of interest of both North and 
South in solving global economic prob 
lems and the humanitarian need to focus 
attention and resources on the world's 
poorest peoples and countries. 
Canada sees economic progress over 
the longer term as a key factor in 
achieving regional stability. The Carib- 
bean Basin initiative area has had a 
growing role for Canada in economic 
terms. Canadian exports to the area 
have grown from slightly under C$800 
million in 1977 to an estimated C$1.8 
billion in 1981. Imports from the area in- 
to Canada have increased from roughly 
C$600 million to C$1.8 billion over the 
same period. Whiie Canadiin trade with 
the area only accounts for about 2% of 
Canada's total foreign trade, the in- 
creases are significant. Countries of the 
region have benefitted from the Cana- 
dian Generalized Preferential Tariff 
System since the early 1970s. In addi- 
tion Commonwealth countries in the 
region enjoy the benefits of Canada's 
Commonwealth Preferences. 
In its aid program, Canada has just 
announced a threefold increase in devel- 
opment assistance to Central American 
countries-C$105 million has been 
allocated for the region over the next 5 
years. This compares to about C$60 
million allocated from 1972 until now. 
Minister MacGuigan said the move 
reflected "Canada's deep concern for the 
conditions of poverty and economic 
dislocation in Central America which lie 
beneath the current instability and trau- 
matic social change there." Major recipi- 
ents of assistance will be Honduras, 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. 
Earlier, Canada announced plans to 
increase its official development 
assistance to the Commonwealth Carib- 
bean from about C$43 million in 
1981-82 to CS90 million in 1986-87. 
Mexico 
Since June 1981 when Mexican Presi- 
dent Lopez Portillo met with President 
Reagan at  Camp David, Mexico has been 
a partner in the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative. Despite differences with the 
United States on regional political 
developments, Mexico views the initia- 
tive as positive in terms of NortWSouth 
cooperation. Mexico shares the U.S. 
perception that additional cooperative 
measures should be taken to stimulate 
economic and social development in the 
region in order to eliminate the underly- 
ing causes of political instability in the 
area. At the same time it has stressed 
its interest in seeing the benefits of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative open to all 
countries of the region on a nonexclu- 
sionary, nonpolitical basis. 
Mexico's principal contribution to the 
region, worth at  least $300 million an- 
nually, is through the joint Mexican- 
Venezuelan oil facility. This program 
finances 30% of Mexico's and 
Venezuela's oil shipments to El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Barbados, 
Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. 
Mexico grants trade preferences to 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Panama, and the countries of the Carib- 
bean Common Market (CARICOM). The 
preferences, which take the form of 
50%-75% import rebates on about 25 
products from each country, are general- 
ly for the principal exports of those 
countries. 
Mexico also finances over 200 in- 
dividual technical assistance grants in 
the Caribbean and Central America. 
Venezuela 
Venezuela is one of the four sponsoring 
countries of the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative. I t  has long been a donor of aid 
to less developed nations. Venezuela has 
reported that it gave $6.5 billion in 
financial assistance abroad from 1974 to 
1980. Annual amounts equaled between 
1.2% and 2.2% of GNP. The bulk of this 
assistance was to countries of the Carib- 
bean, Central America, and the Andean 
Pact. 
Venezuela remains committed to 
continuing financial assistance in the 
Caribbean Basin region. In 1980, 
Venezuela joined Mexico in formulating 
an oil facility for the energy poor na- 
tions of the Caribbean Basin. Nine na- 
tions are currently benefiting from this 
agreement, and several more may be 
added shortly. Under the facility's 
terms, the two donors agreed to extend 
semisoft loans (5 years at  4% interest) 
to the recipients to cover 30% of their 
oil bill. If the loan proceeds are used for 
economic development projects, the 
terms change to 20 years a t  2% interest. 
The two donors also agreed to 
guarantee half of each recipient 
country's oil supply requirement, up to a 
total of 160,000 barrels per day. At cur- 
rent oil prices, the oil facility is worth 
approximately $700 million in conces- 
sional financing per year to the recipi- 
ents. During the facility's first year, 
Venezuela disbursed $289.2 million, and 
for the second year, running from 
August 1981 to July 1982, Venezuela 
has committed a total of $302 million. 
Venezuela has further assisted 
Caribbean Basin nations financially 
through the following Central Bank 
deposits: 1980-Nicaragua, $37 million, 
and the Dominican Republic, $11.1 
million; 1981-Costa Rica, $20 million, 
and Jamaica, $25 million. The Govern- 
ment of Venezuela has a l ~  announced 
that $69 million in project-related loans 
will be granted in Central America in 
1982. The beneficiaries will be El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 
Venezuela is also a generous donor to 
multilateral institutions such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and the OPEC Special Fund, 
which extend finawial help to 
Caribbean B a h  countries. 
Total Venezuelan multilateral 
disbursements in 1980 Oast year 
available) were $456 million. 
Europe and Japan 
In several consultations on the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative, European aid 
donors and the Commission of the Euro- 
pean Community (EC) have expressed 
interest in cooperating with the ini- 
tiative. Eleven Caribbean states (An- 
tigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, St. Lucia, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago) are beneficiaries 
of the EC's trade and aid program 
under the Lome I1 convention. Also the 
EC has provided aid to "nonassociated" 
countries in the region and is consider- 
ing an expanded assistance program for 
Central American states. In addition to 
the EC programs, several European 
states maintain bilateral assistance pro- 
grams for both Lome members and 
"nonassociated" states in the region. 
Lome members, including the Carib- 
bean states, receive trade benefits in the 
form of duty-free access for their ex- 
ports to the EC, subject to provisions on 
rules of origin and safeguards. A special 
arrangement on sugar provides for 
specified amounts of sugar to be im- 
ported by the EC at prices well above 
the world market price. Barbados, 
Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago benefit from this 
arrangement. A quota arrangement for 
duty-free importation of rum also 
benefits Caribbean members. 
The EC's generalized system of 
preferences is open to Lome members as 
well as non-Lome LDCs, including all 
states in the Caribbean and Central 
America. 
In recent years Japan has adopted 
an increasingly more global foreign 
policy in recognition of its respon- 
sibilities as the free world's second 
largest economic power. Japanese rela- 
tions with the Caribbean Basin have 
developed slowly, commensurate with 
Japan's relatively limited interests in the 
region. However, Japan's engagement in 
the area is expanding. 
Japanese policies in the region have 
generally complemented our own, 
although they diverge on some issues 
(e.g. Japan's active trade with Cuba). 
Japan's $10 million loan to Jamaica in 
1981 reflecta both Japan's willingness to 
contribute to the economic development 
of the region and the will to cooperate 
with the United States. 
International Financial 
Institutions 
The international financial institutions 
most active in the Caribbean Basin have 
been the World Bank, the Inter- 
American Development Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund. Over the 
past 2 years, the two banks have under- 
taken new commitments to basin coun- 
tries totaling more than $1.6 billion, 
with about $700 million com4itted by 
the World Bank and $900 million by the 
Inter-American Development Bank. The 
World Bank, through its lending and 
technical assistance activities, has pro- 
moted sound economic policies in Carib- 
bean and Central American countries. In 
addition to project loans, the World 
Bank has recently begun some structural 
adjustment lending in selected basin 
countries, conditioning drawings from 
these loans to progress on specific 
economic reforms agreed to by the bor- 
rowing governments. The Inter- 
American Development Bank has fo- 
cused its activities on agriculture, 
related rural development projects, and 
energy. It is also becoming more in- 
volved in an economic policy dialogue 
with its borrowers. 
The World Bank chairs the Carib- 
bean Group for Cooperation in Economic 
Development, which has served to coor- 
dinate aid policy by the donors and self- 
help efforts by recipient Caribbean coun- 
tries. Recently, the Inter-American 
Development Bank agreed to serve as 
the secretariat institution for a Central 
American group which will seek to coor- 
dinate donor activities and individual 
country programs for countries in that 
region. 
The International Monetary Fund 
has been active in the Caribbean and 
Central America in formulating in- 
dividual country economic stabilization 
programs, when necessary. Under these 
programs, the IMF and basin govern- 
ments have agreed on measures to cor- 
rect balance-of-payments disequilibria. 
While these measures are being im- 
plemented, the IMF allows its member 
countries to purchase foreign exchange 
to be repaid gradually once stabilization 
has been achieved. The IMF currently 
has active programs in Jamaica, 
Dominica, and El Salvador and is ex- 
pected to begin new programs soon in 
Costa Rica and Honduras. 
Consultative Groups 
Since 1978, the nations of the Caribbean 
and principal donors have coordinated 
assistance and development programs 
under the framework of the Caribbean 
Group for Cooperation in Economic 
Development, with the World Bank as 
the lead institution. Recently, the Inter- 
American Development Bank accepted a 
secretariat role for a Central American 
group, which will develop individual 
country programs and coordinate donor 
assistance for Central American coun- 
tries. 
The United States supports these 
two groups as important mechanisms to 
insure that sound development programs 
are formulated which can draw broad 
donor support. 
Caribbean Group for Cooperation 
in Economic Development. The United 
States has been a strong supporter of 
the Caribbean group and was instrumen- 
tal in its formation. Beginning in 1978, 
annual meetings have been held at  the 
IBRD each June under the Bank's 
auspices. These have been supplemented 
by ad hoc sessions throughout the year 
which prepare for the annual meetings 
and focus on particular issues, such as 
the May 1981 meeting in Antigua con- 
cerning the special problems of the 
eastern Caribbean countries. At the an- 
nual meetings, subgroups are held on in- 
dividual countries, as well as regional 
sessions touching on issues affecting all 
countries. 
The stated objective of the group as 
presently constituted is to nurture an 
ongoing process through which external 
donors increase, in  a coordinated way, 
their financial and technical assistance 
to the Caribbean area in support of ap- 
propriate short- and long-term economic 
programs undertaken by countries of the 
region. Particular attention is given to 
the need to increase regional coopera- 
tion among Caribbean countries. 
The United States has found the 
group particularly useful as a forum for 
recipient countries to focus on their self- 
help efforts and progress on compliance 
with sound development programs 
worked out in coordination with the IMF 
and major donors. It also has been effec- 
tive in providing a framework to attract 
nontraditional donor assistance. 
Our basic assumption has been that 
full development potential of the in- 
dividual policies of the Caribbean can on- 
ly be achieved through regional coopera- 
tion and economic complementarity. We 
have promoted the Caribbean group as a 
continuing consultative mechanism ta 
analyze development problems; to 
achieve common understanding of Carib- 
bean development priorities and 
assistance requirements; and to coor- 
dinate external assistance in an efficient 
manner. 
We have sought to assure that the 
group devotes its attention not only to 
short-term balance-of-payments dif- 
ficulties but to the longer term task of 
correcting the underlying structural 
problems. Within this context, we have 
encouraged recipient government poli- 
cies which are conducive to mobilizing 
domestic and external resources, which 
promote private enterprise development 
and em~lovment o~wrtunities. which 
recognize the impdhnce of r&taliza- 
tion of agriculture and the strengthening 
of government institutions, and which 
encourage common services among the 
small islands and other forms of regional 
cooperation for providing essential serv- 
ices at  affordable costs. 
Assistance flows have increased 
significantly during the operation of the 
Caribbean group-from an estimated 
total of $467.3 million in FY 1978-79 to 
$683 million in FY 1980 and to $1.064 
billion in FY 1980-81. 
Central American Group. The 
Inter-American Development Bank 
recently accepted a request from Central 
American countries to serve as the 
secretariat institution for a Central 
American group. The new group would 
formulate individual country develop- 
ment and stabilization strategies, draw- 
ing heavily on technical expertise from 
the IDB and other international institu- 
tions. The United States supports the 
formation of this new group, and an- 
ticipates that it will provide a useful 
mechanism for recipients and donors 
alike. 
As the Caribbean and Central 
American groups evolve, we believe it 
would be productive for both to address 
trade and investment matters as well as 
assistance, drawing in private sector 
participation as well. In this way, the 
key bottlenecks to increased production 
could be brought to the forefront. H 
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The principles which the Organization of 
American States embodies-democracy, 
self-determination, economic develop- 
ment, and collective security-are a t  the 
heart of U.S. foreign policy. The United 
States of America is a proud member of 
this organization. What happens any- 
where in the Americas affects us in this 
country. In that very real sense, we 
share a common destiny. We, the 
peoples of the Americas, have much 
more in common than geographical 
proximity. For over 400 years our 
peoples have shared the dangers and 
dreams of building a new world. From 
colonialism to nationhood, our common 
quest has been for freedom. 
Most of our forebears came to this 
hemisphere seeking a better life for 
themselves. They came in search of 
opportunity and, yes, in search of God. 
Virtually all descendants of the land and 
immigrants alike have had to fight for 
independence. Having gained it, they've 
had to fight to retain it. There were 
times when we even fought each other. 
Gradually, however, the nations of 
this hemisphere developed a set of com- 
mon principles and institutions that pro- 
vided the basis for mutual protection. 
Some 20 years ago, John F.  Kennedy 
caught the essence of our unique mission 
when he said it was up to the New 
World ". . . to demonstrate. . . that 
man's unsatisfied aspiration for 
economic progress and social justice can 
best be achieved by free men working 
within a framework of democratic in- 
stitutions." 
In the commitment to freedom and 
independence, the peoples of this 
hemisphere a re  one. In this profound 
sense, we are  all Americans. Our prin- 
ciples are  rooted in self-government and 
nonintervention. We believe in the rule 
of law. We know that a nation cannot be 
liberated by depriving its people of lib- 
erty. We know that a state cannot be 
free when its independence is subor- 
dinated to a foreign power. And we 
know that a government cannot be 
democratic if it refuses to take the test 
of a free election. 
We have not always lived up to 
these ideals. All of us a t  one time or 
another in our history have been 
politically weak, economically backward, 
socially unjust, or unable to solve our 
problems through peaceful means. My 
own country, too, has suffered internal 
strife including a tragic civil war. We 
have known economic misery and once 
tolerated racial and social injustice. And, 
yes, a t  times we have behaved arro- 
gantly and impatiently toward our 
neighbors. These experiences have left 
their scars, but they also help us today 
to identify with the struggle for political 
and economic development in the other 
countries of this hemisphere. 
Out of the crucible of our common 
past, the Americas have emerged as 
more equal and more understanding 
partners. Our hemisphere has an 
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unlimited potential for economic 
development and human fulfillment. We 
have a combined population of more 
than 600 million people; our continents 
and our islands boast vast reservoirs of 
food and raw materials; and the markets 
of the Americas have already produced 
the highest standard of living among the 
advanced as well as the developing coun- 
tries of the world. The example that we 
could offer to the world would not only 
discourage foes, it would project like a 
beacon of hope to all of the oppressed 
and impoverished nations of the world. 
We are the New World, a world of 
sovereign and independent states that 
today stands shoulder to  shoulder with a 
common respect for one another and a 
greater tolerance of one another's short- 
comings. 
Some 2 years ago when I announced 
as a candidate for the Presidency, I 
spoke of an ambition I had to bring 
about an accord with our two neighbors 
here on the North American Continent. 
Now, I was not suggesting a common 
market or any kind of formal arrange 
ment. "Accordn was the only word that 
seemed to fit what I had in mind. I was 
aware that the United States has long 
enjoyed friendly relations with Mexico 
and Canada, that our borders have no 
fortifications. Yet it seemed to me that 
there was a potential for a closer rela- 
tionship than had yet been achieved. 
Three great nations share the North 
American Continent with all its human 
and natural resources. Have we done all 
we can to create a relationship in which 
each country can realize its potential to 
the fullest? 
Now, I know in the past the United 
States has proposed policies that we 
declared would be mutually beneficial 
not only for North America but also for 
the nations of the Caribbean and Central 
and South America. But there was often 
a problem. No matter how good our in- 
tentions were, our very size may have 
made it seem that we were exercising a 
kind of paternalism. 
At the time I suggested a new North 
American accord, I said I wanted to 
approach our neighbors not as someone 
with yet another plan but as a friend 
seeking their ideas, their suggestions as 
to how we would become better neigh- 
bors. I met with President Lopez- 
Portillo in Mexico before my inaugura- 
tion and with Prime Minister Trudeau in 
Canada shortly after I had taken office. 
We have all met several times since-in 
the United States, in Mexico, and 
Canada. And I believe that we have 
established a relationship better than 
any our three countries have ever 
known before. 
Economic Health of the 
Caribbean Basin 
Today I would l i e  to talk about our 
other neighbors-neighbors by the 
sea-some two dozen countries of the 
Caribbean and Central America. These 
countries are  not unfamiliar names from 
some isolated comer of the world far 
from home. They're very close to home. 
The country of El  Salvador, for ex- 
ample, is nearer to Texas than Texas is 
to Massachusetts. The Caribbean region 
is a vital strategic and commercial 
artery for the United States. Nearly half 
of our trade, two-thirds of our imported 
oil, and over half of our imported 
strategic minerals pass through the 
Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico. 
Make no mistake: The well-being and 
security of our neighbors in this region 
are in our own vital interest. 
Economic health is one of the keys 
to a secure future for our Caribbean 
Basin and to the neighbors there. I'm 
happy to say that Mexico, Canada, and 
Venezuela have joined in this search for 
ways to help these countries realize their 
economic potential. Each of our four 
nations has its own unique position and 
approach. Mexico and Venezuela are 
helping to offset energy costs to Carib- 
bean Basin countries by means of an oil 
facility that is already in operation. 
Canada is doubling its already signifi- 
cant economic assistance. 
We all seek to insure that the 
peoples of this area have the right to 
preserve their own national identities, to 
improve their economic lot, and to 
develop their political institutions to suit 
their own unique social and historical 
needs. The Central American and Carib- 
bean countries differ widely in culture, 
personality, and needs. Like America 
itself, the Caribbean Basin is an extraor- 
dinary mosaic of Hispanics, Africans, 
Asians, and Europeans, as well as  native 
Americans. 
At the moment, however, these 
countries are under economic siege. In 
1977, 1 barrel of oil was worth 5 pounds 
of coffee or 155 pounds of sugar. To buy 
that same barrel of oil today, these small 
countries must provide five times as  
much coffee (nearly 26 pounds) or 
almost twice as  much sugar (283 
pounds). This economic disaster is con- 
suming our neighbors' money, reserves, 
and credit, forcing thousands of people 
to leave for other countries-for the 
United States, often illegally-and shak- 
ing even the most established democ- 
racies. And economic disaster has pro- 
vided a fresh opening to the enemies of 
freedom, national independence, and 
peaceful development. 
Proposed Economic Program 
We've taken the time to consult closely 
with other governments in the region, 
both sponsors and beneficiaries, to ask 
them what they need and what they 
think will work. And we've labored long 
to develop an economic program that in- 
tegrates trade, aid, and investment-a 
program that represents a long-term 
commitment to the countries of the 
Caribbean and Central America to make 
use of the magic of the marketplace, the 
market of the Americas, and to earn 
their own way toward self-sustaining 
growth. 
At the Cancun summit last October, 
I presented a fresh view of a develop- 
ment which stressed more than aid and 
government intervention. As I pointed 
out then, nearly all of the countries that 
have succeeded in their development 
over the past 30 years have done so on 
the strength of market-oriented policies 
and vigorous participation in the inter- 
national economy. Aid must be comple- 
mented by trade and investment. 
The program I'm proposing today 
puts these principles into practice. I t  is 
an integrated program that helps our 
neighbors help themselves, a program 
that will create conditions under which 
creativity and private entrepreneurship 
and self-help can flourish. Aid is an im- 
portant part of this program because 
many of our neighbors need it to put 
themselves in a starting position from 
which they can begin to earn their own 
way. But this aid will encourage private 
sector activities but not displace them. 
Data on Potential Beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin initiative 
TOTAL POPULATION: 39 million 









(Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Dominica, 
Grenada, Montserrat, Saint 
Christopher-Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
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Turks and Caicos Islands 
First. The centerpiece of the pro- 
gram that I am sending to the Congress 
is free trade for Caribbean Basin prod- 
ucts exported to the United States. Cur- 
rently, some 87% of Caribbean exports 
already enter U.S. markets duty free 
under the generalized system of 
preferences. These exports, however, 
cover only the limited range of existing 
products, not the wide variety of poten- 
tial products these talented and in- 
dustrious peoples are capable of pro- 
ducing under the free trade arrange- 
ment that I am proposing. Exports from 
the area will receive duty-free treatment 
for 12 years. Thus, new investors will be 
able to enter the market knowing that 
their products will receive duty-free 
treatment for a t  least the pay-off 
lifetime of their investments. Before 
granting duty-free treatment, we will 
discuss with each country its own self- 
help measures. 
The only exception to the free trade 
concept will be textile and apparel prod- 
ucts because these products are covered 
now by other international agreements. 
However, we will make sure that our 
immediate neighbors have more liberal 
quota arrangements. 
This economic proposal is as un- 
precedented a s  today's crisis in the 
Caribbean. Never before has the United 
States offered a preferential trading 
arrangement to any region. This com- 
mitment makes unmistakably clear our 
determination to help our neighbors 
grow strong. The impact of this free 
trade approach will develop slowly. The 
economies that we seek to help are  
small. Even as they grow, all the protec- 
tions now available to U.S. industry, 
agriculture, and labor against disruptive 
hwrts wiil remain. And growth in the 
Caribbean will benefit everyone with 
American exports finding new markets. 
Second. To further attract invest- 
ment, I will ask the Congress to provide 
significant tax incentives for investment 
in the Caribbean Basin. We also stand 
ready to negotiate bilateral investment 
treaties with interested basin countries. 
Third. I'm asking for a supplemental 
fiscal year 1982 appropriation of $350 
million to assist those countries which 
are  pa.ticular1 hard hit economically. 
Much of this aid will be concentrated on 
the private sector. These steps will help 
foster the spirit of enterprise necessary 
to take advantage of the trade and in- 
vestment portions of the program. 
Fourth. We will offer technical 
assistance and training to assist the 
private sector in the basin countries to 
benefit from the opportunities of this 
program. This will include investment 
promotion, export marketing, and tech- 
nology transfer efforts, as well as  pro- 
grams to facilitate adjustments to 
greater competition and production in 
agriculture and industry. I intend to 
seek the active participation of the 
business community in this joint under- 
taking. The Peace Corps already has 861 
volunteers in Caribbean Basin countries 
and will give special emphasis to 
recruiting volunteers with skills in 
developing local enterprise. 
Fifth. We will work closely with 
Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela, all of 
whom have already begun substantial 
and innovative programs of their own to 
encourage stronger international efforts 
to coordinate our own development 
measures with their vital contributions, 
and with those of other potential donors 
like Colombia. We will also encourage 
our European, Japanese, and other 
Asian allies as well as multdateral 
development institutions to increase 
their assistance in the region. 
Sixth. Given our special valued rela- 
tionship with Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, we will propose special 
measures to insure that they also will 
benefit and prosper from this program. 
With their strong traditions of democ- 
racy and free enterprise, they can play 
leading roles in t,he development of the 
area. 
This program has been carefully 
prepared. I t  represents a farsighted act 
by o m  own people a t  a time of con- 
siderable economic difficulty a t  home. I 
wouldn't propose it if I were not con- 
vinced that it is vital to the security 
interests of this nation and of this 
hemisphere. The energy, the time, and 
the treasure we dedicate to assisting the 
development of our neighbors now can 
help to prevent the much larger expen- 
ditures of treasure as well as human 
lives which would flow from their col- 
lapse. 
One early sign is positive. After a 
decade of falling income and exceptional- 
ly high unemployment, Jamaica's new 
leadership is reducing bureaucracy, 
dismantling unworkable controls, and 
attracting new investment. Continued 
outside assistance will be needed to tide 
Jamaica over until market forces gen- 
erate large increases in output and 
employment, but Jamaica is making 
freedom work. 
Threats to Security 
I've spoken up to now mainly of the 
economic and social challenges to 
development. But there are also other 
dangers. A new kind of colonialism 
stalks the world today and threatens our 
independence. I t  is brutal and totali- 
tarian. I t  is not of our hemisphere but it 
threatens our hemisphere and has estab- 
lished footholds on American soil for the 
expansion of its colonialist ambitions. 
The events of the last several years 
dramatize two different futures which 
are possible for the Caribbean area: 
either the establishment or restoration 
of moderate, constitutional governments 
with economic growth and improved liv- 
ing standards; or further expansion of 
political violence from the extreme left 
and the extreme right resulting in the 
imposition of dictatorships and in- 
evitably more economic decline and 
human suffering. 
The positive opportunity is illus- 
trated by the two-thirds of the nations in 
the area which have democratic govern- 
ments. The dark future is foreshadowed 
by the poverty and repression of 
Castro's Cuba, the tightening grip of the 
totalitarian ieft in Grenada and 
Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet- 
backed, Cuban-managed support for 
violent revolution in Central America. 
The record is clear. Nowhere in its 
whole sordid history have the promises 
of communism been redeemed. Every- 
where it has exploited and aggravated 
temporary economic suffering to seize 
power and then to institutionalize 
economic deprivation and suppress 
human rights. Right now, 6 million 
people worldwide are refugees from 
Communist systems. Already, more than 
a million Cubans alone have fled Com- 
munist tyranny. 
Our economic and social program 
cannot work if our neighbors cannot 
pursue their own economic and political 
future in peace but must divert their 
resources, instead, to fight imported ter- 
rorism and armed attack. Economic pro- 
gress cannot be made while guerrillas 
systematically burn, bomb, and destroy 
bridges, farms, and power and transpor- 
tation systems-all with the deliberate 
intention of worsening economic and 
social problems in hopes of radicalizing 
already suffering people. 
Our Caribbean neighbors' peaceful 
attempts to develop are feared by the 
foes of freedom because their success 
will make the radical message a hollow 
one. Cuba and its Soviet backers know 
this. Since 1978, Havana has trained, 
armed, and directed extremists in guer- 
rilla warfare and economic sabotage as  
part of a campaign to exploit troubles in 
Central America and the Caribbean. 
Their goal is to establish Cuban-style 
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships. Last 
year, Cuba received 66,000 tons of war 
supplies from the Soviet Union-more 
than in any year since the 1962 missile 
crisis. Last month, the arrival of addi- 
tional high-performance MiG-23lFlog- 
gers gave Cuba an arsenal of more than 
200 Soviet warplanes-far more than 
the military aircraft inventories of all 
other Caribbean Basin countries com- 
bined. 
For almost 2 years, Nicaragua has 
served as a platform for covert military 
action. Through Nicaragua, arms are 
being smuggled to guerrillas in El 
Salvador and Guatemala. The Nicar- 
aguan Government even admits the 
forced relocation of about 8,500 Miskito 
Indians. And we have clear evidence 
that since late 1981, many Indian com- 
munities have been burned to the 
ground and men, women, and children 
killed. 
The Nicaraguan junta cabled written 
assurances to the OAS in 1979 that it 
intended to respect human rights and 
hold free elections. Two years later, 
these commitments can be measured by 
the postponement of elections until 
1985; by repression against free trade 
unions, against the media and 
minorities; and-in defiance of all inter- 
national civility-by the continued ex- 
port of arms and subversion to neighbor- 
ing countries. 
Two years ago, in contrast, the 
Government of El  Salvador began an 
unprecedented land reform. I t  has 
repeatedly urged the guerrillas to 
renounce violence, to join in the 
democratic process-an election in which 
the people of El  Salvador could deter- 
mine the government they prefer. Our 
own country and other American 
nations through the OAS have urged 
such a course. The guerrillas have re- 
fused. More than that, they now 
threaten violence and death to those 
who participate in such an election. 
Can anything make more clear the 
nature of those who pretend to be sup- 
porters of so-called "wars of liberation"? 
A determined propaganda campaign has 
sought to mislead many in Europe and 
certainly many in the United States as 
to the true nature of the conflict in El  
Salvador. Very simply, guerrillas, armed 
and supported by and through Cuba, are 
attempting to impose a Marxist-Leninist 
dictatorship on the people of El 
Salvador as  part of a larger imperialistic 
plan. If we do not act promptly and 
decisively in defense of freedom, new 
Cubas will arise from the ruins of 
today's conflicts. We will face more 
totalitarian regimes tied militarily to 
the Soviet Union; more regimes export- 
ing subversion; more regimes so in- 
competent yet so totalitarian that their 
citizens' only hope becomes that of one 
day migrating to other American 
nations, as  in recent years they have 
come to the United States. 
I believe free and peaceful develop- 
ment of our hemisphere requires us to 
help governments confronted with 
aggression from outside their borders to 
defend themselves. For this reason, I 
will ask the Congress to provide in- 
creased security assistance to help 
friendly countries hold off those who 
would destroy their chances for 
economic and social progress and 
political democracy. Since 1947, the Rio 
Treaty has established reciprocal 
defense responsibilities linked to our 
common democratic ideals. Meeting 
these responsibilities is all the more im- 
portant when an outside power supports 
terrorism and insurgency to destroy any 
possibility of freedom and democracy. 
Let our friends and our adversaries 
understand that we will do whatever is 
prudent and necessary to insure the 
peace and security of the Caribbean 
area. 
In the face of outside threats, secur- 
ity for the countries of the Caribbean 
and Central American area is not an end 
in itself but a means to an end. I t  is a 
means toward building representative 
and responsive institutions, toward 
strengthening pluralism and free private 
institutions-churches, free trade 
unions, and an independent press. I t  is a 
means for nurturing the basic human 
rights that freedom's foes would stamp 
out. In the Caribbean we above all seek 
to protect those values and principles 
that shape the proud heritage of this 
hemisphere. I have already expressed 
our support for the coming election in El 
Salvador. We also strongly support the 
Central American Democratic Com- 
munity formed this January by Costa 
Rica, Honduras, and El  Salvador. The 
United States will work closely with 
other concerned democracies inside and 
outside the area to preserve and 
enhance our common democratic values. 
We will not, however, follow Cuba's 
lead in attempting to resolve human 
problems by brute force. Our economic 
assistance, including the additions that 
are part of the program I've just out- 
lined, is more than five times the 
amount of our security assistance. The 
thrust of our aid is to help our neighbors 
realize freedom, justice, and economic 
progress. 
We seek to exclude no one. Some, 
however, have turned from their 
American neighbors and their heritage. 
Let them return to the traditions and 
common values of this hemisphere, and 
we all will welcome them. The choice is 
theirs. 
The Need for Assistance 
As I have talked these problems over 
with friends and fellow citizens here in 
the United States, I'm often asked, 
'Why bother? Why should the problems 
of Central America or the Caribbean 
concern us? Why should we try to help?" 
I tell them we must help because the 
people of the Caribbean and Central 
America are in a fundamental sense 
fellow Americans. Freedom is our com- 
mon destiny. And freedom cannot sur- 
vive if our neighbors live in misery and 
oppression. In short, we must do it 
because we're doing it for each other. 
Our neighbors' call for help is ad- 
dressed to us all here in this country-to 
the Administration, to the Congress, to 
millions of Americans from Miami to 
Chicago, from New York to Los 
Angeles. This is not Washington's prob- 
lem; it is the problem of all the people of 
this great land and of all the other 
Americas-the great and sovereign 
republics of North America, the Carib- 
bean Basin, and South America. The 
Western Hemisphere does not belong to 
any one of us-we belong to the 
Western Hemisphere. We are brothers 
historically as well as  geographically. 
Now, I'm aware that the United 
States has pursued good neighbor 
policies in the past. These policies did 
some good, but they're inadequate for 
today. I believe that my country is now 
ready to go beyond being a good 
neighbor to being a true friend and 
brother in the community that belongs 
as much to others as  to us. That, not 
guns, is the ultimate key to peace and 
security for us all. 
We have to ask ourselves why has it 
taken so long for us to realize the God- 
given opportunity that is ours. These 
two great land masses north and south, 
so rich in virtually everything we 
need-together our more than 600 
million people can develop what is 
undeveloped, can eliminate want and 
poverty, can show the world that our 
many nations can live in peace, each 
with its own customs and language and 
culture but sharing a love for freedom 
and a determination to resist outside 
ideologies that would take us back to 
colonialism. 
We return to a common vision. 
Nearly a century ago a great citizen of 
the Caribbean and the Americas, Jose 
Marti, warned that "Mankind is com- 
posed of two sorts of men-those who 
love and create and those who hate and 
destroy." Today more than ever the 
compassionate, creative peoples of the 
Americas have an opportunity to stand 
together; to overcome injustice, hatred, 
and oppression; and to build a better life 
for all the Americas. 
I have always believed that this 
hemisphere was a special place with a 
special destiny. I believe we are destined 
to be the beacon of hope for all 
mankind. With God's help, we can make 
it so. We can create a peaceful, free, 
and prospering hemisphere based on our 
shared ideals and reaching from pole to 
pole of what we proudly call the New 
World.. 
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On February 24,  1982, President Reagan an- 
nounced a neu: U.S. polir to reritalize the economies 
of the Caribbean and Central American countries, 
and thereby help bring political stability to the area. 
The Caribbean Basin Initiatire, c i th its special 
trade preferences for partiripating countries, was 
uidely viewed as a sharp departure in postwar U.S.  
foreign economic 'policy. But its preczse implica- 
tions urre unclear. To explore these implications, 
FOREIGN POLICY asked seceraf authors, represent- 
ing various points of ciew and d@rent areas of 
expartise, to evaluate the presidenti new pol- 
icy. -The Editor 
MISPLACED 
EMPHASIS 
by Abraham F .  Lowenthal 
I n  the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the 
Reagan administration has recognized that the 
United States has a significant interest in 
Caribbean viability. It has understood that the 
Caribbean today is in trouble: overwhelmed 
(especially in the larger islands) by the crunch- 
ing effects of high energy costs and inter- 
national inflation as well as the other effects of 
the international economic downturn, declin- 
ing agricultural production and productivity, 
high rates of population growth and unemploy- 
ment, a steep decline in tourism, and repeated 
natural disasters. Washington knows that the 
Caribbean has entered a period of political un- 
certainty as West European colonial influenc~ 
recedes, as a generation of leaders that brought 
independence to much of the area passes from 
the scene, and as the Cold War enters the re- 
gion through the attempts of Cuba to expand 
its influence. 




In the face of all these problems, the Reagan 
administration has designed a series of positive 
measures: one-way free trade to provide market 
access for the inherently dependent Caribbean 
territories; technical assistance to help Carib- 
bean countries expand production and exports; 
and specific measures to encourage private in- 
vestment. The CBI also includes country quotas 
for the duty-free entry of sugar into the U.S. 
market at levels based on recent exports, a con- 
cept that should benefit major Caribbean sugar 
producers without encouraging excess produc- 
tion. But this benefit, unfortunately, may be 
undercut by the administration's subsequent 
imposition of protectionist quotas to satisfy 
domestic growers. 
I t  is good that Washington is finally paying 
serious attention to the Caribbean and that it is 
doing so in close consultation with Venezuela, 
Mexico, Canada, and Colombia. In a period of 
declining U.S. concern for international devel- 
opment, the administration's proposal to in- 
crease concessional aid to the Caribbean is 
encouraging. And at a time when bluster comes 
all too easily, the administration's apparent 
decision to subordinate belligerent rhetoric to 
concrete measures should be praised. 
Despite all its positive features, however, the 
CBI leaves much to be desired. An East-West 
focus distorts every aspect of the CBI. The allo- 
cations for assistance suggest that obtaining aid 
from the United States will depend more on a 
country's attitudes toward Cuba, U.S. foreign 
policies, and U.S. private investment than on 
the country's economic need or development 
prospects. The insignificant aid proposed for 
Haiti and Honduras, the two poorest countries 
in their respective regions, illustrates this 
point, as does the administration's obvious in- 
tent to exclude from the CBI not only Cuba but 
also Nicaragua and Grenada. The CBI reflects 
the administration's interest in military secu- 
rity, political loyalty, and advantages for U.S. 
firms, rather than U.S. concern for the region's 
long-term development. Because most Carib- 
bean countries are dependent on the United 
States, they will speak the language the ad- 
ministration wants to hear, but they are dis- 
enchanted by Washington's emphasis and 
rhetoric. 
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The administration, moreover, has height- 
cried the U.S. bilateral presence and visibility 
i l t  rhe Caribbean and has contributed to further 
* . -  tra-Caribbean polarization-by seeking to 
a &te Grenada, for example-rather than to 
gceater regional integration. The Reagan ad- 
ministration has mistakenly emphasized the 
p i:,are sector as the single key to development. 
I:> rcile can bc crucial, but private investors are 
-i~likciy to deal with critical infrastructure 
problems that severely hamper Caribbean 
development. 
The Reagan administration's preoccupation 
wieh the Cold \Var underlies the very concept 
of the so-called Caribbean Basin, which em- 
il!.,ices both the insular Caribbean and Central 
America. The notion of a Caribbean Basin has 
little reality or meaning outside the United 
States, where it has a long history as a strategic 
concept. 
From Washington's perspective, Central 
America and the Caribbean are sensitive 
border regions. Yet there exist important dif- 
ferences between these two regions. Despite 
divergent colonial traditions, the insular terri- 
tories of the Caribbean share social, ethnic, 
economic, and cultural patterns. They also 
share historical relationships with the United 
States and other Western powers that differ 
sharply from those in Central America. Most 
Caribbean countries are handling social and 
economic pressures within a framework of 
established, functioning political institutions, 
while Central America is wracked by civil war. 
Most are very closely tied to the United States 
through extensive economic, cultural, and 
demographic interaction. Satellites in search of 
an orbit, they require a regularized pattern of 
interaction with a metropolitan power. The  
Zemal  American countries, in contrast, are 
~nuch more autonomous, both econonlically 
and politically. Tangible U. S. interests in 
Central America are scant, and U.S. influence 
and leverage are correspondingly lower than in 
the Caribbean. 
U. S. policies toward the two regions should 
reflect those differences. The  Caribbean Basin 
Initiative-support for further economic de- 
velopment and increased integration with the 
U.S. economy -makes most sense now in the 
Lowentbal 
insular Caribbean. Lumping Central America 
and the Caribbean together carries the risk that 
aid will be channeled mainly to those countries 
where it can do the least good, precisely be- 
cause of insurgent activities. 
Unfortunately, the very nature of the U.S. 
political system may make it impossible to ob- 
tain the necessary resources for Caribbean 
development without emphasizing threats, real 
or imagined, to U.S. security. Even those 
within the administration who recognize that 
the Caribbean's problems are primarily in- 
ternal and who understand that long-term eco- 
nomic and social changes are more important 
than immediate political loyalty tend to believe 
that anticommunist rhetoric is required to har- 
ness resources. The  cost of this approach, 
however, is precisely the CBI'S misplaced em- 
phasis. If Congress and the American people 
are told that economic assistance is needed for 
the Caribbean to prevent communist inroads, 
they will not support future aid programs to 
countries that pursue independent foreign poli- 
cies and maintain friendly ties with Cuba, even 
though long-term U.S. interests might best be 
served by incorporating such states into a com- 
prehensive Caribbean plan. 
The administration should recognize and ex- 
plain to the American public that the key U.S. 
interest in the Caribbean is unrelated to mili- 
tary security or political loyalty in the narrow 
Cold War context. U.S. interest derives pri- 
marily from the steady flow of people back and 
forth between the Caribbean and the United 
States. One out of every eight persons born in 
the insular Caribbean and alive today now lives 
on the mainland of the United States. The 
equivalent of 80 per cent of the annual increase 
in the work force of several Caribbean islands 
migrates to the United States each year. The 
immigrants come from all over the Caribbean, 
not solely or even primarily from Cuba; in- 
deed, the share of Cubans immigrating is not 
higher than the Caribbean-wide percentage. 
The economic, political, social, and even cul- 
tural effects of this migration on the United 
States are profound. 
And there is an important reverse flow to the 
Caribbean, not only of returning migrants but 
of Americans as well. Thousands of elderly 
117. 
Americans retire in the Caribbean. Thousands 
of younger Americans attend medical schools 
in Grenada, Dominica, and the Dominican 
Republic. More than 1 million Americans visit 
the Caribbean each year as tourists. And 
American culture and technology, from pop 
music and college T-shirts to used cars and 
illegal arms shipments, permeate the islands at 
all levels and in all classes. 
This intense movement of people, based on 
individual human initiatives that go well 
beyond the programs of any single administra- 
tion in Washington, creates binding ties be- 
tween the United States and the Caribbean. 
The welfare of the Caribbean islands directly 
affects U.S. welfare; the Caribbean's prob- 
lems inevitably become those of the United 
States. 
Understanding this national interest in 
Caribbean viability would enable the United 
States to see beyond military bases to basic 
human needs. It would allow the United States 
to be less preoccupied with airport runways 
and more with ways of life and to design poli- 
cies grounded neither in narrow self-interest 
nor in national insecurity, but rather in gen- 
erosity and national self-confidence. 
A POSITIVE 
DEPARTURE 
by Peter Johnson 
T h e  success or failure of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative will have a far-reaching impact on the 
region's economic and political future; it will 
color U.S. relations and security in the Carib- 
bean Basin for years to co.ne. Unfortunately, 
the debate now tends to highlight side issues. 
As a result, the central thrust and importance 
of the proposal are being lost. The debate in 
Congress concentrates on how to keep the CBI 
from working so well that it results in disad- 
vantages to some American constituency. The 
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debate in the foreign policy community focuses 
on the motives behind the CB1, wondering if it 
reflects an arrogant or sinister hidden agenda in 
U.S. policy rather than something the people 
of the region really want or need. 
The questions posed by the critics are not 
unimportant- but they are also answerable. In  
parrying the protectionist opposition, CBI ad- 
vocates can point out that adverse impacts on 
the U.S. economy are unlikely. Furthermore, 
the economic collapse of the Caribbean Basin 
would have extremely adverse, long-run effects 
on U. S. immigration, export earnings, and 
security, far outweighing any short-term disad- 
vantages of the CBI. 
T o  allay ideological concerns, CBI advocates 
can point out that the leaders of the region have 
themselves identified the creation of jabs and 
income through expanded trade, investment, 
and credit as their most pressing economic 
priorities; that the CBI'S provisions have been 
designed to respond directly to those expressed 
priorities; and that Third World countries have 
long insisted that trade access is of more funda- 
mental importance than new aid programs. 
And finally, simply because regional security 
concerns are one motive for the United States 
to recognize its stake in the economic health of 
the Caribbean Basin does not make that stake 
less real or less worthwhile. 
The more important question, however, is 
one that both camps in the CBI debate manage 
to avoid: Will the cB1 actually be helpful? One 
might also ask whether the CBI will come 
quickly enough and with sufficient resources to 
meet the problems it was designed to address. 
T o  understand the purpose of the CBI and its 
chances for success, one must appreciate the 
extent to which the CBI'S private sector strategy 
represents a departure from traditional devel- 
opment aid, as well as the regional circum- 
stances that make this new approach possible 
and necessary. In the past, U.S. development 
assistance to the Third World, whether bi- 
lateral or multilateral, concentrated on govern- 
ment-to-government financial aid. Official 
U.S. policy toward foreign investment was de- 
signed more to defend the rights of C.S. in- 
vestors abroad than to influence decisions on 
overseas investment. L'nder the Generalized 
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System of Preferences, trade policy included 
the concept of preferential treatment for de- 
veloping countries but religiously avoided any 
trace of bias toward a particular region's devel- 
oprnenr. The  Agency for International Devel- 
opment's (AID) dollars bought what they paid 
for-irrigation projects, roads, rural health 
clinics, and vocational training programs. 
The!. u.ere spent, however, with little consid- 
cra:ion for their capacity to attract additional 
resources from elsewhere. 
T h e  CBI is the first concerted effort to  use 
public policies-trade and tax incentives, .\ID 
credit and projects, and bilateral investment 
treaty negotiations-as a means to mobilize a 
far more substantial array of private resources 
behind underlying U.S. objectives. For the CBI 
these objectives include expanding and diver- 
sifying production, increasing exports, and 
substantially reducing unemployment in the 
Caribbean Basin. T o  achieve these objectives, 
the resources needed -investment capital, 
marketing contacts and commitments, and 
managerial expertise and technology-must 
by their very nature come from the private sec- 
tor. ii'hatever the difficulties of reaching and 
mobilizing individual business decision 
makers, there is no other Lvay to tap into the 
mainstream of the U.S. economic system 
where the necessary resources lie. 
An  All- Out Efloort 
T h e  united States is coming forward with 
its Caribbean Basin Initiative at a crucial junc- 
ture. After a decade of widespread socialist 
experimentation, Caribbean electorates and 
development professionals alike have con- 
cluded that centralizing economic power in ex- 
pensive, slow-moving public sector bureaucra- 
cies brings only increased unemployment and 
economic stagnation. Yet the moderate, pro- 
gressive governments recently elected in many 
CBI countries on a platform of economic regen- 
eration through private enterprise and closer 
ties with the U.S.  economy have only a short 
time to demonstrate their effectiveness. T h e  
same desperation that led to  experimentation 
with socialist solutions has now led to a wide- 
spread desire to try the private enterprise ap- 
proach. If that approach also fails to  live u p  to 
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its expectations, the pendulum can be expected 
to swing back in the opposite direction with 
added force. 
T h e  cBI provides the necessary framework 
in which the countries of the Caribbean Basin 
can undertake the efforr of revitalizing their 
economies. Its trade, aid, and investment pro- 
visions are carefully crafted and balanced for 
maximum potential synergism and mobiliza- 
tion of resources. T h e  Caribbean Basin will 
benefit from this framework, however, only if 
individual entrepreneurs decide to  use it to 
create the new markets and undertake the new 
ventures necessary to  make a visible impact on 
the region's economies. Large numbers of small 
and middle-sized U.S. firms m u s r b e  stimu- 
lated to invest in the region. Major U.S.  proc- 
essing and distribution firms need t o  work out 
dependable arrangements to purchase Carib- 
bean Basin products. Yet precisely because the 
U.S.  economy is not centrally planned and 
these resources are in the hands of individuals, 
the private sector approach of the CBI contains 
a certain amount of unavoidable risk. 
For that reason a private sector. resource- 
leveraging approach requires on the part of the 
U.S. government at least as much active plan- 
ning and creative leadership-together with 
substantial public sector funding-as do the 
more traditional public sector approaches. As 
the aid component of the CB1 package recog- 
nizes, public sector investment to meet basic 
infrastructure needs is essential to attract 
private investment. Carefully targeted aid pro- 
grams can overcome specific bottlenecks- 
insufficient electric power generation, refrig- 
eration equipment for agricultural products, 
port facilities, or export trading companies- 
that hold up  valuable investments for lack of a 
few links in a complex chain. Over the past 
year AID has been increasingly exploring these 
novel approaches, which directly enhance the 
process of economic development; it should 
be further encouraged in this effort. 
T h e  administration must also accept the re- 
sponsibility for mobilizing the U.S. business 
community. It  is one thing to recognize that the 
needed resources reside in the private sector; it 
is quite another to  assume these resources will 
be automatically forthcoming. T o  reach U.S. 
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firms that are not aware of the opportunities in 
the basin, a promotional campaign is urgently 
needed. This effort can and should be mounted 
with the active involvement of private sector 
leaders and organizations in the United States 
and the Caribbean Basin. But the momentum 
and tone to create an urgent national priority 
can be set only in Washington and, ultimately, 
by President Reagan himself. 
Finally, the leadership roles of both the 
public and the private sectors in the Caribbean 
Basin must receive recognition and support. 
The recent emphasis on the private sector has 
brought new vitality to the region's business 
community and has given rise to a new breed of 
business leader, with a positive commitment to 
national interests and developmental pro- 
gress-the Caribbean Association of Industry 
and Commerce in the eastern Caribbean and 
the new Guatemala Chamber of Businessmen 
in Central America are two such examples. 
At the same time, CBI planners must recog- 
nize that in the region a broad consensus still 
exists for active involvement of the state in the 
economic development process. The chances 
for the C ~ I  to succeed in generating new busi- 
ness growth-both inside and outside the re- 
gion's economies-will depend on whether 
competent, dynamic leaders in the region's 
governments and private sector organizations 
will be able to work together to create the kind 
of climate in which new business can flourish. 
With so many potentially unruly elements to 
orchestrate and with incentives and persuasion 
as the only real tools at hand, the CBI'S private 
sector development approach might seem to be 
a high risk venture. It may be that a private 
enterprise approach to development-like 
democracy in the political arena-is the worst 
possible system except for all the others. Yet 
the need, the resources, and the potential for 
substantial responsiveness to the region's own 
priorities are all there. The U.S. government 
and business community owe it to their Carib- 
bean Basin allies and to America's own national 
interests to make an honest, all-out effort to 
make the CBI work. For the CBI to fall short of 
its objectives is possible, but for the American 
people to decide not even to try would be disas- 
trous. 
PUERTO RICO: 
PARTNER OR VICTIM? 
by Rafael Hernundez-Colin 
I n  Puerto Rico, the pro-statehood administra- 
tion and its delegate to Congress, ignoring the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative's devastating effects 
on the island's economy, have endorsed the 
plan in an effort to gain support for their state- 
hood views in Washington. Puerto kco's  legis- 
lature, controlled by the pro-commonwealth 
party over which I preside, has expressed its 
concern to the Reagan administration and to 
Congress about the negative impact the CBI 
could have on Puerto k c o  and has suggested 
measures that would allow the island to cope 
and cooperate with the initiative. 
Puerto Rico is the most populated area in the 
Caribbean. Per capita income is 50 per cent 
below that of Mississippi-the poorest state in 
the union. After three decades of meaningful 
economic growth, a period of stagnation set 
in. Presently, regression is replacing stag- 
nation. Factories are closing continuously; 
the most recent and dramatic example 
is the shutdown of the multimillion dollar 
commonwealth refining and petrochemical 
complex. The departure of old industries out- 
paces the opening of new ones, thereby creat- 
ing a net loss of jobs and a 5 per cent decline in 
real investment per year. Unemployment has 
reached 22 per cent. Puerto Rico's construction 
sector is virtually paralyzed. And because the 
government faces serious fiscal difficulties, the 
Reagan budget cuts are particularly painful. In 
light of this adversity, Puerto Rico must re- 
structure its economy; yet the CBI would make 
this task virtually impossible. 
As the csr stimulates industrial development 
in Caribbean countries, they will export manu- 
factured products to the United States, en- 
croaching on those markets that now provide 
Puerto Rico with income and employment. 
Puerto Rico's internal market will be the im- 
mediate target for the exports of Caribbean 
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agricultural products (sugar excepted), both 
because of the island's size and location and 
because Caribbean food products match Puerto 
Rican food consumption patterns. Thus,  in the 
short run, the United States is not offering its 
own market to its Caribbean neighbors but in- 
stead that of Puerto Rico. 
As sovereign states, the Caribbean Basin 
countries are free to set their own minimum 
wages and environmental regulations, elimi- 
nate duties on imported materials for manufac- 
tured goods, use the cheapest means of ocean 
transport, buy oil from Venezuela and Mexico 
at  reduced prices, lure tourists through duty- 
free shops, and protect their agriculture from 
food imports. Puerto Rico, however, must 
apply U.S. economic regulations and conse- 
quently does not enjoy any of the above free- 
doms. T h e  resulting inequities will discourage 
investment in Puerto Rico and ultimately 
plunge its economy into a regressive tailspin. 
President Reagan included several measures 
in the initiative to  insure that Puerto Rico "will 
benefit and prosper." But these measures are 
totally inadequate either to  prevent, injury to  
Puerto Rico or to compensate for the injury it 
would surely suffer. It is indeed paradoxical 
that the United States should put forward a 
plan to stabilize the Caribbean Basin that will 
actually destabilize Puerto Rico-the foremost 
example of a country committed to democratic 
values and solidarity with the United States in 
the Caribbean. 
T h e  historical relationship between Puerto 
Rico and the U.S .  mainland has been strained 
as well as challenged on numerous occasions by 
the forces of reaction and violence. In the 
1930s, 1940s, and very early 195Os, these forces 
were non-communist and less sophisticated, 
hut more widespread and fanatical than they 
are not(.. Years of laborious economic, social, 
and political development under the enlight- 
cncd democratic leadership of Luis .\iunoz 
muted these upheavals and ushered in a period 
of stability under the commonwealth structure 
established in 1952. Local programs based on a 
fiscal and common market relationship with 
the United States gradually achieved one of the 
most spectacular rates of growth in the 
Caribbean. In the 1970s. however, changes in 
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the world economy undermined this growth. 
And current misguided policies, which foster 
increased Puerto Rican dependence on the 
United States, have exacerbated the island's 
economic problems. 
Given Puerto Rico's previous economic sta- 
bility and growth, Marxist-Leninist operations 
have had only minimal success on the island. 
But if the CBI'S effects are added to current 
problems, Puerto Rico will suffer social u p  
heaval that will create opportunities for those 
who advocate violent change. 
T h e  legislature of Puerto Rico has presented 
a set of proposals to the administration and 
Congress designed to counter the adverse ef- 
fects the CBI would otherwise impose-on Puerto 
Rico. T h e  most important proposals are: 
eliminating restrictions on Puerto Rican 
maritime transportation imposed by the Jones 
Act, thereby placing Puerto &co in the same 
competitive position as other Caribbean Basin 
countries with regard to transportation costs; 
0 authorizing Puerto Rican tariffs and im- 
port controls, especially on agricultural prod- 
ucts and on materials imported from foreign 
countries for use in manufacturing; 
recognizing the commonwealth's capacity 
to enter into bilateral and multilateral commer- 
cial and educational relations with its neigh- 
bors. Puerto Rico could then seek participation 
in the petroleum purchasing facility created by 
Mexico and Venezuela that is already available 
to other Caribbean Basin countries with which 
Puerto Rico must compete; and 
restructuring the present level of federal 
transfer payments under various grants and 
categorical programs into a single economic 
development block grant for Puerto Rico and 
its municipalities. 
T h e  legislature's proposals would create the 
conditions under which Puerto Rico could live 
with and complement the economic objectives 
of the CBI. These conditions would benefit 
both Puerto Rico and its neighbors. T h e  pro- 
gress of the Caribbean states need not be built 
on Puerto Rico's decline. T h e  commonwealth 
relationship possesses sufficient constitutional 
flexibility to allow adjustments to be made, 
thereby permitting Puerto Rico to become a 
source of stability in the region. 
PUERTO RICO 
WILL BENEFIT 
T h e  Caribbean Basin Initiative represents the 
first comprehensive effort in 20 years on the 
part of the United States to stimulate economic 
development in that region. With certain modi- 
fications, the proposal merits the support of the 
American people, including the people of 
Puerto Rico. 
From the beginning, Puerto Rico has fol- 
lowed the initiative with interest and concern. 
The interest springs from an appreciation that 
Puerto Rico itself is more likely to prosper over 
the long run if it finds itself in a basin of 
hopeful prosperity rather than destabilizing 
poverty. Yet more than economic calculations 
are at work. Given the common history, heri- 
tage, and geographic location of the countries 
of the basin, Puerto Rico's attraction also 
springs from the emotions of consanguinity. 
Puerto Kco has, however, expressed some 
concerns about the policy. T o  be successful, 
the cBl must adequately protect, preserve, and 
develop further the Puerto Rican economy. In 
the letter transmitting the CBI bill to Congress, 
President Reagan reaffirmed his administra- 
tion's commitment to a number of steps de- 
signed to take into account the speciai position 
of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 
The accelerated cost recovery system and 
the investment tax credit, for example, will be 
extended to property used by companies oper- 
ating in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. Excise taxes on all imported rum will 
be transferred to Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands, and other measures may be taken by 
the president, including the withdrawal of 
duty-free treatment of rum provided by the 
initiative, if rum revenues to Puerto RICO and 
the Virgin Islands are reduced. 
T o  promote the concept of "twin plants" and 
joint resource development in the basin, inputs 
B A L T A S A R  CORRADA (D.-Puerto Rxo) has been the 
reszdpnt commirszoner to the U S  Congress fiom Puerto 
R~co nnre 1976. 
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to Caribbean Basin production from plants in 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands will be con- 
sidered domestic inputs from Caribbean Basin 
countries for purposes of the rules of origin 
when goods are exported to the United States. 
Industries in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Is- 
lands will have access to the same safeguard 
provisions as mainland industries under the 
Trade Act of 1974. Thus affected industries 
will be able to petition for relief from serious 
injury. Finally, to further the agricultural 
development of the area, a tropical agricultural 
research facility will be centered in Mayaguez, 
Puerto Rico. 
Despite these specific measures to aid Puerto 
Rico, its population remains concerned about 
certain issues such as the bulk shipment of rum 
and imported processed tuna. Puerto Rico is 
urging Congress to amend the legislation to 
further strengthen Puerto Rican safeguards for 
rum and tuna. Although Puerto Rico realizes 
that obsolete protectionist policies are not the 
solution to the structural problems of the is- 
land's economy, it is crucial to prevent the loss 
of jobs and protect these important industries, 
which may be adversely affected by the CBI. 
Initial steps in Congress were somewhat en- 
couraging. Puerto Rico hopes final congres- 
sional action will be more helpful. 
Whether the CBI can be successful will de- 
pend on the kind of partnership the govern- 
ments of the area decide to forge with private 
business. A wise partnership will enable the 
countries in the area to promote fairer business, 
trade, and labor practices. In contrast, the ini- 
tiative can only fail if governments encourage 
activities that exacerbate the unfair exploitation 
of local resources, including labor, and result in 
the rich becoming richer. The experience of 
Puerto Rjco can offer an example: Its successful 
experiments others can suitably adapt; its mis- 
takes they can carefully avoid. 
N O  doubt, political courage will be required. 
On the mainland and in Puerto Rico, for exam- 
ple, the CBl may create temporary adjustment 
problems. A difficult political choice will then 
be posed: very real short-term pain versus 
much more significant long-run gain. The 
former can be surmounted and the latter real- 
ized if the U.S. government remains fair but 
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not protectionist. For only in that way can the 
benefits of increased economic activity be 
spread more ~videly throughout the region. 
A FLAWED MODEL 
By Sidney I\.eintraub 
T h e  Caribbean Basin Initiative is the most 
recent addition to a historic list of U.S. eco- 
nomic initiatives stimulated by anticommu- 
nism. The  CBl grew out of the recognition that 
the \Vestern Hemisphere could not be "the bea- 
con of hope for all mankind," to use President 
Reagan's o.ords, unless economic hope accom- 
panied the militaristic emphasis of U.S. policy 
in the Caribbean region. Yet the initiative lacks 
the political excitement of the Marshall Plan, 
the vision of social reformation of the Alliance 
for Progress, and the resources of either. 
In developing the cB1 package, the Reagan 
administration was confronted with the reality 
that few significant economic measures were 
available. For the very short run, there is no 
substitute for increased aid, particularly for 
countries approaching or actually submerged 
in civil \var. But aid appropriations have an 
un\\-elcome budgetary impact in the United 
States at a moment of budgetary stringency. So 
do tax incentives. This reality left the center- 
piece to trade. The  administration wanted a 
dramatic centerpiece, and its planners came 
quicl;ly to special trade preferences. 
Caribbean Basin countries already enjoy 
many privilqes: Exports can enter the United 
States until 1985 under the Generalized 
S!-stem of Preferences (GSP); assembly indus- 
tries that use U.S. components can now export 
their products to the United States under 
section 80: of the U. S. tariff code and be sub- 
ject to the tariff only for the value added; and 
most Caribbean Basin countries now provide 
long tax holidays for foreign investment. 
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For the trade and tax incentives of the CBI to  
have meaning, the countries of the region must 
expand exports of goods for which tariffs now 
are imposed, or the incentives must stimulate 
new investment. Even in the absence of new 
production, $800 million of currently dutiable 
imports from the Caribbean Basin countries 
would enter duty-free under the proposed pref- 
erences, and some part of the foregone tariff 
presumably would return to  exporters. 
A substantial portion of the foregone tariff 
would go to a few sugar-producing countries. 
With the exception of the Dominican Republic 
(which alone accounts for one-third of U.S. 
sugar imports), Guatemala, and Panama, all 
sugar exporting countries of the region now 
enjoy duty-free treatment in the United States 
under the GSP because their annual exports d o  
not exceed the competitive-need limitation of 
$50.9 million. T h e  three countries currently 
excluded from the GSP would receive prefer- 
ential treatment under the c B I  u p  to  a com- 
bined ceiling of 1.15 niillion metric tons 
(780,000 tons for the Dominican Republic, 
2 10,000 for Guatemala, and 160,000 for 
Panama). They  would be exempt from paying 
the U.S. duty but would still be subject to the 
fee imposed on sugar imports designed to stabi- 
lize the U.S. sugar price, which is substantially 
higher than the world price. T h e  recent impo- 
sition of U.S. quotas has further complicated 
already complex sugar import policies. 
In addition to  sugar, the main dutiable im- 
ports that would enter the United States duty- 
free under the CBI are electrical and electronic 
equipment, baseball equipment (from Haiti), 
leather goods, rum, tobacco and cigars, phar- 
maceuticals, and some fresh fruits and vegeta- 
bles. T h e  duties on these items tend to be high 
because producers in the United States, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands have enough influ- 
ence to keep them high. It  would be naive not 
to  expect efforts to have them excluded from 
duty-free entry under the CBI. 
T h e  promise of significant trade benefits 
from special preferences must then reside in the 
new investment that will be stimulated. But the 
turmoil in Central American countries will cer- 
tainly make investors cautious. In the Carib- 
bean, the most promising types of industries 
129. 
are assembly plants, mainly for electronic 
equipment and consumer goods, and there al- 
ready exist abundant incentives for such invest- 
ment. The special preferences would add a new 
ingredient, as would U.S. tax incentives, but 
rarely a decisive one. 
Marketplace Magic 
Despite the exclusion of textiles and apparel 
from the special preferential arrangement, the 
proposal to expand imports of these products 
from Caribbean Basin countries at the expense 
of other suppliers, particularly those in Asia, 
could be significant, more so than special pref- 
erences on many other products. The promise 
of special treatment coupled with the benefits 
of section 807 could stimulate investment and 
increased production of textiles and apparel 
throughout the Caribbean Basin. 
Preferences in international trade can be ex- 
plicit, or they can be handled on a practical 
level, item by item. Products that are of prin- 
cipal interest to Caribbean Basin countries 
could be added to the U.S. GSP list, thereby 
providing a practical preference without an al- 
teration of current trade policy. In addition, 
competitive suppliers outside the Caribbean 
Basin could be graduated from the GSP for that 
product; this graduation process is already 
U.S. practice. This approach is quiet, con- 
sistent with international obligations, and 
mostly behind the scenes. 
There are positive aspects to the csr, espe- 
cially the attention devoted to economic devel- 
opment by using a11 the instruments available 
to the United States. The combination, how- 
ever, is not always harmonious. It focuses on 
trade policy, which at best takes time to have a 
substantial impact, to meet what is being ad- 
dressed as an immediate crisis. It stresses the 
magic of the marketplace for countries that 
have small markets and inadequate infrastruc- 
tures. Modest aid increases are sought with one 
hand and aid decreases in the multilateral de- 
velopment banks are promoted with the other. 
Tax incentives to influence the direction of in- 
vestment are advocated by an administration 
that has argued that tax policy should be 
neutral in this respect. X diversity of donor 
countries is sought under which each partner 
can do whatever it wishes in whatever coun- 
tries it prefers. The main concern about the 
CBI, however, like U.S. policy generally in the 
Caribbean Basin, is that it is unlikely to achieve 
its objective of contributing to the political sta- 
bilization of the region and, in turn, may com- 
promise other U.S. interests. 
The entire arrangement for special prefer- 
ences must come before the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade for a waiver from 
the most-favored-nation clause. Non-CBI sugar 
producers can be expected to complain at that 
time, as may other countries excluded from 
both the U.S. and West European preference 
systems.The basis for the most-favored-nation 
principle in trade policy is less ideological than 
practical. The goal of a preference is to favor 
the products of one or a group of countries and, 
hence, to discriminate against products of other 
countries. Discrimination arouses deep resent- 
ments, as noted in the complaints already re- 
ceived from non-preferred countries under the 
proposed sugar preferences. 
The United States may be able to justify to 
itself that something special is desirable for 
Caribbean Basin countries because they are 
near, but other countries, such as the Philip- 
pines-an ex-possession harboring major U.S. 
military installations and an ex-recipient of 
U.S. trade preferences-feel they also have 
some claim to equal treatment. And when re- 
sentment builds, the pressure is most easily 
assuaged by the expansion of preferences, not 
their containment. Similarly, preferential ar- 
rangements are easily entered into but escape is 
often impossible. Thus the tendency is for 
special preferences not to diminish over time, 
but to expand. Preferences may help to con- 
trive a division of the world in which different 
industrial countries are responsible for meeting 
the trading needs of specific groups of develop- 
ing countries. 
If the special preferences help significantly 
expand the exports of Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries, then the price may be justified. If the 
special preferences have an insignificant im- 
pact, the United States will have compromised 
commercial policy in vain. 
Puerto Rico (as well as the U.S. Virgin Is- 
lands, for which many of the following com- 
ments apply) has enjoyed tariff preferences in 
the U.S. market over the years. T h e  cBI  now 
threatens to  eliminate much of this preference 
margin with respect to  other Caribbean Basin 
countries. i\t issue, however, is something 
deeper-whether the Puerto k c a n  develop- 
ment model, which involved special tariff-free 
treatment in the U.S. market and tax incentives 
to spur capital investment, should be replicated 
throughout the Caribbean Basin. These mea- 
sures distort the relative prices of labor and 
capital.. Even during P u e n o  Rico's high growth 
of the 1950s and 1960s employment lagged, 
and the safety valve of emigration to the main- 
land was necessary. T h e  administration has 
implied that the cBI  should help stanch emi- 
gration from the region to the United States. 
Past experience provides n o  basis for such a 
contention. 
T h e  Puerto Rican model has resulted in a 
gap between gross domestic product and gross 
national product-that is, a growing propor- 
tion of production in Puerto Rico is not avail- 
able to commonwealth residents because of 
profits and interest remitted to  the mainland. 
AS a result, Puerto Rico has not become self- 
sustaining, bur rather increasingly dependent 
on the United States. This  dependence is evi- 
dent, among other things, from the large pro- 
portion of Puerto Rican families relying on 
food stamps (bet~reen one-half and two-thirds). 
T h e  Puerto Rican development model 
should not be denigrated, since it  accomplished 
much. But neither is it ideal, since it has left 
many intractable problems in its wake. I t  
merits deeper study than it has been accorded 
in the elaboration of the CBI. T h e  Puerto Rjcan 
experience lends support to those who fear that 
special trade preferences and exclusive tax in- 
centives inevitably lead to increased depen- 
dencc and ro deep political involvement of the 
country granting special preferences. 
\lrhat is missing from the CBI is some 
technique to force regular consultation and 
negotiation indefinitely into the future. This  
consultative process must deal not only with 
aid issues, but also with the interaction of all 
types of economic interchange. Periodic sched- 
uled meetings of policy officials would serve to 
bring issues to the attention of decision makers. 
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T h e  CBI has no such framework. Any future 
consultations that occur will necessarily be 
haphazard; adjustments will be implemented 
only when there is a crisis. T h e  value of the 
llarshall Plan was not just in the U.S .  aid 
tlou~s, but also in its consultative and negotiat- 
ing machinery. Mechanisms were put  in place 
under the Alliance for Progress to  force 
analysis of and stimulate dialogue on the chang- 
ing scene. T h e  cBl would benefit from a com- 
parable mechanism. 
It is not a fair criticism of the CBI that it 
comes too late. T h e  tardiness of the initiative is 
not the fault of the present administration. It is 
not a fair criticism, either. that the resources 
bring devoted to it are inadequate to'the task at  
hand. This  is a consequence of the times. T h e  
criticisms that are fair are that the presentation 
thus far has been inadequate in setting forth the 
benefits that can be expected from the inida- 
rive, h o u  they tvould be shared among the 
disparate countries of \\hat is being called the 
Caribbean Basin, how prospective benefits 
measure up  against potential costs, and 
\(.hether the underlying economic development 
model is iralid. 
A BILATERALIST 
GAMBLE 
by Richurd E. Feinberg and Richrd S. Nex:farrner 
T h e  Caribbean Basin Initiative, although it 
contains laudable provisions, marks a radical 
departure in the international economic policy 
of the United States. It  sweeps aside the 
p o s m w  tradition of globalism-the policy of 
non-discrimination that has applied the same 
rules for trade and investment to  all coun- 
tries-and substitutes preferential regionalism 
in the name of national security. In  its worst 
light, the program could be interpreted as a 
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politicization of trade and investment that 
ultimately undermines U.S. interests in an ex- 
panding, non-discriminatory trade and invest- 
ment regime. 
The  concept of a Caribbean Basin is more 
geopolitical than economic. In the Dominican 
Republic, much of the English-speaking Carib- 
bean, and Panama, relatively stable political 
structures already exist, and the chances of suc- 
cess are best. In Central America, however, 
powerful insurgencies have challenged the 
political status quo. On balance, the admin- 
istration's interest in the Caribbean Basin 
shows a greater concern for the political tur- 
moil and economic decline in Central America 
than for the economic future of the Caribbean. 
This priority is reflected in the distribution of 
the $350 million proposed emergency supple- 
mental assistance package of which $243 mil- 
lion is destined for Central America in general 
and $128 million for El Salvador specifically. 
Yet in Central America the administration's 
economic and political strategies are working at 
cross-purposes. Washington's economic plan 
aims to stimulate business, but a confronta- 
tionist diplomacy threatens to delay the resto- 
ration of investor confidence. Rather than 
seriously pursuing negotiations among all the 
major parties to the conflict in El Salvador, the 
administration has hoped to exclude the guer- 
rillas from the political process and to defeat 
them militarily. Rather than working to iron 
out major disagreements with Nicaragua, 
Washington has resorted to a policy of verbal 
threats and perhaps even covert paramilitary 
action. Rather than seeking to isolate Hondp-as 
from conflict, the L'nited States proposes to 
increase military aid, lengthen airstrips to 
handle large military cargo planes, and take 
actions that may plunge this fragile, imperfect 
democracy into war. By heightening political 
conflict, the United States threatens to in- 
flict deeper tvounds on already badly mangled 
economies. 
In response to the recent peace initiative of 
Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo, the ad- 
ministration has shoum some interest in nego- 
tiations. The  path of negotiated settlement 
offers the best hope of reinstating a political 
climate in which economic gro\vth can occur. 
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Unless the administration fully commits itself 
to this new path with a willingness to corn- 
promise, however, negotiations are unlikely 
to bear fruit and the economics of Central 
America will continue to decline. 
In the absence of peaceful resolutions to 
political conflicts within and among the coun- 
tries of the region, private capital will continue 
to flee Central America. Fearing that political 
strife will continue and even worsen, fright- 
ened Central American businessmen are 
stashing their savings in Florida's banks and 
condominium market. Even U. S. government 
agencies have hesitated to commit their own 
resources to Central America's private sector. 
The  Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) is virtually closed for business in El Sal- 
vador and Nicaragua and has been approaching 
Guatemala and Costa Rica with caution. T h e  
proposed changes contained in the CBI will al- 
low for a greater involvement of OPIC in the 
region, but its activities will still be constrained 
by its own risk criteria. T h e  Export-Impon 
Bank has also been unwilling to undertake 
major new ventures in Central America. 
Without investor confidence, two of the 
three prongs of the CBI-investment incentives 
and trade opportunities-will be largely irrel- 
evant to Central America. T h e  remaining 
prong--official aid-will in considerable mea- 
sure be devoted to maintain consumption levels 
and indirectly to purchase weapons. Invest- 
ment planning and implementation, public or 
private, cannot proceed efficiently in an envi- 
ronment of political turmoil. 
T h e  administration's diplomacy of confron- 
tation has also prevented the realization of a 
truly multilateral Caribbean Basin Initiative. 
The  administration has consulted Canada, 
Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. It has not, 
however, made the political compromises 
necessary to permit the elaboration of a coop- 
erative and integrated approach to the region's 
economic problems. Each donor country is 
pursuing its own development programs, 
which often conflict with the administration's 
intentions. iMexico, for example, has concen- 
trated substantial resources in Nicaragua while 
the United States has suspended some bilateral 
assistance programs and sought to reduce 
% 1' .~car:-ua's access to the multilateral develop- 
ment banks. 
.4 genuinely multinational framework would 
a h \  for a more efficient coordination of scarce 
resources as well as encourage donor countries 
to share the aid burden more widely. More- 
over, multilateralism provides mechanisms for 
rhe transfer of aid resources without the polit- 
ical tensions and resentments that accompany 
bilateral programs. T h e  Caribbean Group for 
Economic Cooperation in Dei7elopment has, 
since 197'. provided such a multilateral vehicle 
for aid to the insular Caribbean. Washington's 
uncompromising~bilateral and hard-line diplo- 
macy has impeded the formation of a similar 
group for Central '4merica. 
-7'homas Reed 
Administration officials have indicated that 
Cuba. Nicaragua. and Grenada may be ex- 
cluded. not only from bilateral aid, but also 
from trade and investment incentives. Such an' 
exclusionary policy would be counterproduc- 
tive for three reasons. First, rather than adopt- 
ing more moderate policies, the excluded gor- 
ernments are very likely to react with a defiant 
nationalism; conversely, countries that par- 
ticipate actively in the L.S. economy are less 
likely to seek or maintain relations with coun- 
tries hostile to the United States. 
Second, the heightened tensions between the 
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United States and the excluded states will have 
negative repercussions on economies in other 
countries. Conflict between the United States 
and Nicaragua, for example, will adversely af- 
fect Costa Rica and Honduras, whose econo- 
mies are partially interdependent with Nicara- 
gua's. Third,  by excluding Nicaragua and 
Grenada, the United States seems to attack 
existing regional institutions. Yet the reverse 
policy-seeking to strengthen ties between 
Nicaragua and the Central American Common 
Market and between Grenada and the Carib- 
bean Common Market-would be more likely 
to moderate these two governments. 
T h e  economic gains to the region,will have to  
be sufficient to  offset the political costs of 
potential damage to multilateralism. O f  a legis- 
lative package that includes aid, investment, 
and trade measures, the president has heralded 
the Free Trade Area as the CBI'S centerpiece. 
As the president noted, however, 87 per cent 
of the region's exports already enter the United 
States duty-free, either through the General- 
ized System of Preferences or because the ex- 
ports do not compete with L.S. products. Of 
the remaining 13 per cent, nearly one-half are 
textiles and sugar, products excluded from the 
Free Trade Area, leaving only about 7 per cent 
of the region's current trade affected by the 
removal of the tariffs. 
A systematic estimation of the effects of 
lowering U.S. tariffs on leading products 
shows that under the most favorable conditions 
the amount of new exports created by the Free 
Trade Area, in the first year, is unlikely to  
exceed $40 million (in 1980 dollars). T h e  Free 
Trade Area, together with the changes in 
sugar, textiles, and value-added requirements, 
will probably not increase regional exports by 
more than 1 per cent or $108 million in the first 
year, expanding to only 2 . 5  per cent or $250 
million in the next few years. 
T h e  effects of the investment tax credit are 
uncertain. First, there is no guarantee that the 
estimated annual $10 million cost to the treas- 
ury in lost tax collections tvill produce any new 
investment over and above that which would 
have occurred anyway. In the foreseeable 
future, U.S. investors in many countries will 
probably invest only the amount absolutely 
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necessary to maintain their ongoing plant and 
equipment. Thus they will receive a windfall 
gain at the taxpayers' expense. Second, there is 
no guarantee that the new investment will pro- 
duce a satisfactory impact, measured by new 
jobs or development relevant to the poor. T o  
avoid these uncertainties and still achieve the 
administration's goals of enhancing private sec- 
tor growth, stimulating new private investment 
by the inducement of public capital, and 
insuring maximum development impact, 
Lf'ashington should channel the $40 million 
directly into the economies, through the Inter- 
national Finance Corporation of the World 
Bank or through the Agency for International 
Development. 
The value of the trade and investment incen- 
tive together will probably have much less 
effect than would renewed U.S. domestic 
growth. A soundly managed U.S. economy- 
in which growth increased by 3 per cent and 
interest rates fell by five points-would pro- 
duce $550 million in foreign exchange for the 
CBI countries. Nevertheless, even if the whole 
CBI package, including the concessional aid, 
were to amount to as much as $500 million in 
the first year, it would still be far less than the 
$4 billion in foreign exchange the region ur- 
gently needs. Thus the international financial 
institutions, whose allocation the administra- 
tion has threatened to cut back in future 
budgets, will have to bear the burden of bridg- 
ing the resource gap. 
The ultimate impact of the CBI will depend 
upon the spirit with which it is implemented. If 
tied to a diplomacy of compromise and inclu- 
siveness, the CBI could be an initial step toward 
helping the region attain political stability and 
economic development. Nevertheless, the pro- 
gram should not be oversold. Alone this pack- 
age of bilateral initiatives offered by the Reagan 
administration cannot hope to cure the region's 
economic ills. Only in conjunction with a re- 
juvenated U.S. economy and substantial in- 
creases in multilateral external financing can 
the offer promise real improvement in the 
Caribbean Basin. 
